'  J??-.r.-."'- 


■:^saEgr 


THE    PSYCHOLOGY 
OF   REASONING 


BY 

W.  B.  PILLSBURY,  Ph.  D. 

JUNIOR  PROFESSOR  OF  PHILOSOPHY,  DIRECTOR  OF  THE  PSY- 
CHOLOGICAL   LABORATORY,    UNIVERSITY    OP    MICHIGAN 


D.   APPLETON   AND   COMPANY 
NEW  YORK  AND  LONDON:  1910 


IdF"^^ 


eftc. 

-IBRARY 


Ck)PYBIGHT.  1910,  BY 

D.  APPLETON  AND  COMPANY 


Published  May,  1910 


**A11  men  are  mortal, 


Socrates  is  a  man. 
Therefore,  Socrates  is  mortal." 


PREFACE 

This  little  volume  is  based  upon  eight  lectures  given 
during  my  tenure  of  the  Non-resident  Lectureship  in 
Psychology  at  Columbia  University  in  January  and 
February,  1909.  The  material  has  been  somewhat  re- 
arranged and  divided  into  chapters  along  more  nat- 
ural lines  than  was  possible  in  the  lectures. 

My  purpose  is  to  give  a  brief  statement  of  the  place 
of  the  logical  processes,  particularly  judgment  and 
inference,  in  the  concrete  individual  consciousness. 
Confining  my  discussion  to  the  facts  of  the  individual 
consciousness  has  compelled  me  to  omit  in  large 
measure  a  consideration  of  the  social  aspects  of  reason- 
ing and  of  the  results  of  the  outcome  of  reasoning  in 
action.  This  omission  has  not  been  due  to  any  fail- 
ure to  appreciate  the  importance  of  these  two  sides  of 
the  reasoning  process.  Kather,  Professor  Baldwin 
and  Professor  Dewey  have  left  little  to  be  said  on 
these  topics.  For  my  own  immediate  purpose,  also, 
society  and  action  are  but  two  of  the  sources  from 
which  are  drawn  the  materials  of  reasoning,  and  are 
but  two  of  the  influences  that  serve  to  affect  the  course 
of  reasoning.  My  problem  has  been  to  determine  the 
ways  in  which  reasoning  has  grown  out  of  the  simpler 
mental  operations,  and  to  discuss  the  uses  that  have 
been  made  of  the  materials  in  reasoning,  without  ref- 
erence to  the  sources  from  which  the  materials  have 
been  drawn. 

vii 


PEEFACE 

Needless  to  say,  I  have  neglected  to  discuss  or  even 
to  mention  many  phases  of  the  reasoning  process  that 
are  important.  I  should  have  been  very  glad  to  find 
space  for  a  psychological  interpretation  of  fallacies 
and  even  for  the  more  important  forms  of  the  syl- 
logism, but  space  and  the  limitations  imposed  by  a 
semi-popular  audience  made  that  impossible.  I  have 
also  made  no  attempt  to  review  the  literature  of  either 
logic  or  psychology  exhaustively  even  on  the  topics  dis- 
cussed. Even  where  my  conclusions  have  grown  out 
of  the  discussions  of  others,  I  have  not  always  indi- 
cated the  fact.  I  had  space  to  do  no  more  than  sum- 
marize my  own  results  and  could  cite  the  related  work 
of  others  in  but  few  instances. 

I  desire,  however,  to  express  my  gratitude  in  gen- 
eral to  the  many  writers  from  whom  I  have  drawn  in- 
spiration. Perhaps  I  owe  most  to  Bradley  and  Bosan- 
quet,  although  I  very  much  doubt  if  either  would  be 
willing  to  recognize  me  as  a  disciple.  Of  the  more 
recent  writers.  Professors  Dewey  and  Baldwin  have 
been  most  helpful.  I  have  received  many  suggestions 
and  even  more  stimulus  from  my  colleagues  at  the 
University  of  Michigan,  and  from  my  temporary  col- 
leagues at  Columbia  during  the  preparation  of  the 
manuscript,  for  which  I  am  glad  to  acknowledge  my 
indebtedness.  Particularly  I  desire  to  thank  Pro- 
fessor Cattell,  whose  invitation  to  give  these  lectures 
and  to  spend  a  half-year  at  Columbia  at  once  gave  the 
incentive  and  the  leisure  for  the  preparation  of  the 
lectures. 

W.   B.   PiLLSBURY. 


vni 


CONTENTS 

CHAPTER  PAGE 

I.  The  Place  of  Reasoning  in  Psychology  1 

II.  Belief 23 

III.  Meaning  and  the  Concept    ....  60 

IV.  Judgment 99 

V.  Judgment  and  Language 137 

VI.    Inference 172 

VII.    Proof— The  Syllogism 200 

VIII.    The  Nature  of  Inductive  Proof     .     .  236 

IX.    Degrees     of     Truth.    Modality     and 

Probability 255 

X.    Conclusion 276 


THE  PSYCHOLOGY 
OF  REASONING 

CHAPTEE  I 

THE  PLACE   OF   KEASONING   IN   PSYCHOLOGY 

As  is  usual  with  terms  that  are  used  both 
popularly  and  scientifically,  reasoning  has  a 
multitude  of  meanings  and  a  very  large  num- 
ber of  implications  and  relationships.  In  popu- 
lar use  reasoning  is  often  made  to  include  all 
actions  that  are  not  the  outcome  of  habit  and 
instinct;  sometimes  it  is  restricted  in  its 
use  to  the  highest  mental  accomplishments.  In 
the  former  use,  the  animal  reasons  when  it  ap- 
plies some  earlier  acquired  response  in  a  new 
way;  in  the  latter,  man  is  said  to  reason  when 
he  is  solving  some  abstruse  problem  in  math- 
ematics or  in  the  sciences,  while  he  would  be 
but  remembering  or  using  some  lower  capacity 
when  he  finds  the  solution  for  a  puzzle.  Where 
usage  is  so  divergent,  one  might  accept  any 

1 


THE  PSYCHOLOGY  OF  EEASONING 

meaning  that  is  desired.  The  wider  of  the  two 
in  question  seems  the  more  satisfactory,  and 
corresponds  more  closely  with  psychological 
usage.  For  our  purposes  reasoning  shall  be 
considered  the  application  of  any  knowledge  in 
a  new  way.  Reasoning  may  be  particular,  as 
when  one  avoids  a  difficulty  in  accomplishing 
some  task,  or  it  may  be  abstract  in  reaching 
some  conclusion  about  the  ultimate  nature  of 
the  universe.  Each  must  be  included  in  any 
theory  that  pretends  to  discuss  reasoning. 

If  one  turns  from  the  more  general  relations 
to  the  place  of  reasoning  in  a  technical  psycho- 
logical discussion,  one  finds  that  it  has,  on  the 
one  hand,  close  relations  to  the  memo^  and 
imagination  processes  and,  on  the  other,  to  the 
active  processes  of  habit  and  instinct.  In  rela- 
tion to  action,  reasoning  is  a  muscular  product 
and  the  ends  are  at  once  realized.  In  the  form 
of  reasoning  that  is  closely  related  to  memory 
and  imagination,  on  the  other  hand,  the  results 
of  reasoning  are  purely  subjective.  They  may 
be  tested  later  in  action  but,  as  they  stand, 
they  are  purely  mental  processes,  not  actions. 
Each  needs  separate  discussion,  each  is  con- 
trolled by  different  laws,  although  what  dis- 
tinguishes reasoning  from  the  related  processes 

2 


THE  PLACE  OF  EEASOXING 

is  about  the  same  in  each  field.  While  the  two 
uses  of  the  word  are  different,  they  are  applica- 
ble to  the  same  general  operation  expressed  in 
different  ways. 

Keasoning,  as  a  purely  mental  operation,  is, 
like  all  of  the  cognitive  processes,  to  be  ex- 
plained by  association.  It  is  primarily  a  pro- 
cess of  making  use  of  the  acquired  experiences, 
and  these  are  to  be  explained,  so  far  as  their 
connections  and  the  order  of  their  recall  are 
concerned,  in  terms  of  association.  Ordinarily, 
the  same  materials  are  used  when  one  thinks 
abstractly  and  in  connection  with  a  new  prob- 
lem, as  when  one  recalls  a  familiar  experience. 
Each  is  represented  by  a  concrete  picture,  al- 
though each  may  be  in  terms  of  words  or  of 
some  more  general  ideas.  One  may  remember 
the  face  of  a  frier  ^>in  clear  images,  as  one  may 
plan  an  instrument  in  simple  pictures  of  the 
instrument,  but  one  may  remember  in  purely 
verbal  terms  merely  that  the  friend  was 
present  on  a  certain  occasion  and  also  may 
plan  the  instrument  in  words,  or  in  the 
most  vague  way  may  think  that  the  device 
in  question  will  work.  Similarly,  if  one  will 
but  follow  through  a  chain  of  reasoning,  it 
will  be  observed  that  the  elements  are  eon- 

3 


THE  PSYCHOLOGY  OF  SEASONING 

nected  by  the  same  laws  of  association  that 
are  operative  in  the  simplest  recall.  Neither 
the  materials  nor  medium  of  reasoning,  or 
the  laws  of  connection,  then,  are  distinctive  of 
reasoning  as  opposed  to  recall  or  imagination. 
"What  does  seem  to  be  characteristic  is  the 
way  the  material  is  applied  and  the  resulting 
attitude  toward  the  construction,  the  attitude  of 
belief  or  of  doubt.  If  the  materials  are  com- 
bined in  the  old  familiar  way,  they  are  felt  to 
be  familiar,  are  recognized.  They  are  also 
ordinarily  believed  to  have  real  existence.  If 
new  combinations  of  the  old  material  are  made, 
the  result  is  unfamiliar.  The  result  may  be  re-  ^ 
garded  as  untrue  to  reality,  in  which  case,  one 
employs  imagination;  or  if  it  be  regarded  as  a 
true  combination  even  when  new,  one  calls  the 
result  reasoning.  These  serve  as  the  distin- 
guishing marks  of  the  processes  that  come 
through  association.  What  is  recognized  is 
said  to  be  remembered ;  what  is  not  recognized 
is  said  to  be  the  result  of  reasoning  or  imagina- 
tion. While  reason  is  like  imagination  in  that 
both  are  new  combinations  or  applications  of  old 
material,  it  is  like  memory  in  that  the  results 
are  believed  to  hold  of  reality.  Reasoning 
gives  a  product  that  is  believed  but  not  recog- 

4 


THE  PLACE  OF  EEASONING 

nized;  memory  a  product  that  is  at  once  be- 
lieved and  recognized;  while  imagination's 
product  is  neither  believed  nor  recognized. 

One  other  fact  of  reasoning  often  emphasized, 
is  that  reasoning  deals  with  general  statements 
and  often  with  abstract  qualities,  not  merely 
with  the  particular  and  the  concrete.  This  is 
undoubtedly  one  of  the  most  striking  capacities 
of  the  human,  if  not  of  all  mind,  but  it  is  not 
a  quality  that  is  altogether  peculiar  to  reason- 
ing. One  very  frequently  remembers  in  ab- 
stract terms ;  one  remembers  general  events  as 
well  as  particulars.  This,  then,  as  was  noticed 
above,  is  not  peculiar  to  reasoning,  although 
without  it  reasoning  and  thinking  of  all  kinds 
would  be  far  less  effective  than  they  are.  On 
the  purely  mental  side,  truth  and  newness  are 
the  only  distinguishing  characteristics  of  rea- 
soning, and  these  only  from  the  fact  that  it  is  in 
reasoning  alone  that  they  occur  together. 

As  a  form  of  action,  reasoning  is  to  be  distin- 
guished from  habit  and  instinct.  As  opposed 
to  both,  it  is  characterized  by  the  newness  of  the 
act  or  the  newness  of  the  application  of  the  act. 
Habit  and  instinct  are  found  in  the  lowest  forms 
of  animals  and  from  the  earliest  stage  in  the 
development  of  the  child.    Eeasoning  makes  its 


THE  PSYCHOLOGY  OF  REASONING 

appearance  only  in  the  higher  animals  and  rela- 
tively late  in  the  development  of  the  human 
being.  Habit  is  dependent  merely  upon 
changes  in  the  organism  that  are  induced  by 
any  action  which  make  that  action  repeat  itself 
whenever  similar  occasions  arise.  It  is  to  be 
related  to  changes  in  the  connection  of  the  ele- 
ments that  unite  nerve  cells,  originally  not 
united.  Instinct  is  an  expression  of  changes  in 
the  organism  as  a  result  of  selection;  habit  of 
changes  in  the  individual  as  a  result  of  some 
movement  hit  upon  by  chance  and  found  to  give 
desirable  results.  In  reasoning  the  old  act  is 
used  when  some  new  occasion  arises  for  which 
no  habit  has  been  developed.  The  movement  is, 
in  this  case,  identical  in  character  with  the  move- 
ment that  is  applied  in  the  habitual  way.  The 
only  distinguishing  characteristics  are  that  the 
connections  of  the  act  are  new,  and  that  it  is 
directed  immediately  to  the  end  that  it  is  to 
serve.  It  does  not  come  as  the  result  of  chance 
trial,  and  it  must  be  adequate  to  the  end.  Habit 
is  seen  in  the  act  of  a  soldier  who  fires  at  the 
word  of  command,  reason  in  the  act  of  a  general 
who  sees  in  a  given  engagement  a  similarity  to 
an  historical  battle  and  makes  use  of  a  disposi- 
tion similar  to  the  one  that  won  a  famous  vic- 

6 


THE  PLACE  OF  REASONING 

tory.  Eeasoning  would  be  exhibited,  too,  when 
a  soldier  made  use  of  bis  firearm  to  provide  a 
splint  for  a  wounded  companion  in  a  way  that 
he  had  not  been  previously  drilled  to  use  it. 
Here  a  familiar  stimulus  or  object  elicits  a  new 
response. 

These  two  applications  of  reasoning  are  at 
first  sight  rather  widely  divergent.  If  closely 
analyzed,  however,  they  are  seen  to  be  very 
much  alike.  Each  is  marked  by  the  new  appli- 
cation of  an  old  experience ;  each,  too,  results  in 
an  adequate  solution  of  the  problem  presented, 
or  in  a  solution  believed  to  be  adequate  should 
occasion  arise  for  its  practical  application. 
Each,  too,  is  distinguished  from  other  ideas  or 
other  actions  only  by  these  two  features,  or  by 
a  combination  of  these  two  features.  Eandom 
ideas,  like  random  actions,  are  new  but  since 
not  true  or  not  adequate  at  the  moment  are  not 
said  to  be  rational.  On  the  other  hand,  recalled 
ideas  and  habits  are  usually  adequate,  but  are 
not  new,  and  hence  are  not  classed  as  reason- 
ing. The  only  fundamental  distinction  between 
the  two  forms  is  that  one  is  an  idea,  the  other 
a  movement  or  series  of  movements.  Even  this 
distinction  ceases  to  be  of  importance  when  one 
considers  that  the  ideas  that  are  designated 
a  7 


THE  PSYCHOLOGY  OF  REASONING 

reasoning  are  usually  developed  with  reference 
to  their  ultimate  expression  in  action  of  some 
sort.  The  act  is  merely  delayed.  And  in 
action  one  usually  may  detect  in  himself  ideas 
that  precede  the  act.  Eeasoning  in  idea  is  but 
action  postponed,  reasoning  in  action  is  but  an 
idea  expressed. 

If  reasoning  is  applied  to  approximately  the 
same  operations  in  thinking  and  action,  it  should 
be  possible  to  describe  the  character  of  the 
rational  process  more  in  detail  and  more  con- 
cretely. Eeasoning,  like  all  mental  operations, 
can  be  understood  only  in  its  setting.  While, 
for  simplicity  of  explanation,  it  is  necessary  to 
assume  that  consciousness  may  be  thought  of 
as  made  iip  of  elements,  it  does  not  follow  at 
all  that  the  elements  exist  in  the  same  way  out- 
side of  their  connections,  as  in  them.  Because 
an  animal  can  be  understood  only  when  consid- 
ered as  made  up  of  separate  elements,  it  does 
not  follow  that  the  elements  have  the  same  func- 
tion apart  from  the  whole  that  they  have  in  it. 
Mental  elements  are  even  more  closely  de- 
pendent upon  the  whole  of  which  they  are  the 
part  for  their  real  and  true  existence.  When 
torn  from  their  setting,  they  no  longer  bear 
sufficient  resemblance  to  their  character  in  the 

8 


THE  PLACE  OF  REASONING 

setting  to  be  recognized  as  the  same  structure. 
Reasoning  in  particular  must  be  studied  in  its 
place  in  tbe  whole  of  mind.  As  will  be  seen  in 
the  course  of  the  discussion,  many  of  the  de- 
fects in  the  earlier  treatments  and  in  many  of 
the  current  treatments  of  the  reasoning  opera- 
tions come  from  the  attempt  to  understand 
them  apart  from  the  natural  context. 

To  understand  any  concrete  bit  of  reasoning, 
one  must  consider  four  phases  or  parts  of  the 
process :  (1)  Every  act  of  reasoning  is  closely 
related  to  the  felt  need  or  purpose  of  the  indi- - 
vidual  at  the  moment.  This  is  purely  sub- 
jective in  its  origin  and  an  expression  of  much 
in  the  earlier  history  of  that  individual  and  in 
his  immediately  preceding  life.  It  is  connected 
with  the  desires,  and  these  go  back  to  early 
training ;  with  life  purpose,  however  originated ; 
and  finally  with  instinct.  The  purpose  cannot, 
in  its  turn,  be  understood  apart  from  the  larger 
whole  of  the  life  of  the  individual,  although  the 
momentary  purpose  is  sufficient  to  enable  one 
to  understand  the  course  of  reasoning.  (2) 
The  outcome  of  reasoning  is  dependent  very 
largely  upon  the  tools  that  present  themselves 
and  upon  the  other  External  circumstances  of 
the  moment,  more  particularly  upon  the  way  the 

9 


THE  PSYCHOLOGY  OF  EEASONING 

circumstances  of  the  moment  are  appreciated 
and  interpreted.  The  interpretation  or  appre- 
ciation of  the  situation  is  very  closely  connected 
with  the  purpose.  When  one  is  interested  in 
a  problem,  one  sees  it  in  a  certain  situation. 
When  the  purpose  changes,  the  interpretation 
differs.  The  purpose,  then,  is  dependent  for 
its  accomplishment  upon  the  material  setting, 
but  the  setting  is  dependent  for  its  interpreta- 
tion upon  the  purpose.  (3)  When  a  purpose 
and  situation  are  given,  some  solution  of  the 
problem  usually  suggests  itself.  The  solution 
will  depend  upon  the  connections  that  have  been 
earlier  developed.  If  the  solution  is  in  idea 
alone,  the  situation  will  recall  old  ideas  that 
have  been  used  in  more  or  less  similar  situa- 
tions to  solve  similar  problems.  If  the  solution 
is  a  movement,  the  situation  will  call  out  accus- 
tomed movements  that  have  been  learned  in 
other  connections  and  will  apply  them  to  the 
new  problem.  In  either  case  the  outcome  will 
be  controlled  in  some  degree  by  the  purpose 
that  is  dominant.  (4)  Finally,  each  solution 
must  be  tested.  The  test  will  be  the  actual  suc- 
cess of  the  movement  if  the  solution  is  an  act; 
it  will  be  the  belief,  disbelief,  or  doubt  of 
the  suggested  solution  if  the  answer  is  in  idea 

10 


THE  PLACE  OF  REASONING 


alone,  j  These  four  stages  or  phases  may  be  dis- 
tinguished in  every  bit  of  reasoning.  Often  the 
line  of  demarkation  between  two  succeeding 
elements  is  difficult  to  determine.  Sometimes 
one  of  the  elements  may  lie  in  the  background 
and  not  be  at  all  obvious,  but  a  little  observa- 
tion will  serve  to  bring  it  out.  Thus  the  test 
and  the  solution  may  be  part  of  the  same  proc- 
ess. One  may  be  not  at  all  impressed  by  the 
fact  that  the  movement  is  adequate,  one  may 
not  consciously  raise  the  question  of  belief,  but 
the  adequateness  and  the  belief  are  taken  for 
granted.  In  many  cases  proper  appreciation  of 
the  situation  gives  the  solution  so  immediately 
that  belief  in  its  adequacy  need  not  be  expressed 
in  words.  This  is  the  usual  result  where  the 
situation  and  solution  have  been  frequently  con- 
nected. The  controlling  purpose  often  seems  to 
be  no  part  of  the  reasoning  process,  and  one  is 
in  fact  seldom  aware  of  it.  But  failure  to  take 
the  influence  of  the  dominant  purpose  of  the 
moment  into  consideration  is  responsible  for 
many  misconceptions  of  the  process.  Each  of 
the  four  stages  must  be  considered  or  the  knowl- 
edge of  the  whole  is  certain  to  be  defective. 

These  four  factors  of  reasoning  have  many 
psychological  and  many  logical  relations.    In 

11 


THE  PSYCHOLOGY  OF  EEASONING 

fact,  tliey  are  practically  identical  with  psycho- 
logical processes,  very  familiar  under  other 
names.  What  we  have  called  the  gurpose  is 
recognized  by  practically  every  writer  and  made 
to  play  a  prominent  part  in  the  explanation  of 
all  of  the  spontaneous  mental  operations.  It  is 
represented  in  the  systems  of  Herbart,  Stout, 
and  Wundt,  by  apperception.  It  appears  in  the 
writings  of  many  as  attention  or  as  the  con- 
trolling factor  in  attention,  and  receives  the 
name  of  ** attitude''  or  ^'cortical  set'*  in  the 
writings  of  several  very  recent  workers. 
Whatever  it  may  be  called,  it  is  the  determining 
factor  in  practically  all  of  the  concrete  mental 
operations.  It  gives  form  to  the  different  per- 
cepts, gives  direction  to  association,  decides  be- 
tween the  different  memories  that  are  competing 
for  recall  and  it  rules  action.  Eeasoning  then 
is  not  alone  in  its  subordination  to  the  wider 
purpose  of  the  moment.  The  character  of  each 
of  these  familiar  operations  changes  as  the  pur- 
pose varies.  In  them  too  the  purpose  does  not 
stand  alone  but  is  an  outgrowth  of  very  many 
elements  in  the  experience  and  inheritance  of 
the  individual. 

The  second  part  of  the  operation,  the  appre- 
ciation of  the  situation  is  approximately  identi- 

12 


THE  PLACE  OF  REASONING 

cal  with  attention  and  perception.  To  be  af- 
fected by  the  situation  we  must  attend  to  it ;  to 
make  use  of  the  materials  offered  we  must  inter- 
pret them,  and  interpretation  is  practically  iden- 
tical with  perception.  As  we  shall  have  oc- 
casion to  indicate  later,  it  is  more  difficult  to 
distinguish  between  appreciation  and  percep- 
tion than  it  is  to  discover  points  of  similarity 
between  them.  The  third  part  of  the  process 
in  order  of  development,  the  overcoming  of  the 
appreciated  difficulty  or  making  any  needed 
improvement  in  the  appreciated  situation,  is 
in  its  character  essentially  one  with  association 
or,  if  the  improvement  be  actual  not  thought, 
with  habit.  Like  controlled  association,  or  con- 
trolled response  in  any  connection  or  in  any 
operation,  it  is  the  outcome  of  earlier  associa- 
tion with  the  appreciated  situation  checked  and 
directed  by  the  dominant  purpose.  While  this 
is  the  really  effective  step  in  reasoning,  little 
need  be  said  about  it  since  it  differs  from  other 
forms  of  recall  only  in  the  adequateness  of 
the  result,  which  in  turn  is  due  to  the  more 
complete  control.  The  fourth  and  final  step  in 
the  completed  operation,  Belief,  is  most  char- 
acteristic of  all.  It  alone  is  in  some  degree 
peculiar  to  the  process  under  discussion.    As 

13 


THE  PSYCHOLOGY  OF  EEASONING 

has  been  repeatedly  said,  any  new  construction 
that  is  believed  to  be  adequate  is  rational.  How 
the  construction  has  been  attained  is  a  matter 
of  relative  indifference.  Historically  the  dis- 
cussions of  thinking  in  all  of  its  forms  have 
centered  about  truth  and  the  methods  of  estab- 
lishing or  demonstrating  truth.  So  far  has  this 
gone  that  the  modes  of  obtaining  truth  have 
largely  been  lost  sight  of  as  compared  with 
the  methods  of  establishing  its  validity.  In 
fact,  proof  has  frequently  been  confused  with 
obtaining  a  solution.  While  it  may  attach  to 
many  other  psychological  operations,  belief  has 
been  most  often  discussed  in  connection  with 
reasoning,  and  in  that  sense  it  is  the  one  of 
our  four  stages  peculiar  to  reasoning. 
(TI  reasoning  has  these  many  psychological 
analogues  and  relations,  it  must  be  remembered 
that  it  is  not  a  topic  for  psychology  alone,  but 
that  the  entire  science  of  Ipgic  is  devoted  pri- 
marily to  its  consideratiopi  Our  account  of 
reasoning  would  be  obviously  one-sided  did  we 
neglect  logic's  discussions  of  the  problem. 
That  the  attitude  of  logic  is  essentially  differ- 
ent from  that  of  psychology  is  evident  from  the 
different  division  that  it  makes  of  the  reason- 
ing operations.    The  universal  practice  of  the 

14 


THE  PLACE  OF  REASONING 

logician  is  to  divide  reasoning  into  conception, 
judgment,  and  inference.  There  isl)y  no  means 
such  c^omplete  agreement,  however,  as  to  what 
these  different  terms  represent  in  the  way  of 
processes.  In  fact  from  the  attitude  that  logic 
takes  toward  reasoning,  the  terms  refer  rather 
to  the  products  of  mental  operations  than  to 
the  operations  themselves.  Fprmal  logic  at 
least  is  mainly  concerned  with  thinking  as  it  is 
expressed  in_words.  In  consequence,  the  out- 
comes of  the  operations  alone  are  considered, 
and  that  with  little  reference  to  the  occasions 
or  laws  that  give  rise  to  them.  The  concept  for 
formal  logic  is  defined  as  a  term  that  applies  to 
or  represents  a  class  of  individuals,  or  an  ab- 
stract quality.  The  term  itself  is  any  word 
that  represents  an  object.  Judgment  is  the 
process  of  connecting  the  terms  or,  in  the  static , 
form  that  is  usually  discussed,  it  is  the  combina- 1 
tion  of  two  terms.  Inference  is  the  combina- 1  / 
tion  of  judgments.  Three  judgments  in  the  / 
syllogistic  reasoning  unite  in  the  development 
of  a  new  truth. 

Any  attempt  to  answer  the  question,  what 
psychological  operations  are  behind  these  ele- 
ments recognized  by  formal  logic,  involves 
numerous  difficulties.    Perhaps  the  most  im- 

15 


THE  PSYCHOLOGY  OF  EEASONIXG 

f  portant  is  the  disagreement  among  the  logicians 
themselves  as  to  what  the  operations  are,  or 

I  even  as  to  the  exact  parts  of  the  total  problem 
ta  which  the  different  words  are  to  be  applied. 
The  formal  logic  definitions  have  been  aban- 
doned or  modified  in  many  particulars  by  the 
more  modern  logicians,  who  are  more  concerned 
with  the  real  operations  that  lie  behind  the 
words  than  the  older  men.  If  we  correlate  the 
words  of  the  logician  with  the  phases  above, 
we  find  that  the  only  term  that  exactly  applies 
is  the  word  judgment,  which  is  the  approximate 
equivalent  of  appreciating  the  difficulty.  Even 
here,  to  obtain  our  correspondence,  we  must 
accept  the  definition  of  the  modern  logician  that 
the  judgment  is  the  application  of  meaning  to 
the  given.  Inference  covers  much  the  same 
operation  as  the  solution  of  the  problem  but 
the  formal  logician  is  not  so  much  concerned 
with  the  process  as  with  the  proof.  He  takes 
the  solution  for  granted  as  it  is  expressed  in 
words  and  contents  himself  with  asking  if  the 
result  is  correct,  or  how  it  can  be  shown  to  be 
correct.  The  process  is  overshadowed  by  the 
proof  in  his  use  of  the  term  inference.  The 
traditional  equivalent  of  inference,  the  syllo- 
gism, is  wholly  devoted  to  proof  and  does  not 

16 


THE  PLACE  OF  EEASONING 

at  all  correspond  to  the  process  of  obtaining 
the  solution.  Inference,  then,  covers  three  of 
the  processes  that  we  have  distinguished:  the 
solution  of  the  problem,  belief,  and  the  methods 
of  inducing  belief,  proof.  Two  terms  of  the 
logician  then  correspond  closely  enough  with  the 
phases  of  the  reasoning  process  as  they  present 
themselves  to  the  psychologist  to  be  used  to 
designate  them.  One  preliminary  problem 
from  e^h  group  must  be  discussed,  these  are : 
first,  the  nature  of  belief^  or  the  criterion  of 
truth  which  has  been  discussed  now  and  again 
by  the  logician  but  which  is  certainly  a  psycho- 
logical problem  from  one  of  its  aspects;  and 
second,  the  problem  of  the  concept  that  is  now 
ordinarily  combined  with  the  problem  of  mean- 
ing. Discussion  of  the  influence  of  the  purpose 
and  the  wider  relations  of  the  elements  of  the 
thinking  process  must  be  incidental  to  the  other 
phases  of  the  subject.  Our  problems  for  dis- 
cussion are,  then:  (1)  What  is  it  that  gives 
belief?  (2)  How  is  it  possible  for  the  concrete 
mental  image  or  word  to  represent  abstract 
qualities  and  for  the  one  to  be  representative 
of  the  many?  (3)  What  is  the  process  of  judg- 
ing or  appreciating,  ordinarily  appreciating  a 
difficulty?     (4)  What  is  the  process  of  infer- 

17 


THE  PSYCHOLOGY  OF  SEASONING 

ence,  or  of  obviating  a  difficulty,  or  solving  a 
problem?  (5)  In  what  ways  may  the  truth 
of  the  conclusion  be  established,  the  part  really 
emphasized  by  the  traditional  logic  1  In  the  dis- 
cussion of  each  we  shall  emphasize  the  psycho- 
logical position  but  shall  also  attempt  to  do 
justice  to  the  results  and  methods  of  the  logi- 
cian. 

The  general  difference  in  the  standpoint  of 
the  logician  and  the  psychologist  will  serve  to 
throw  light  upon  the  discussion  of  the  particular 
problem.  The  most  important  of  these  is  prob- 
ably the  relation  of  the  thinking  process  to  the 
concrete  individual  consciousness.  The  psy- 
^  chologist  makes  reasoning  one  operation  among 
many;  the  logician,  or  at  least  several  modern 
logicians,  deny  that  thinking  ever  goes  on  in 
the  mind  that  the  psychologist  investigates. 
Bradley  and  Bosanquet  and  more  recently  Hus- 
serl  make  the  latter  assertion  with  great  em- 
phasis. The  former  two  men  accept  Mill's  de- 
scription of  consciousness  as  accurate  and  when 
they  find  no  possibility  of  a  satisfactory  expla- 
nation of  reasoning  in  Mill's  system,  insist  that 
it  must  go  on  in  some  higher  realm,  a  world 
of  meaning  that  is  apart  from  the  individual 
consciousness,     although     perhaps     connected 

18 


THE  PLACE  OF  REASONING 

with  it  in  some  unassignable  way.  Husserl, 
similarly,  argues  that  the  results  of  reasoning 
must  be  true  absolutely  and  universally  while 
mental  processes  are  always  relative  to  the  ex- 
perience of  that  individual,  and  need  be  true 
for  that  individual  alone.  To  the  first  argu- 
ment, the  psychologist  must  reply  that  it  is 
against  all  direct  evidence  to  assume  that 
thinking  does  not  go  on  in  consciousness.  The 
results  are  always  expressed  through  the  indi- 
vidual and  bear  marks  of  the  individual 
peculiarities  of  the  thinker.  If  the  psy- 
chology of  Mill  is  inadequate,  the  obvious 
course  is  to  develop  an  adequate  psychology. 
It  does  not  follow  that  one  must  look  to  a  supra- 
mental  realm  for  the  seat  of  thought.  As  a 
matter  of  fact  the  universal  mind  or  world  of 
meanings  of  Bradley  is  much  more  like  the  real 
mind  as  the  psychologist  describes  it  to-day 
than  is  the  mind  pictured  by  Mill  and  his  con- 
temporaries. 

The  argument  of  Husserl  brings  out  most 
clearly  the  fundamental  difference  between  the 
methods  and  attitudes  of  the  logician  and  the 
psychologist.  The  aim  of  the  logician  is  to 
discover  a  theory  that  shall  give  knowledge  the 
character  that  he  believes  it  to  have.     The  aim 

19 


THE  PSYCHOLOGY  OF  EEASOXING 

-  the  psychologist  is  to  examine  consciousness 
as  he  finds  it  with  no  preconceived  idea  of  what 
the  outcome  may  be.  He  follows  out  the  ac- 
cepted methods  and  accepts  without  question 
the  results  that  they  give.  There  is  more  than 
a  suggestion  in  the  one  attitude  of  working  for 
an  answer,  as  the  schoolboy  solves  a  problem. 
.The  other  too  often  forgets  to  ask  whether  the 
outcome  of  his  method  is  adequate  to  the  de- 
mands made  upon  it.  Both  methods  have  dis- 
advantages. Working  for  an  answer  is  not 
likely  to  foster  impartial  investigation,  but  too 
great  indifference  to  the  outcome  in  matters  as 
complicated  as  the  working  of  mind  makes  it 
possible  for  an  entirely  inadequate  solution  to 
be  palmed  off  as  adequate.  It  is  as  if,  in  cal- 
culating the  balance  in  the  bank,  one  should  find 
a  much  smaller  sum  than  expected.  Three 
courses  would  be  open.  (One  might  assert  that 
the  result  was  impossible  and  that  in  conse- 
quence the  laws  of  addition  and  subtraction 
ordinarily  used  must  be  wrong;  fone  might  ac- 
cept the  outcome  as  infallible  because  it  is  the 
expression  of  methods  known  beyond  question 
to  be  truej  or  one  might  accept  the  correctness 
of  the  methods,  but  believe  that  some  mistake 
had  been  made  in  the  application  and  look  back 

20 


THE  PLACE  OF  EEASONING 

over  the  results  to  see  if  each  part  of  the  opera- 
tion had  been  properly  carried  out.     The  first        i 
course  is  a  caricature  of  the  logician's  conclu- 
sion with  reference  to  reasoning;  the  second        -^ 
exaggerates  the  method  of  the  older  psychol- 
ogy, or  at  least  of  some  older  psychologists ; 
the  third  is  the  every  day  common  sense  prac-      J 
tice.     Obviously  the  intermediate  course  is  the 
only  one  that  gives  promise  of  success. 

With  reference  to  these  more  fundamental 
problems,  the  present  discussion  will  assume 
that  thinking  goes  on  in  the  human  conscious- 
ness, and  that  it  is  possible  to  determine  the 
laws  and  conditions  of  thinking  from  an  exam- 
ination of  mind.  The  investigation  shall  make 
use  of  the  generally  accepted  methods,  but  an 
eye  will  be  kept  constantly  on  the  results  of  the 
method  to  make  sure  that  the  conclusions  agree 
roughly  with  the  accepted  character  of  the 
thinking  operations.  If  the  results  are  mani- 
festly inadequate  to  the  actual  attainments  of 
reasoning,  the  methods  will  be  re-examined  to 
determine  the  source  of  error,  if  any  exist.  It 
will  also  be  kept  in  mind  that  reasoning  may 
not  really  be  of  the  character  popularly 
assigned  to  it.  Its  accomplishments  must  be 
examined  from  time  to  time  to  make  sure  that 

21 


THE  PSYCHOLOGY  OF  EEASONING 

they  are  actual,  not  pretended.     By  these  meth-  I 

ods  and  on  these  presuppositions  we  may  pro-  \ 
ceed  to  our  investigation  of  belief,  of  the  nature 

of  meaning  and  the  concept,  of  judgment  and  I 

inference,  and  of  proof.  j 

i 


CHAPTER   II 

BELIEF 

The-problem  of  belief  is,  in  one  of  its  aspects, 
the  problem  of  truth.  As  such,  discussions  of 
belief  have  been  numerous  in  the  history  of 
philosophy.  The  earliest  form  of  the  doctrine 
is  closely  intermingled  with  the  discussions  of 
the  ultimate  nature  of  things.  One  solution  of 
this  character  we  find  in  Plato's  ideas  whose 
existence  gave  certainty  and  stability  to  the 
more  transient  mental  images.  Later  the  dis- 
cussions of  the  principle  of  sufficient  reason  in 
Leibniz,  in  Pascal  and  other  logical  writers  ap- 
proach the  problem  from  a  different  point  of 
view.  Most  of  the  tests  were  of  a  logical  char- 
acter alone.  Pascal,  to  be  sure,  asserted  that 
the  clearness  and  definiteness  of  an  idea  gave 
it  the  warrant  of  truth.  But  it  is  only  with  the 
modern  writers  that  we  find  the  distinctly  psy- 
chological problem  put  as  we  would  put  it, 
viz. :  what  is  it  that  distinguishes  the  true  from 
the  false  as  psychological  states?  The  first  of 
3  23 


THE  PSYCHOLOGY  OF  REASONING 

the  modern  writers  to  recognize  the  problem 
was  Hume,  who  made  belief  depend  upon  the 
clearness  or  distinctness  of  ideas.  The  famous 
classification  of  mental  states  into  impressions 
and  ideas  gives  one  answer  to  the  question. 
Impressions  must  be  accepted  because  they  are 
intense,  ideas  may  be  denied  if  indistinct.  Be- 
lief in  ideas  is  also  made  to  depend  upon  the 
strength  of  the  associations  that  bring  them  into 
consciousness.  For  us  the  essential  aspect  of 
the  theory  is  that  it  is  the  first  to  give  an  em- 
pirical basis  for  belief,  to  discover  a  criterion 
that  lies  in  consciousness  itself  and  is  imme- 
diately open  to  investigation.  Whatever  credit 
may  be  due  to  Hume  as  the  pioneer  in  the  prob- 
lem, as  the  first  who  recognized  the  possibility 
of  answering  the  question  in  a  scientific  way, 
we  must  reject  his  explanation  as  at  best  but 
partial  and  incomplete.  While  in  general  vivid 
experiences  are  accepted  and  the  faint  and  in- 
definite are  doubted  or  rejected,  there  are  not- 
able exceptions.  Many  intense  experiences  are 
not  believed  to  be  real  and  a  still  larger  number 
of  faint  impressions  are  at  once  given  credence. 
Many  detected  hallucinations  and  illusions  are 
of  considerable  intensity,  while  very  many  faint 
impressions  are  accepted  at  their  first  appear- 

24 


BELIEF 

ance  without  question.  Certain  of  our  beliefs 
then  may  depend  in  part  upon  the  intensity  and 
vividness  of  mental  states,  but  this  quality  is 
not  to  be  regarded  as  important.  The  excep- 
tions are  fully  as  important  as  the  rule. 

Bain  formulated  the  next  of  the  more  signifi- 
cant types  of  theory.     This  has  two  independ- 
ent criteria  or  explanations  of  belief.     The  first  | 
is  his  suggestion  that  to  ask  why  we  believe 
is  to  put  the  less  important  and  less  easily 
answered  of  two  possible  questions.    For  belief 
is  the  natural  process,  psychologically — is  nega- 
tive ;  while  doubt  is  positive.    We  believe  every-  \ 
thing  that  comes  to  consciousness  unopposed.   ) 
What  requires  explanation  is  doubt.    Belief  is  j  H' 
the  original  process  in  the  mind  of  the  child.  // 
He  does  not  doubt  until  he  has  accumulated  a 
considerable  amount  of  knowledge,  until  he  has 
attained  a  relatively  high  stage  in  the  develop- 
ment of  intelligence.     The  other  phase  of  this         ^ 
theory,  that  action  is  the  test  of  belief,  has  had 
even  a  larger  place  historically.    We  believe 
anything  that  we  are  prepared  to  act  upon. 
Belief  comes  with  action  however  action  may  'i 
have  been  initiated.     The  first  mentioned  char-  1 
acteristic  of  belief  may  be  derived  from  this, 
for  from  the  beginning  there  is  a  natural  ten- 

25 

1 


THE  PSYCHOLOGY  OF  REASONINO 

dency  to  respond  to  every  sense  impression. 
The  main  criticism  to  be  passed  upon  Bain's 
theory  affects  its  importance  not  its  truth,  and 
this  applies  only  to  the  one  criterion,  action. 
There  can  be  no  doubt  that  when  we  act,  we 
have  ordinarily  believed,  but  it  may  be  a  ques- 
tion whether  we  do  not  act  because  we  believe, 
rather  than  believe  because  we  act.  In  other 
words,  one  questions  whether  it  is  not  much 
more  important  to  explain  action  in  terms  of 
belief  than  to  explain  belief  in  terms  of  action. 
What  really  concerns  one  is  to  determine  the 
conditions  of  belief  and  of  action,  not  to  learn 
that  one  believes  when  one  is  ready  to  act. 
Action  comes  as  the  outgrowth  of  belief,  or  at 
most  as  another  expression  of  the  same  set  of 
conditions.  What  we  are  really  anxious  to  de- 
termine is  whether  the  idea  is  justifiable  and 
likely  to  prove  profitable  before  action  has 
tested  it.  It  might  be  urged  too  that  belief 
often  seems  to  grow  through  action,  but  in  these 
cases  it  is  probable  that  the  resulting  belief 
comes  from  the  success  of  the  action,  rather 
than  through  the  mere  action  itself.  Some  acts 
to  be  sure  give  rise  to  belief  whose  results  are 
indifferent  to  belief;  frequent  repetition  gives 
rise  to  a  habit  and  the  habitual  movement  dis- 

26 


BELIEF 

tracts  from  consideration  of  circumstances  that 
might  arouse  suspicion.  This  is  not  real  belief. 
More  usually  however  action  serves  like  the 
experiment  in  science  to  conJfirm  or  refute.  Not 
the  act  but  the  new  evidence  it  furnishes  is  the 
source  of  belief.  Of  the  two  effects  of  action 
in  furthering  belief,  one  ordinarily  gives  mere 
pretense  before  the  world,  not  real  belief;  the 
other  derives  its  value  not  from  the  act  itself, 
but  from  its  results,  an  intellectual  contribution 
.  that  frequently  destroys  belief.  We  may  read- 
ily grant  the  statement  that  action  is  an  excel- 
lent test, — if  we  believe,  we  are  willing  to  act 
in  accordance  with  our  belief,  but  action  does 
not  give  rise  to  belief  in  any  great  number  of 
cases.  The  second  thesis  that  Bain  upholds  is 
at  once  important  and  true.  Credulity  is  nat-/ 
ural,  doubt  comes  only  at  a  relatively  late  stage 
in  intellectual  development.  It  follows  that 
what  needs  discussion  and  interpretation  is  not 
belief  but  doubt,  or  disbelief,  and  we  shall  take 
advantage  of  the  suggestion  when  we  come  to 
the  positive,  more  constructive  part  of  our  dis- 
cussion. 

The  third  man  to  emphasize  the  importance 
of  belief  was  Brentano,  although  he  contributes 
little  to  the  detailed  analysis  of  the  state  as 

27 


U 


THE  PSYCHOLOGY  OF  EEASONING 

such.  Brentano  makes  belief  identical  with 
judgment.  Unlike  Bain,  he  insists  that  mental 
states  are  at  first  indifferent  to  truth  and  must 
be  judged  before  they  become  either  true  or 
false.  Brentano  positively  declines  to  state  in 
what  the  process  of  belief  consists,  or  to  give 
it  any  conditions.  He  argues  strenuously  that 
it  is  an  unanalyzable  process.  We  believe  and 
that  is  all  that"  can  be  said.  This  can  mean 
only  that  the  process  has  not  yet  been  analyzed 
or  that  Brentano  does  not  care  to  undertake 
the  task.  He  does  in  practice  carry  out  his 
definition  and  makes  judgment,  or  belief,  one 
of  the  elements  of  mind  on  the  same  level  as 
sensation  or  action.  The  truth  or  falsity  of 
Brentano 's  theory  can  be  established  only  by 
successful  completion  or  admitted  failure  of 
the  analysis.  While  then  in  the  recent  history 
of  the  reasoning  theories  Brentano  *s  theory  of 
judgment  bulks  large,  his  theory  of  belief  de- 
serves mention  only  from  the  importance  he 
attaches  to  it  in  the  total  system. 

One  of  the  last  great  advances  made  is  by 
James.  Belief  in  the  materials  of  perception 
is  for  James  as  for  Hume  dependent  upon  the 
intensity  or  vividness  of  the  impression  itself, 
upon  the  actions   and  emotions   aroused   and 

28 


BELIEF 

upon  the  degree  to  which  it  fits  in  with  the  hab- 
its of  observation  and  action.    Self -consistency 
is  the  most  important  condition  of  belief  in  i 
matters   of  theory.    Less   important   are   the ' 
emotional     and     experiential     aspects.    The 
struggle  between  the  different  theories  to  sat- 
isfy our  aesthetic  and  emotional  needs  eventu- 
ates in  a  compromise  that  is  given  belief.    In 
one  passage  belief  is  defined  as  *Hhe  emotional   ] 
reaction  of  the  entire  man  upon  an  object.*' 
This  definition  seems,  however,  to  be  subordi- 
nated to  the  others.    We  also  find  in  James 
strong  insistence  upon  the  statement  that  one 
can  by  habitual  endeavor  make  one's  self  be- 
lieve what  could  not  be  believed  at  first.    The 
most  characteristic  of  all  these  conditions  is  the 
assertion  that  belief  comes  from  the  consistency  \ 
of  the  object  or  statement  with  itself.     The  en-    \ 
largement  of  this  idea  into  the  several  systems 
of  belief  that  are  all  consistent,  each  within 
itself,  but  inconsistent  with  each  other,  is  sig- 
nificant of  a  tendency  to  demand  for  belief  a 
wider  consistency  of  the  thing  believed  with 
other  experiences. 

If  we  look  back  over  the  theories  of  belief,  we 
see  that  each  man  has  accepted  many  elements 
from  his  predecessors   but   has   subordinated 

29 


THE  PSYCHOLOGY  OF  REASONING 

them  to  the  criteria  that  he  was  himself  con- 
cerned to  establish.  If  we  combine  all,  we  have 
the  general  statement  that  anything  is  believed 
that  is  intense  or  vivid,  we  believe  that  upon 
which  we  are  willing  to  act  and  which  harmo- 
nizes with  our  old  habits  and  our  emotional  na- 
ture, provided  always  that  it  does  not  manifest 
inconsistencies  within  itself.  So  much  we  may 
accept  as  present  in  some  degree  in  most  states 
of  belief.  Any  one  except  self -consistency  may 
be  absent  and  belief  be  present.  We  may  be- 
lieve in  things  that  are  not  sensuously  clear  or 
vivid,  we  may  even  believe  statements  that  are 
opposed  to  our  habitual  emotions  and  habits, 
if  they  are  presented  under  new  and  striking 
conditions.  We  probably  do  not  believe  any- 
thing that  we  are  not  willing  to  act  upon,  but 
it  is  a  question  whether  that  tells  us  more  of 
the  conditions  of  belief  or  of  the  conditions  of 
action.  The  objection  to  the  theories  men- 
tioned is  not  that  each  does  not  contain  some 
truth  but  that,  taken  together,  they  do  not  cover 
all  cases  of  belief.  In  some  instances  we  have 
belief  where  no  one  of  them  is  present,  and  in 
others  all  may  be  present  and  belief  still  be 
absent.  We  have  perceptions  that  are  vivid 
and  in  harmony  with  our  emotional  mood  and 

30 


BELIEF 

past  habits  of  response,  that  we  do  not  believe, 
and  we  hear  stories  that  are  all  of  these  things 
and  self-consistent  as  well  that  we  still  do  not 
believe,  while  more  rarely  we  believe  assertions 
or  accept  experiences  that  possess  none  of  these 
qualities. 

We  may  begin  our  own  constructive  task  with 
at  least  one  fact  gained  from  the  history  of  the 
theories.  This  is  Bain's  assertion  that  belief  is 
a  negative  and  natural  process  that  attaches  to 
all  mental  states  unless  there  is  some  good 
reason  to  the  contrary;  that  one  must  seek 
reasons  for  doubt,  not  for  belief.  Anything 
that  enters  mind  is  normally  at  once  accepted 
as  true.  Doubt  or  disbelief  on  the  contrary 
must  have  some  positive  ground,  and  conse- 
quently arises  only  with  sophistication  and  on 
the  basis  of  positive  evidence.  In  opposition  to 
Brentano  it  seems  that  there  is  no  moment 
when  any  perception  or  idea  stands  in  con- 
sciousness as  a  mere  given  that  is  neither 
believed  nor  disbelieved.  Introspection  seems 
to  show  no  moment  of  suspended  judgment. 
An  object  or  statement  is  accepted  or  rejected 
at  once.  On  its  entrance  it  stands  before  con- 
sciousness a  thing  believed,  a  thing  denied  be- 
lief or  a  thing  in  doubt.     These  attitudes  may 

31 


THE  PSYCHOLOGY  OF  REASONING 

succeed  one  another;  a  statement  may  be  first 
believed,  then  disbelieved  or  doubted ;  but  never, 
so  far  as  my  experience  goes,  does  it  stand 
without  evaluation  as  to  its  truth.  Even  when 
there  is  intentional  suspension  of  judgment  as 
a  consequence  of  a  warning  that  the  question  is 
difficult  or  that  there  is  danger  of  being  mis- 
led, what  is  suspended  is  not  so  much  belief  as 
the  usual  consequences  of  belief,  action  or  the 
final  stamp  of  approval.  Brentano's  assertion 
that  in  its  initial  stages  the  impression  is  indif- 
ferent to  belief  seems  not  to  have  been  the  result 
of  actual  experience  or  observation  so  much  as 
a  construction  based  on  considerations  of  the- 
ory. If  one  were  to  suppose  with  Brentano 
that  belief  were  an  independent  mental  process 
without  relation  to  anything  else,  it  might  be 
necessary  or  convenient  to  have  two  operations 
rather  than  one  involved  in  the  acceptance  of 
an  impression  by  consciousness.  Brentano 
seems  to  have  emphasized  the  needs  of  his  psy- 
chological system  rather  than  the  facts  of  ex- 
perience. 

Accepting  belief  as  a  natural  and  immediate 
state  of  consciousness,  we  must  begin  our  analy- 
sis of  the  state  and  its  conditions  not  with  belief, 
but  with  its  opposite,  disbelief,  or  the  more  def- 

32 


BELIEF 


inite  quality,  doubt.  For  disbelief  seems  usu- 
ally to  be  belief  in  sometbing  else,  doubt  is 
unique.  We  may  begin  our  study  by  observing 
an  instance  of  doubt  on  the  perceptual  level 
where  the  phenomenon  appears  in  its  simplest, 
most  analyzable  form.  One  may  take  an  old 
example  in  the  illusion  of  reversible  perspec- 
tive.   In  the  figure  one  sees  at  first  glance  a 


Ai_ 

V  y 

\2l 

y\ 

' 

V- 

<^ 

flight  of  steps  clearly  and  unambiguously 
drawn.  A  second  glance  shows  that  the  figure 
is  part  of  a  broken  wall  under  which  one  might 
take  shelter  from  rain.  The  interpretation 
changes  with  the  attitude.  When  one  thinks 
of  walking  up  and  down  on  the  steps,  the  steps 
reappear.  As  the  attitude  changes  in  this  way 
from  moment  to  moment,  the  interpretation 
varies.  If  one  takes  the  experiment  seriously, 
he  is  puzzled  as  long  as  the  fluctuation  contin- 
ues.    This  is  the  typical  attitude  of  doubt.     The 

33 


THE  PSYCHOLOGY  OF  REASONING 

alternation  is  usually  unpleasant  when  the 
problem  is  real.  Complicated  strain  sensations 
are  likely  to  arise  and  these  add  a  new  element 
to  the  unpleasantness.  Qualitatively,  then, 
doubt  is  unpleasant,  and  is  marked  by  somewhat 
complicated  strains.  On  the  psychological  side, 
the  conditions  of  the  fluctuations  are  the  ante- 
cedent ideas  or  mental  attitudes.  AVhen  one  is 
in  a  '^flight  of  steps''  attitude,  one  sees  steps; 
when  in  a  ^'broken  walP'  attitude,  the  over- 
hanging wall  dominates.  The  attitude  is  in- 
duced and  changed  by  the  words,  but  it  might 
have  changed  spontaneously  had  the  words 
been  lacking.  The  fluctuation  ceases  and  be- 
lief replaces  doubt  when  the  person  looking  at 
the  picture  learns  that  the  drawing  is  perfectly 
plane;  that  the  alternation  is  not  due  to  per- 
spective, and  that  the  fluctuations  arise  from 
the  ideas  brought  to  bear  on  the  interpretation 
of  the  presentation  rather  than  in  the  presen- 
tation itself. 

This  simple  illustration  is  typical  of  all  cases 
of  doubt  in  perception.  It  is  very  frequently 
possible  to  look  at  an  object  from  more  than 
one  point  of  view.  How  it  will  be  seen  depends 
upon  these  points  of  view  and  the  resulting  in- 
terpretation will  shift  with  the  shifting  atti- 

34 


BELIEF 

tude.    As  long  as  two  points  of  view  are  pos- 
sible or  are  actually  operative  in  changing  the 
interpretation,  there  will  be  doubt;  when  one 
or  the  other,  or  some  third  that  transcends 
them,  is  definitely  established,  doubt  vanishes 
and  belief  ensues.    Very  frequently  alternation 
of  interpretation  is  lacking;  one  context  alone 
is  dominant,  and  belief  is  present  from  the  start. 
I  There  is  not  even  definite  recognition  of  the 
:  possibility  of  doubt,  so  no  conscious  belief.    The 
;  first  interpretation  persists  and  is  taken  as 
true  without  being  consciously  regarded  as  true 
I  or  false. 

It  will  be  noted  in  a  case  of  this  kind  that 
there  is  no  third  distinct  process  of  disbelief. 
One  takes  the  figure  as  either  concave  or  con- 
vex, and  believes  either  one  or  the  other.  It 
is  possible,  however,  to  express  belief  in  one  in- 
terpretation directly  or  indirectly  as  disbelief 
of  the  alternative  interpretation.  Whether  one 
uses  one  form  or  the  other,  depends  very  largely 
upon  the  verbal  context.  If  some  one  suggests 
that  the  figure  above  is  concave,  while  one  is 
seeing  it  convex,  one  is  more  likely  to  deny  the 
concavity  than  to  assert  the  convexity.  The 
rejection  of  some  other  person's  definite  asser- 
tion is  almost  the  only  occasion  for  using  the 

35 


THE  PSYCHOLOGY  OF  REASONING 

negative  form.  In  this  case  the  negative  is 
altogether  a  matter  of  language,  not  of  psychol- 
ogy. The  only  case  in  which  disbelief  is  not 
really  belief  in  something  else  is  when  no  inter- 
pretation is  satisfactory.  Each  suggestion  is 
rejected.  As  a  result,  the  negative  form  is 
used  without  any  definite  positive  disposition 
of  the  object  in  consciousness.  Then  doubt  un- 
resolved gives  rise  to  the  negative.  In  any  case 
the  negative  does  not  present  a  new  psycholog- 
ical category.  The  only  psychological  proc- 
esses are  doubt  and  belief.  We  might  note, 
too,  that  what  is  asserted  of  the  logical  negative 
by  Bradley  holds  in  the  psychology  of  disbe- 
lief. Bradley,  it  will  be  recalled,  asserts  that 
one  never  gives  a  proposition  the  negative  form 
except  upon  positive  grounds;  that  one  never 
makes  a  negative  statement  except  upon  some 
definite  occasion.  The  same  holds  of  disbelief. 
One  would  never  assert  disbelief  in  the  existence 
of  an  object  or  of  an  interpretation  of  an  object 
unless  the  interpretation  had  been  asserted  and 
rejected,  or  unless  the  interpretation  had  sug- 
gested itself  to  the  speaker  and  it  had  later  been 
seen  that  some  other  was  more'  stable.  In  the 
figure  just  discussed  one  would  not  say 
that  it  was  not  concave  unless  some  one  had 

36 


BELIEF 

suggested  the  possibility  of  seeing  it  as  con- 
cave and  one  had  not  succeeded  in  the  attempt. 
One  does  not  assert  disbelief  at  random.  There 
are  thousands  of  statements  that  might  be  de- 
nied of  the  figure,  that  it  was  red,  virtuous,  of 
curved  lines,  etc.,  but  none  of  these  are  denied 
because  they  do  not  suggest  themselves  to  any- 
one as  possible. 

Doubt  concerning  a  statement  of  more  gen- 
eral fact  or  theory  has  very  much  the  same 
explanation.  Doubt  arises  whenever  a  state- 
ment can  be  brought  into  two  or  more  contexts 
,and  changes  as  the  context  changes.  Doubt, 
then,  is  an  expression  of  the  fluctuation  that 
results  from  viewing  a  statement  from  differ- 
ent points  of  view.  It  carries  with  it,  also,  the 
implication  that  it  is  impossible  to  view  it  in 
one  way  for  any  length  of  time.  Thus,  the 
relation  between  body  and  mind  is  believed  to 
be  causal  as  long  as  one  considers  the  similari- 
ties between  the  relation  that  subsists  here  and 
the  relation  of  cause  and  effect  as  it  is  recog- 
nized in  physics  or  in  the  practical  world  by 
the  practical  man.  On  the  other  hand,  for 
some,  at  least,  the  idea  refuses  to  fit  into  gen- 
eral experience  when  one  emphasizes  the  dif- 
ferences   between    the    physical    and    mental 

37 


THE  PSYCHOLOGY  OF  EEASONING 

aspects,  and  attempts  to  apply  the  generally 
accepted  principle  of  the  conservation  of  en- 
ergy. As  long  as  the  two  ways  of  regarding 
the  problem  alternate,  there  will  be  doubt. 
Doubt  ceases  and  we  have  belief  whenever  one 
way  of  regarding  the  subject  vanishes  and  the 
other  remains  in  unchallenged  supremacy  on 
the  mental  field.  As  soon,  for  example,  as  con- 
sciousness is  accepted  as  a  form  of  energy,  the 
conflict  with  the  doctrine  of  conservation  dis- 
appears and  the  psychologist  becomes  an  inter- 
actionist.  If  the  difference  between  conscious 
states  and  energy  is  emphasized,  and  the  dif- 
ferences between  the  relation  of  the  mental  and 
the  physical  and  the  causal  relation  in  the 
purely  physical  realm  increase  in  prominence, 
the  man  refuses  belief  in  interaction,  and  either 
remains  in  doubt  or  becomes  a  parallelist,  which 
is  probably  essentially  the  same  outcome. 

Again,  one  may  believe  in  socialism  if  one 
considers  the  evident  disparity  between  the 
rewards  of  different  individuals  who  may  be 
regarded  as  of  the  same  ability  or  as  of  the 
same  degree  of  desert.  One  is  firmly  opposed 
to  socialism  when  men  are  regarded  as  essen- 
tially very  different  in  ability,  and  ability  and 
desert  are  identified,  or  it  is  assumed  that  men 

38 


BELIEF 

differ  in  their  deserts  as  completely  as  they  do 
in  ability.    Just  so  long  as  the  two  sets  of 
experiences  fluctuate  before  the  mind,  one  will 
be  in  doubt  as  to  which  of  the  abstract  prin- 
ciples is  the  more  desirable.    When  one  per- 
sists, it  is  by  that  very  fact  believed.     On  a 
subject  that  depends  upon  knowledge,  belief 
cannot  be  permanent.    As  long  as  there  is  no 
I  scientific  knowledge  about  the  extent  of  indi- 
I  vidual  variation  in  ability,  or  general  agree- 
i  ment  about  the  relation  between  ability  and 
I  desert,  every  man  will  have  his  socialistic  mo- 
ments and  his  individualistic  moments,  accord- 
ing as  life  has  presented  one  feature  or  another 
to  him  in  his  immediate  past.    And  individuals 
will  be  predominantly  individualistic  or  social- 
istic as  life  as  a  whole  has  presented  the  advan- 
tages or  the  disadvantages  of  the  present  indi- 
vidualistic   society.     This    presentation    may 
have  been  in  matters  of  practice  or  it  may  have 
been  in  matters  of  theory.    In  any  case,  we 
have  belief  in  one  theory  or  the  other  just  so 
long  as  one  set  of  experiences  predominates  in 
consciousness;  doubt  enters  whenever  there  is 
rivalry  between  two  sets  of  experience  or  alter- 
nating dominance  of  one  and  the  other.    Any 
similar  instance  of  doubt  or  belief  seems  to 
4  39 


THE  PSYCHOLOGY  OF  REASONING 

reduce  to  the  same  factors.  Here  again  we  may 
say  that  disbelief  is  no  third  state.  When  be- 
lief is  lost  in  one  statement,  belief  in  something 
else  or  doubt  ensues. 

If  we  turn  from  the  particular  to  the  general, 
belief  may  be  said  to  arise  when  any  statement 
or  interpretation  harmonizes  with  experience 
as  a  whole,  with  the  knowledge  of  the  indi- 
vidual. We  must,  that  is,  go  beyond  the  self- 
consistency  of  the  statement  or  object  to  its 
consistency  with  the  wider  whole.  There  is 
nothing  particularly  indefinite  or  mysterious 
about  this  statement  if  one  will  but  accept  the 
conclusion  of  modern  psychology  that  no  expe- 
rience ever  stands  alone,  but  that  even  the  ap- 
parently most  simple  mental  operation  really 
expresses  large  parts  of  earlier  experience.  In 
the  simple  perception,  for  example,  we  have  the 
action  of  a  vast  number  of  facts  acquired  days 
and  years  before.  No  apparently  discrete  ele- 
ment is  really  discrete,  but  is  the  focusing  point 
of  consciousness  as  a  whole.  Every  impression 
that  enters  consciousness  does  so  by  the  positive 
or  permissive  action  of  forces  derived  from 
much  of  past  experience.  It  follows  then  that 
to  assert  that  belief  depends  upon  very  much 
of  our  earlier  experience,  in  fact  upon  all  that 

40 


I 


BELIEF 

is  active  at  the  moment,  does  not  require  any 
new  complication  of  the  mechanism  of  mind. 
All  that  is  necessary  is  to  assume  that  the  same 
factors  that  control  attention  or  that  direct  the 
course  of  associations  or  constitute  the  attitude 
toward  the  interpretation  of  the  entering  im- 
pression in  perception,  are  also  the  factors  that 
i  pass  upon  the  truth  or  the  falsity  of  the  result- 
ing object  or  assertion.  Since  experiential  fac- 
tors are  present  and  in  active  control  there  is  no 
reason  why  they  should  not  also  he  called  upon 
to  determine  whether  the  product  of  their  action 
is  to  be  accepted  or  rejected.  The  operation 
of  passing  upon  the  product  of  a  mental  opera- 
tion is  part  of  the  pi^ocess  of  producing  it. 
One  usually  takes  place  at  the  same  time  as  the 
other  and  is  always  a  result  of  the  same  kind 
I  of  force.  It  is  true,  the  product  may  linger  in 
memory  for  a  moment,  to  be  tested  after  it  has 
been  formed.  During  this  period  forces  or  f ac- 
itors  that  were  not  operative  before  may  enter 
I  to  take  part  in  the  testing  process  and,  if  the 
new  product  fails  to  square  with  them  as  well 
as  with  those  earlier  effective,  it  will  be  re- 
jected. It  is  difficult  to  say  what  limits  of  age 
may  be  put  upon  the  experiences  that  play  a 
part  in  the  operation  of  testing.    Certain  it  is 

41 


THE  PSYCHOLOGY  OF  REASONING 

that  many  very  remote  elements  may  have  their 
part  in  it.  Eemnants  of  knowledge  or  of  habit 
acquired  in  early  childhood  may  at  times  have 
their  effect  upon  belief,  and  it  is  difficult  to 
draw  a  definite  line  in  time  and  to  say  that  all 
earlier  experiences  were  without  influence,  all 
later  ones  were  effective. 

Not  all  experience  is  organized  into  perfectly 
consistent  systems.  As  a  result  we  find  that  not 
all  of  experience,  or  even  all  that  is  essential, 
need  be  active  at  any  one  moment  in  the  test- 
ing. In  consequence,  as  different  systems  come 
into  prominence  successively,  the  attitude  to- 
ward the  construct  will  vary  and  with  this  vari- 
ation the  interpretation  fluctuates  and  the  con- 
sequent doubt  supervenes.  This  gives  the 
change  in  mental  attitude.  Doubt  is  due  to  the 
alternating  dominance  of  systems  of  experience 
that  have  not  been  altogether  coordinated  one 
with  another.  In  this  as  in  many  other  connec- 
tions it  is  seen  that  this  attitude  or  purpose  | 
varies  from  moment  to  moment.  When  two  I 
more  or  less  opposed  systems  succeed  one  an-  I 
other  closely,  the  whole  train  of  alternating 
interpretations  ensues  and  the  unsteadiness  re- 
sults in  alternating  beliefs.  These  characterize 
the  doubt  consciousness.    In  some  matters  and 

42 


BELIEF 

at  some  moments  one  context  and  one  alone  is 
present.  That  constitutes  or  characterizes  the 
momentarily  settled  conviction.  In  other  mat- 
ters several  systems  or  contexts  conflict  and  no 
single  organization  can  be  made  to  include  them 
all.  Conviction  is  lacking  or  unsettled  and, 
unless  settled,  some  shadowing  of  the  disturb- 
ance gives  rise  to  the  general  experience  of 
doubt. 

This  dependence  of  belief  upon  earlier  expe- 
riences and  upon  the  reaction  of  earlier  acquired 
knowledge  upon  the  momentary  product  is  evi- 
denced by  a  consideration,  in  the  individual  or 
in  the  race,  of  the  change  in  beliefs  with  growth 
in  knowledge.  Some  evidence  can  also  be  ob- 
tained for  it  from  a  study  of  the  conditions  of 
partial  and  temporary  beliefs  and  of  other 
somewhat  pathological  or  unusual  forms.  The 
slightest  observation  shows  that  growth  in 
knowledge  is  invariably  accompanied  by  corre- 
sponding change  in  belief.  The  man  of  the 
early  historic  periods  accepted  any  statement 
not  in  direct  conflict  with  his  experience.  He 
peopled  the  universe  with  fairies  and  super-hu- 
man beings,  with  witches  and  weir-wolves;  he 
put  implicit  confidence  in  absurd  cures  for  dis- 
ease and  in  spells  and  incantations.    It  is  only 

43 


THE  PSYCHOLOGY  OF  REASONING 

as  man  lias  grown  in  knowledge,  and  experi- 
ences have  become  sufficiently  numerous  and 
may  be  treated  with  sufficient  discrimination  to 
make  evident  the  conflict  of  the  new  with  the 
old,  that  doubt  is  at  all  possible.  Similarly  if 
we  trace  the  development  of  accepted  theory  in 
any  branch  of  science  we  find  that  the  theories 
of  any  period  harmonize  with  the  observation 
and  accumulated  knowledge  of  the  period. 
These  theories  are  changed  only  as  new  facts 
and  observations  appear.  So  the  explanation 
of  perception  and  all  action  at  a  distance  by 
corpuscular  emanations  was  held  to  as  long  as 
there  were  no  facts  in  direct  opposition.  As 
facts  accumulated  that  would  not  fit  into  the 
theoretical  scheme,  people  began  to  doubt  it. 
It  was  abandoned  in  one  field  after  another  as 
the  facts  that  would  not  fit  became  numerous 
enough  to  overwhelm  it,  and  a  new  coordination 
was  hit  upon  that  would  be  less  in  conflict  with 
the  observations.  It  is  interesting  to  note  that 
the  senses  that  have  been  most  useful  or  could 
be  most  easily  investigated  were  the  first  to 
accept  the  explanation  in  terms  of  wave  motion. 
In  the  individual,  too,  we  find,  as  experiences 
accumulate,  the  same  increase  in  the  severity 
of  the  tests  that  are  applied.     Children  accept 

U 


BELIEF 

with  relatively  little  question  anything  that  their 
senses  give  them,  or  that  anyone  tells  them. 
The  phrase  childlike  credulity  is  an  accurate 
indication  of  the  facts.  As  they  grow  older 
or  as  knowledge  accumulates  they  become  more 
and  more  difficult  to  satisfy.  Their  credulity 
disappears  with  increasing  age  and  intelligence. 
Fewer  and  fewer  general  statements  will  be  be- 
lieved because  fewer  are  in  harmony  with  their 
knowledge.  Their  beliefs  become  at  once  more 
restricted  and  more  trustworthy  when  tested  by 
the  generally  accepted  standards.  The  indi- 
vidual of  restricted  experience  shares  with  the 
child  ready  belief  and  restricted  doubt.  Illus- 
trations of  both  of  these  statements  will  un- 
doubtedly be  suggested  to  all  without  further 
illustration.  Both  lines  of  evolution  tend  to 
confirm  our  general  thesis  that  belief  is  an  im- 
mediate and  complete  expression  of  the  earlier 
acquired  knowledge  of  the  individual  so  far  as 
he  has  it  ready  to  pass  upon  the  new  experiences] 
and  statements  which  present  themselves. 

The  evidence  in  the  same  direction  from  the 
cases  of  partial  or  artificial  belief  is  no  less 
striking.  Perhaps  the  most  complete  instance 
in  the  normal  life  of  impaired  critical  capacity 
toward  a  mental  construction  is  to  be  found  in 

45 


THE  PSYCHOLOGY  OF  REASONING 

the  dream  state.  It  is  common  experience  that 
while  dreaming  we  believe  the  dream  to  be  real, 
no  matter  how  bizarre  or  unnatural  the  con- 
struction that  results.  However  when  we  recall 
the  dream  on  waking  there  is  no  longer  any 
belief  that  it  could  possibly  be  true.  The  whole 
elaborate  structure  falls  like  a  house  of  cards. 
The  explanation  fits  very  easily  into  our  theory. 
For  whatever  theory  of  sleep  one  may  choose, 
one  is  bound  to  assume  that  during  the  dream 
state  part  of  the  brain  is  awake  while  the 
greater  part  is  still  asleep.  As  a  result  the 
control  of  association  in  the  dream  is  the  expres- 
sion of  but  a  small  portion  of  the  cortex,  of 
only  a  small  portion  of  the  accumulated  ex- 
perience. The  construction  that  harmonizes 
with  the  partial  experience  that  has  controlled 
its  development,  is  entirely  out  of  harmony  with 
the  wider  experience  that  passes  upon  it  when 
it  is  recalled.  When  viewed  in  the  dim  twilight 
of  consciousness  it  is  believed,  but  when  exposed 
to  the  full  daylight  of  complete  consciousness, 
it  becomes  at  once  ^Hhe  stuff  of  which  dreams 
are  made."  The  adequacy  of  belief  is  a  func- 
tion of  the  completeness  of  the  experience  that 
passes  upon  it.  The  same  phenomenon  can  be 
illustrated  even  more  completely  perhaps  in  the 

46 


BELIEF 

misplaced  beliefs  of  the  insane.  Whenever  the 
association  tracts  are  impaired  and  the  corre- 
sponding experiences  thereby  blotted  out  of  the 
nervous  system,  belief  is  impaired  in  much  the 
same  degree  as  knowledge.  That  delusions  per- 
sist and  are  accepted  as  real  is  a  defect  pri- 
marily of  belief.  There  is  no  reasonably  fertile 
mind  in  which  untrue  combinations  of  experi- 
ence do  not  make  their  appearance  from  time 
to  time,  but  in  the  sane  individual  they  are 
refused  belief  and  so  do  not  persist  for  any 
length  of  time.  In  the  paranoiac  the  critical 
powers  are  reduced  and  the  delusions  persist 
and  are  permitted  to  lead  to  action. 

Cases  in  which  hasty  belief  is  revised  at  leis- 
ure are  also  illustrations  of  the  same  general 
principle.  The  ill-considered  acts  arise  from 
acceptance  of  a  course  of  action,  or  from  assent 
to  a  proposition  while  dominated  by  partial 
knowledge.  The  belief  given  is  in  the  light 
of  less  than  the  sum-total  of  the  individual's 
knowledge  of  the  matter  in  question,  certainly 
in  the  light  of  less  than  the  total  amount  of 
knowledge  available  to  him  at  the  time.  The 
later  regret,  if  it  comes  as  often  it  does,  before 
the  decision  has  been  expressed  in  action  and 
new  experience  thereby  accumulated,  is  in  terms 

47 


THE  PSYCHOLOGY  OF  EEASONING 

of  the  wider  knowledge  that  is  then  brought 
to  bear  upon  the  subject.  When  the  unused 
knowledge  is  brought  to  bear,  the  old  belief  is 
found  to  be  out  of  harmony  with  important  ele- 
ments of  experience  and  immediate  rejection 
follows.  If  the  rejection  is  not  so  complete  but 
there  is  wavering  between  two  groups  of  ex- 
perience, belief  is  replaced  by  doubt.  In  all 
of  these  cases  there  is  appeal  from  a  partial 
experience  to  a  complete  experience,  and  the 
decision  of  the  full  bench  stands. 

But  these  cases  of  absolute  belief  followed  by 
just  as  complete  disbelief  are  not  the  only  cases 
of  belief  that  throw  light  upon  our  problem. 
Many  instances  of  partial  belief  persist  over 
long  intervals  of  time  and  these  are  recognized, 
too,  as  partial  beliefs  during  the  entire  period 
of  their  persistence.  Most  artistic  and  aesthetic 
beliefs  come  under  this  head.  AVhen  one  reads 
a  novel  there  is  belief  of  a  kind,  but  not  com- 
plete belief.  One  believes  in  the  work  as  a 
study  of  character  under  the  conditions  that  are 
assumed,  and  of  the  characters  as  they  are 
assumed  to  exist.  In  a  word,  one  puts  one's 
self  artificially  in  the  mood  of  the  author  and 
believes  that  were  the  conditions  as  he  assumed 
them  to  be  when  he  wrote,  the  outcome  would 

48 


BELIEF 

be  as  he  asserts  it  to  be.  If  he  departs  from 
his  tacit  assumptions  we  at  once  say  that  his  art 
is  false.  As  long  as  his  development  harmo- 
nizes with  his  presuppositions  we  are  content  to 
believe;  his  art  is  true.  Were  one  at  any  mo- 
ment to  look  at  the  statements  as  one  would 
historic  fact,  it  would  appear  that  one  did  not 

'  believe  and  could  not  believe.  One  consciously 
reads  with  an  artificially  limited  experience, 
and  as  long  as  the  experience  that  tests  is  lim- 
ited in  this  way,  one  believes  in  part,  but  is 
aware  that  the  belief  is  in  part.  It  is  prob- 
able that  the  limitation  of  the  testing  experi- 
ence arises  automatically  at  the  suggestion  of 
the  peculiar  style  of  the  novelist.  This  is  not 
restricted  to  the  ^^once  upon  a  time''  of  the 
story  book,  but  the  whole  tenor  of  the  construc- 
tion and  even  the  outside  appearance  of  the 
book  carries  with  it  an  incentive  to  look  at  the 

i  story  from  the  attitude  of  partial  belief.     This 

I  suggestion  serves  unconsciously  to  limit  the  ex- 
perience of  the  reader  in  the  same  way  that  the 
experience  of  the  writer  was  limited  while  writ- 
ing.   Here  as  in  the  dream  state  so  long  as  the 

I  experience  that  tests  is  the  same  as  the  experi- 
ence that  produces,  there  is  belief.  Whenever 
the  experience  is  widened,  as  it  is  when  one 

49 


THE  PSYCHOLOGY  OF  REASONING 

asks  the  question,  *'Is  this  really  trueT'  belief 
departs. 

This  testing  of  the  presentation  by  a  partial 
experience,  a  partial  knowledge,  is  character- 
istic of  the  artistic  consciousness  wherever  we 
find  it.    In  music,  in  painting,  in  sculpture,  as 
in  the  novel  and  on  the  stage,  what  is  character- 
istic of  the  attitude  of  the  artist  during  the 
development  and  of  the  appreciator  in  his  en- 
joyment of  the  works  of  art,  is  the  limitation  of 
the  extent  of  the  guiding  and  testing  experience. 
AVith  him  one  is  willing  and  able  for  the  mo- 
ment to  emphasize  one  phase  of  one's  experi- 
ence and  through  that,  one  phase  of  life,  while  l 
everything  else  is  for  the  moment  excluded.  ] 
Enjoyment  comes  from  the  fact  that  one  can  1 
for  a  time  banish  all  conflicting  considerations 
and  look  with  an  eye  single  to  that  phase  or 
aspect  of  life.     The  fact  that  the  figure  is  of  ^ 
marble,  not  flesh,  that  the  painting  is  flat,  that 
the  scenery  on  the  stage  is  canvas,  is  not  per- 
mitted to  interfere  with  the  truth  that  is  de- 
picted.   If  one  fails  to  perceive  the  picture's 
meaning,  persists  in  looking  in  the  light  of  a  ] 
complete  experience  or  under  any  other  set  of 
experiences  than  that  intended  by  the  artist, 
there  is  no  truth  and  so  no  pleasure.    In  this 

50 


BELIEF 

respect  one  must  agree  with  Schiller  and  his 
numerous  disciples  that  art  is  like  play.  In 
play,  too,  we  are  content  to  put  aside  many  of 
the  realities  of  life  and  to  make  believe  for  the 
moment  that  they  do  not  exist.  And  the  im- 
portance of  play  is  due  to  the  fact  that  all  that 
makes  for  disbelief  can  be  momentarily  ex- 
cluded from  our  consciousness,  that  we  may 
judge  the  actions  of  ourselves  and  others  le- 
niently and  partially.  The  child  with  smaller 
amounts  of  experience,  and  with  fewer  of  the 
stern  habits  of  life  and  business  has  consider- 
ably less  difficulty  in  reducing  to  the  minimum 
the  knowledge  by  which  he  tests  events  and 
consequently  has  less  difficulty  in  playing  and 
more  enjoyment  from  the  simpler  plays.  All 
that  distinguishes  these  beliefs  of  the  artistic 
consciousness  from  the  beliefs  of  the  dream 
state,  or  from  the  beliefs  of  the  paranoiac  in  his 
delusions  is  that  they  are  consciously  partial, 
and  that  they  may  be  dissolved  at  will  whenever 
the  necessities  of  daily  life  demand.  All  alike 
illustrate  the  dependence  of  belief  upon  the  ac- 
cumulated experience,  particularly  upon  the 
accumulated  experiences  that  chance  for  the 
moment  to  be  dominant. 
We  might  class  among  these  temporary  and 
51 


THE  PSYCHOLOGY  OF  REASONIXG 

partial  beliefs  the  belief  under  definitely  formu- 
lated suppositions,  that  are  not  in  themselves 
known  to  exist.  One  is  constantly  saying, 
granted  that  the  new  president  is  a  believer 
in  civil  service,  we  shall  have  a  better  adminis- 
tration, or  at  least  the  appointment  of  better 
qualified  men  to  the  offices.  Of  course  no 
assumption  is  made  as  to  the  truth,  but  we  are 
recognizing  a  definite  possible  limitation  of  our 
experience  and  permitting  our  mind  to  run  on 
under  its  control.  This  is  a  frequent  and  im- 
portant practical  attitude.  That  it  is  allied  to 
the  partial  belief  of  the  artistic  and  the  play 
consciousness  is  apparent.  We  need  but  to 
mention  it  in  passing  in  this  connection  because 
it  must  be  given  extended  discussion  in  connec- 
tion with  judgment  and  inference.  It  is  at  the 
basis  of  the  hypothetical  propositions  that  we 
shall  have  occasion  to  discuss  later. 

All  departures  from  belief  and  modified 
forms  of  belief,  as  well  as  belief  itself,  seem 
:o  justify  the  original  assertion  that  belief  is 
one  of  the  necessary  results  of  the  cooperation 
of  older  experiences  with  new  in  the  formation 
of  any  mental  process.  As  all  experiences  con- 
tribute in  some  small  degree  to  the  control  of 
mental  operations  and  to  an  amplification  of 


BELIEF 

the  simple  datum  of  sense  or  to  the  hardly  less 
simple  resultant  from  association,  so  all  experi- 
ences pass  upon  the  accuracy  of  each  perception 
and  of  each  statement  made  and  heard  by  the 
speaker  or  his  auditor.  If  this  be  the  correct 
analysis  of  belief,  it  follows  that  beliefs  grow, 
that  they  can  not  be  made  or  even  controlled. 
Belief  can  change  only  with  change  in  knowl- 
edge. One  can  no  more  change  one's  belief 
arbitrarily  than  one  can  change  one's  height 
or  one's  health.  Given  one  stage  in  the  devel- 
opment of  knowledge,  one  kind  of  belief  is  just 
as  certain  to  result  as  an  unsupported  ball  is 
certain  to  fall  to  the  ground.  True  the  same 
man  does  not  believe  the  same  thing  at  all  times, 
but  it  is  also  true  that  the  same  set  of  experi- 
ences is  not  active  at  all  times  in  any  one  man. 
One  can  change  the  belief  of  any  individual 
either  by  giving  him  new  and  different  experi- 
ences, or  by  so  presenting  a  statement  that  it 
shall  arouse  a  different  set  of  experiences  to 
pass  upon  the  statement.  Both  methods  are  ap- 
i  plied  in  practical  argumentation.  The  effect- 
jiveness  of  a  plea  depends  upon  the  success  with 
which  new  groups  of  experiences  can  be  roused 
to  give  the  attitude  that  is  desired.  "When  the 
attitude  is  properly  aroused  belief  follows  as 

53 


THE  PSYCHOLOGY  OF  REASONING 

a  matter  of  course.    It  is  asserted  by  some  re- 
ligious cults  that  certain  forms  of  belief  can  and 
should  be  aroused  at  will.     This  is  not  far  from 
the  doctrine  that  Professor  James  holds  in  his 
**Will  to  Believe.*^     From  the  point  of  view 
we  have  reached,  it  would  be  just  as  absurd  to 
exhort  anyone  to  change  his  belief  without  new 
evidence  or  new  interpretation  of  old  evidence 
as  it  would  to  exhort  him  to  hasten  his  pulse, 
or  to  increase  his  stature.    Even  if  he  endeav- 
ored to  comply,  the  most  that  could  result  would 
be  a  pretense  before  the  world,  in  which  there 
would  be  neither  practical  efficiency  nor  any 
great  virtue.    And  as  a  matter  of  fact  will  and 
belief  are  undoubtedly  common  products  of  the 
same  deeper  lying  forces.    Whatever  appeals  to 
us  strongly  enough  to  tempt  us  to  desire  to  be- 
lieve, by  the  very  same  appeal  compels  belief. 
The  only  exceptions  are  found  where  social  re- 
wards come  from  pretending  to  believe.     And  in  ^j 
these  cases  we  probably  should  be  able  to  carry  j 
on  the  pretense  without  belief,  but  it  is  a  ques-  | 
tion  how  long  it  would  be  before  pretense  gave  J 
belief.    It  is  as  necessary  to  believe  to  will  as  it  ' 
is  to  will  to  believe;  indeed,  the  former  is  the 
normal  and  usual  order. 
In  this  discussion  as  throughout  I  have  paid 
54 


BELIEF 

QO  attention  to  two  important  elements  in  the 
experiences  that  make  for  belief.  These  are  the 
effects  of  actual  trial,  and  the  influences  of 
society.  I  have  omitted  to  mention  them,  not 
because  they  are  in  my  opinion  unimportant, 
for  they  are  probably  the  two  most  important 
kinds  of  experience  in  the  development  of  be- 
lief, but  because  the  more  prominent  fac- 
tor in  belief  is  the  fact  of  the  interaction  of 
lexperiences  rather  than  the  nature  of  any  of  the 
experiences  that  interact.  The  most  important 
single  group  of  facts  concerned  in  deciding  how 
we  shall  believe  are  the  results  of  earlier  activi- 
ties. Every  idea  has  been  put  to  some  kind 
of  practical  test,  and  the  results  of  this  test 
or  tests  constitute  the  most  important  part  of 
the  ideas  in  control  of  later  belief.  Further- 
more, whenever  belief  comes  we  are  likely  to  test 
it  by  acting  upon  it,  where  in  the  nature  of  the 
case  action  is  possible.  It  is  in  this  that  we 
find  the  truth  of  Bain's  doctrine  and  of  modern 
pragmatism.  Far  from  disputing  the  state- 
ment, I  am  concerned  only  to  point  out  that  the 
grounds  of  action  and  of  belief  are  one,  and  that 
'both  are  to  be  found  in  the  accumulated  experi- 
ences of  the  individual,  many  of  which  in  turn 
have  been  derived  from  the  results  of  action. 
5  55 


THE  PSYCHOLOGY  OF  EEASONING 

Hardly  to  be  distinguislied  from  the  active 
experiences  in  importance  are  the  elements  in 
belief  that  come  from  the  interaction  of  the  indi- 
vidual with  his  fellows.  Most  experiences  are 
of  social  origin.  Practically  all  of  our  knowl- 
edge, at  least  all  of  our  early  knowledge  on  all 
important  matters,  is  taken  on  hearsay.  With 
the  borrowed  knowledge  there  comes  borrowed 
belief.  The  religion,  politics,  medical  dogmas 
and  so  on  of  the  young  and  of  the  masses  are 
obtained  at  second  hand,  and  too  often  from 
unintelligent  or  prejudiced  sources.  As  a  re- 
sult, the  belief  of  the  community  becomes  the 
belief  of  the  individual.  Any  slight  or  even 
great  discrepancy  in  these  subjects  between 
actual  outcome  and  the  cherished  belief  is  cov- 
ered by  the  fact  that  the  products  of  observa- 
tion are  never  clear-cut,  that  it  is  necessary  to 
compare  results  over  long  periods  or  to  collect 
numerous  cases,  before  a  conclusion  can  be 
established.  Ignorance  of  statistics,  or  indif- 
ference to  them  as  compared  with  the  few  cases 
that  come  under  actual  observation,  sustains 
the  original  ignorant  belief.  In  this  sense  the 
majority  of  beliefs  have  a  social  origin, 
although  it  must  be  asserted  that  advance  or 
change  in  belief  comes  from  the  individual,  not 

56 


BELIEF 

from  society.  The  individual  is  ever  originat- 
ing new  theories  which  he  refers  to  society  for 
its  approval. 

So  far  we  have  been  dealing  with  the  question 
of  the  conditions  and  functions  of  belief,  but  we 
have  not  raised  the  question  whether  there  is  a 
distinctive  quality  that  attaches  to  the  conscious 
state  that  is  believed,  that  marks  it  off  from  the 
state  that  is  refused  belief  or  held  in  suspense. 
On  this  question  there  seems  to  be  much  differ- 
ence of  opinion.  Brentano  and  Wundt  would 
apparently  make  belief  a  feeling  on  much  the 
same  level  as  any  other  feeling.  Brentano 
would  even  make  it  one  of  the  three  funda- 
mental conscious  processes.  Others  from  their 
silence  apparently  do  not  give  assent.  Certain 
it  is  that  the  function  is  easier  to  demonstrate 
than  the  existence  of  a  state  or  structure.  Per- 
sonally I  can  discover  in  a  moment  of  belief 
nothing  but  the  stable  persistence  of  the  idea  or 
state  that  is  believed.  If  doubt  is  functionally 
the  positive  process,  one  might  suspect  that  it 
might  also  be  the  process  to  which  the  distin- 
guishing structural  characteristic  attaches.  In 
a  measure  the  conjecture  corresponds  to  ob- 
served fact.  But  even  doubt  has  few  enough 
characteristics.    In  doubt  one  state  of  opinion 

57 


THE  PSYCHOLOGY  OF  REASONING 

follows  another,  consciousness  is  unstable.  In 
extreme  cases  some  positive  discomfort  may 
show  itself.  Sometimes  it  seems  that  the  com- 
peting masses  of  experience  reveal  themselves 
even  when  there  is  no  definite  presence  of  the 
corresponding  interpretation.  Certain  it  is 
that  we  doubt  in  many  cases  when  there  is  no 
evidence  in  consciousness  of  what  the  alterna- 
tive is  to  be.  What  gives  doubt  is  often  very 
difficult  to  ^x  upon  and  still  more  difficult  to 
describe.  Much  the  same  answer  must  be  given 
if  we  ask  what  marks  off  the  artistic  conscious- 
ness of  partial  belief  from  the  matter-of-fact 
attitude  of  total  belief.  All  that  can  be  said 
is  that  we  never  make  a  mistake  in  the  actual 
interpretation,  but  that  we  cannot,  or  at  least  I 
cannot,  pick  out  any  particular  quality  that  jus- 
tifies or  characterizes  the  state.  The  function 
is  easy  to  establish,  the  structure  is  hard  to 
find.  Belief  is  the  harmony  of  the  part  that 
is  believed  with  the  whole  of  experience. 
Doubt,  not  belief,  is  the  positive  process. 
Whatever  is  not  doubted  is  believed.  Doubt  is 
characterized  by  a  conflict  of  interpretations  of 
an  object  or  a  statement.  The  consciousness  of 
doubt  or  belief  comes  not  from  the  particular 
element  but  from  the  interacting  masses  of 

58 


BELIEF 

experience.  The  quality  of  doubt  or  belief 
is  difficult  to  describe.  It  is  not  even  pos- 
sible to  say  whether  there  is  a  quality  of  be- 
I  lief  apart  from  the  total  consciousness  of  every- 
thing else. 


CHAPTER   III 

MEANING  AND  THE  CONCEPT 

A  second  characteristic  of  the 
operation  is  that  it  deals  with  general  state- 
ments, is  ordinarily  concerned,  not  with  bare 
meaningless  particulars,  but  with  things  that 
have  meaning,  and  with  statements  and  opera- 
tions that  may  apply  to  classes  not  to  individ- 
uals. One  may  think  of  man  and  mean  no  par- 
ticular man,  as  well  as  John  Smith.  One  may 
think  of  an  abstract  quality  in  no  particular 
connection  as  well  as  of  a  single  object  of  that 
quality.  This  fact  is  important  for  all  formal 
logic  and  for  modern  logic  and  psychology.  At 
least  four  phases  of  this  problem  may  be  distin- 
guished. First, — how  is  it  possible  for  a  single 
mental  state  or  process  to  stand  for  or  repre- 
sent all  of  the  particulars  that  are  meant  when 
we  use  the  term?  Second, — how  is  it  possible 
for  the  concrete  mental  image  to  represent  ab- 
stract qualities  1  Third, — what  is  it  that  repre- 
sents the  particular  and  the  abstract?    And 

60 


MEANING  AND  THE  CONCEPT 

finally, — what  is  the  nature  of  the  abstract  itself 
that  is  represented  ?  These  four  questions  have 
not  all  presented  themselves  to  the  same  minds. 
Perhaps  all  four  questions  could  not  present 
themselves  definitely  to  the  same  mind  at  the 
same  time  for  it  is  not  improvable  that  some 
are  mutually  exclusive,  but  all  have  played  a 
part  in  the  theory  of  logic  and  psychology,  and 
it  would  probably  be  possible  to  find  all  repre- 
sented at  any  period  of  the  history  of  logic,  if 
not  of  psychology. 

We  can  group  the  treatment  of  the  problems 
about  two  general  topics.  These  are,  first,  what 
is  meaning ;  second,  what  is  the  concept.  About 
the  one  cluster  the  various  theories  as  to  how 
one  mental  state  may  do  duty  for  many,  or  the 
concrete  for  the  abstract;  the  other  discusses 
the  question  of  what  it  is  that  represents  or 
is  represented.  The  one  may  be  discussed  un- 
der meaning,  the  other  under  the  concept. 
True,  these  two  terms  have  not  always  been  re- 
stricted to  the  significance  I  am  giving  them. 
Each  has  been  used  to  designate  the  fact  I  have 
designated  by  the  other.  And  even  when  most 
closely  defined,  the  two  functions  have  much  in 
common.  But  a  fringe  of  each  is  always  dis- 
tinct and  it  seems  that  more  is  to  be  gained  by 

61 


THE  PSYCHOLOGY  OF  REASONING 

retaining  the  two  terms  and  circumscribing  the 
meaning  of  each  than  by  attempting  to  fuse 
the  two  problems  into  one,  similar  as  they  may 
be  in  general. 

Currency  was  given  to  the  word  and  to  the 
problem  of  meaning  by  the  logical  writings  of 
Bradley  and  Bosanquet.  Bradley  used  it  to  per- 
mit him  to  speak  of  mental  operations  in  some 
other  terms  than  those  used  by  Mill  in  his  psy- 
chology. He  accepted  Mill's  description  as 
true  of  the  concrete  actual  mind,  but  as  he 
rightly  insists,  we  need  something  else  to  ex- 
plain the  thinking  processes.  This  need  is  sat- 
isfied by  the  world  of  meanings,  connected  with 
the  images  in  a  way  that  he  does  not  make  at 
all  explicit.  In  Bradley's  words  every  idea 
has  two  aspects.  From  one  point  of  view  it 
is  merely  an  image,  a  psychological  somewhat, 
and  nothing  more.  From  the  other  it  is  a 
symbol  of  a  general  idea  or  of  a  universal  mean- 
ing. In  this  use  it  is  no  longer  individual;  it 
is  typical,  representative.  For  Bosanquet  the 
image  that  one  uses  when  one  thinks  stands  in 
the  same  relation  to  the  thing,  that  signal  flags 
do  to  the  messages.  The  flag  with  its  color  and 
form  is  not  at  all  similar  to  the  message  that 
it  transmits,  but  serves  its  representative  func- 

62 


MEANING  AND  THE  CONCEPT 

tion  admirably.  In  this  sense  Bradley  and 
Bosanquet  both  insist  that  mental  images  never 
are  what  they  mean.  They  are  just  bare  exist- 
ences in  crude  outline,  but  they  mean  real  flesh 
and  blood  beings  in  the  most  concrete  sense. 

It  must  be  said  of  the  theory  of  Bradley  and 
Bosanquet  that  the  thing  meant  is  not  some 
more  concrete  process,  what  in  the  language  of 
the  man  in  the  street  would  be  called  a  thing, 
but  is  always  a  more  developed  general  idea 
that  is,  as  it  always  has  been,  a  prototype  of  all 
particulars.  They  also  tend  to  use  the  term 
meaning  in  a  second  sense  as  this  general  idea 
which  is  represented  by  the  image.  The  system 
of  general  ideas  they  would  call  the  world  of 
meanings.  In  this  world  all  is  closely  intercon- 
nected. It  is  a  world  of  completely  developed 
relations  and  is  a  world  of  universals,  of  types, 
not  of  concrete  or  individual  ideas.  They  were 
driven  to  this  world,  as  has  been  said  above, 
because  they  could  not  understand  how  think- 
ing could  go  on  in  a  mind  of  the  kind  that  Mill 
describes  where  there  is  nothing  but  discrete 
and  disconnected  elements,  with  no  principle  of 
interrelation  wider  than  the  associative  connec- 
tion between  contiguous  or  successive  ideas. 
The  process   of   coming   into   mind   seems   to 

63 


THE  PSYCHOLOGY  OF  SEASONING 

them  to  have  two  parts.  First  the  given  comes 
into  the  concrete  mind,  into  the  world  of  bare 
images,  and  then  into  the  world  of  meanings 
or  of  universals.  This  distinction  is  perhaps 
more  marked  for  Bradley  than  for  Bosanquet, 
but  even  for  the  latter  the  two  realms  seem  to 
be  distinct,  and  how  anything  may  pass  from 
one  to  the  other  constitutes  one  of  the  impor- 
tant problems  of  logic. 

The  theories  of  the  nature  of  the  concept 
developed  earlier  and  along  a  slightly  different 
line.  The  attack  upon  the  problem  was  much 
more  direct,  but  the  results  in  many  respects 
have  been  similar.  Historically,  the  problem 
of  the  concept  has  been  primarily  the  problem 
of  representation.  The  earlier  history  of  the 
discussions  of  the  concept  contains  many  un- 
necessary complications.  We  need  not  go  into 
these,  but  we  can  proceed  at  once  to  a  statement 
of  the  problem  as  it  stands  to-day.  In  simplest 
terms  the  representative  function  of  any  mental 
state  -depends  upon  its  associations,  its  connec- 
tions with  many  other  mental  processes.  This 
representative  function  has  been  traced  by 
Wundt  to  the  fact  that  the  image  is  replaceable 
by  any  one  of  a  large  group  of  other  images 
that  have  been  in  consciousness.     The  triangle 

64 


MEANING  AND  THE  CONCEPT 

thought  or  even  seen  on  the  page  is  representa- 
tive because  it  has  been  connected  at  different 
times  with  all  other  triangles  and  any  one  of 
them  might  be  substituted  for  it.  The  state- 
mjent  is  true  for  the  facts  of  recall,  but  does  not 
literally  describe  the  way  the  connection  was 
established.  The  representative  image  could 
not  have  been  seen  simultaneously  with  each 
particular  that  it  represents.  The  number  of 
particulars  is  too  great,  and  observation  shows 
that  the  concept  means  things  with  which  it 
could  not  have  been  associated. 

The  genesis  of  the  concept  tends  to  confirm 
the  statement  that  it  depends  in  part  upon  the 
associations  it  has  made.  The  greater  the 
number  of  relations  into  which  the  representa- 
tive image  has  entered,  the  wider  is  its  meaning. 
For  the  child  the  word,  color,  can  mean  only 
the  particular  shades  that  he  has  seen.  Every 
new  color  presented  enriches  the  word  by  just 
so  much.  The  same  enrichment  of  the  concept 
would  be  present  if  the  representative  in  con- 
sciousness were  not  a  word,  but  were  some  par- 
ticular image  or  anything  else  that  had  come 
to  be  representative  of  the  mass  of  particular 
elements.  If,  for  example,  one  has  always  con- 
nected a  right  angle  triangle  with  other  forms 

65 


THE  PSYCHOLOGY  OF  EEASONING 

of  triangle,  or  what  is  the  more  natural  order 
has  always  connected  the  right  triangle  with 
each  kind  of  triangle  as  it  is  presented,  the  right 
triangle  would  come  to  represent  all  others  in 
thought.  Whenever  any  form  is  to  be  treated 
in  a  mental  operation,  what  would  be  present 
in  mind  would  be  not  the  form  itself,  but  would 
be  the  right  triangle.  Kepresentation  would 
then  be  fundamentally  dependent  upon  the  fact 
that  the  mental  process  in  question  might  be 
replaced  by  any  one  of  the  particular  elements 
without  having  it  necessary  to  change  any  of 
the  uses  to  which  the  imagery  actually  used 
might  be  put.  This  possibility  of  replacement 
depends  primarily  upon  the  associative  connec- 
tions of  the  representative  element,  but  one 
would  hardly  dare  to  say  that  everything  that 
it  represents  has  actually  been  associated  with 
it  at  some  time  in  the  past. 

In  addition  to  the  connections  that  may  be 
reinstated,  some  conscious  sign  that  these  par- 
ticular connections  and  no  others  are  in  exist- 
ence undoubtedly  attaches  to  the  element  itself. 
Thus,  when  one  is  using  a  right  triangle  as 
representatives  of  all  triangles,  it  will  be  used 
in  different  ways  and  with  more  associates  than 
when  one  is  using  the  same  mental  impression 


MEANING  AND  THE  CONCEPT 

as  a  symbol  for  right  triangles  alone,  and  that 
in  spite  of  the  fact  that  the  image  is  identical 
in  the  two  cases.  What  this  difference  is  it  is 
not  easy  to  say  from  an  analysis  of  the  con- 
scious content.  Wundt  calls  it  the  concept  feel- 
ing, but  that  is  not  to  describe  it  and  Wundt  is 
always  very  ready  with  names  for  processes, 
vague  feeling  processes  at  least,  that  give  very 
little  enlightenment  concerning  the  nature  of 
the  mental  state  and  are  accompanied  by  very 
little  description  of  the  feelings  that  are  desig- 
nated. That  there  is  something  in  conscious- 
ness that  checks  a  use  of  the  mental  state  when 
one  is  inclined  to  use  it  in  a  way  that  the  con- 
crete things  it  represents  would  not  permit, 
seems  to  me  indisputable,  but  how  much  con- 
sciousness may  attach  to  this  inhibiting  func- 
tion is  a  question  that  I  am  not  prepared  to 
answer  on  the  basis  of  my  own  introspection. 
If  there  be  any  consciousness,  it  must  corre- 
spond to  the  wider  connections  of  the  mental 
state  at  the  moment  and  not  to  the  mental  state 
itself.  There  can  not  be  consciousness  of  all 
the  associations  into  which  it  has  entered  in 
the  past  because,  as  we  have  seen,  not  all  of  the 
associates  are  effective  in  controlling  the  uses 
to  which  the  concept  may  be  put.     Our  triangle 

67 


THE  PSYCHOLOGY  OF  REASONING 

would  have  one  set  of  uses  and  on  our  present 
theory  one  set  of  feelings  when  it  meant  one 
thing ;  another  use  and  another  feeling  when  it 
represented  another.  Certainly,  it  is  hardly  to 
be  supposed  that  the  image  as  a  separate  ele- 
ment has  a  different  quality  when  it  represents 
one  set  of  particulars,  and  another  when  it  rep-  J 
resents  another  set.  For  the  same  image,  con-  *" 
sidered  as  an  image,  does  duty  not  for  one 
set  of  particulars  alone,  but  for  many  such  sets. 
If  the  quality  were  the  differentia  it  would  be 
necessary  to  assume  that  each  representing 
element  would  have  as  many  possible  qualities  ,. 
as  there  were  different  sets  of  particulars  that  i 
it  might  represent.  Evidently,  then,  the  con- 
sciousness that  marks  the  representative  ele-  11 
ment  as  representative,  as  distinct  from  the 
same  state  as  non-representative,  cannot  be 
found  in  the  mental  state  itself.  The  conscious- 
ness that  a  mental  state  is  representative  in 
one  way  at  one  time  and  in  another  way  at 
another  is  not  to  be  related  to  the  core  of  the 
image.  Physiologically,  at  least,  the  conscious- 
ness must  be  dependent  upon  the  connections, 
as  is  evident  from  the  fact  that  the  uses  to 
which  the  element  is  put  depend  for  their  nature 
upon  the  experience  of  the  individual  in  the 

68 


MEANING  AND  THE  CONCEPT 

past.  Even  this  can  not  be  the  whole  story, 
however,  because  the  function  shows  that  what 
is  effective  is  not  the  entire  mass  of  associates, 
but  merely  one  small  group  that  changes  from 
moment  to  moment  with  the  group  of  particu- 
lars represented. 

If  on  the  one  hand  the  consciousness  that 
marks  the  mental  state  as  representative  does 
not  belong  to  the  element  alone,  but  to  its  con- 
nections, and  on  the  other  hand  does  not  belong 
to  all  of  its  connections  but  to  certain  ones 
only,  it  is  evidently  essential  to  discover  the 
elements  or  processes  that  contribute  something 
to  the  consciousness  of  the  moment  as  well  as 
serve  to  extend  the  consciousness  of  the  image 
beyond  the  simple  state.  This,  I  think,  we  may 
discover  in  the  purpose  or  momentary  mental 
set  that  controls  the  course  of  association  at 
any  moment.  This  purpose  or  context  it  is 
that  limits  the  associates  that  may  be  aroused 
by  our  triangle.  At  one  time  it  limits  the  ef- 
fective associates  to  right  triangles  of  all 
shapes  and  forms,  and  at  another  moment  it 
extends  the  possibility  of  excitation  to  all  tri- 
angles of  any  kind  whatsoever.  If  the  prob- 
lem be  understood  to  deal  with  the  properties 
of  but  one  kind  of  triangle  the  associates  are 

69 


THE  PSYCHOLOGY  OF  KEASONING 

limited  by  this  understanding,  this  context,  to 
that  one  sort  of  figure.  If  the  purpose  be  to 
attain  some  knowledge  of  triangles  in  general, 
the  field  of  representation  is  extended  to  cover 
all  types.  Apparently,  then,  the  consciousness 
that  attaches  to  the  representative  image  is  not 
confined  to  that  process  alone,  but  is  extended 
to  include  all  the  ideas  that  are  likely  to  be 
recalled  by  that  element  under  the  given  con- 
trolling purpose,  in  the  given  context.  If  we 
look  at  the  matter  physiologically,  we  may  say 
that  consciousness  during  one  of  these  proc- 
esses of  representation  is  not  restricted  to  the 
nerve  cell  or  group  of  nerve  cells  that  would 
ordinarily  be  aroused  by  what  we  call  the  sim- 
ple sensation,  but  that  it  corresponds  to  that 
set  of  nerve  cells  plus  all  the  other  nerve 
cells  and  connections  of  nerve  cells  that  might 
be  aroused  by  it  at  that  moment  and  in  that 
context.  What  gives  variety  to  the  conscious- 
ness as  the  representative  function  changes,  is 
the  different  set  of  associated  cells  that  are 
aroused  to  partial  activity  in  the  different  con- 
texts. Whether  the  cells  are  actually  partly 
aroused,  are  in  a  state  of  slight  excitation,  or 
the  consciousness  attaches  to  the  mere  tendency 
toward  association,  is  a  matter  of  indifference 


MEANING  AND  THE  CONCEPT 

to  our  present  problem.  We  would  find  the 
consciousness  that  marks  a  mental  state  as  rep- 
resentative, not  in  the  state  itself,  but  in  the 
wider  group  of  connections  in  which  it  is  pre- 
sented, and  in  certain  associated  processes 
which  it  tends  to  arouse.  It  is  not  even  certain 
that  any  particular  consciousness  attaches  to 
the  state  to  distinguish  it  as  representative 
from  the  same  state  as  non-representative. 
Certain  it  is  that  the  uses  to  which  it  can  be 
put  are  different  in  the  two  cases  and  it  is 
more  important  to  discover  the  difference  in 
use  than  to  determine  the  quality  of  conscious- 
ness. Another  aspect  of  the  concept  brings  us 
back  close  to  the  problem  of  meaning  as  it  has 
already  been  discussed  in  connection  with  the 
logic  of  Bradley  and  Bosanquet.  We  think  of 
things  as  general  and  of  abstract  qualities. 
The  conscious  representatives  of  things  in  gen- 
eral correspond  very  closely  to  the  meaning  of 
Bradley.  It  remains  to  decide  whether  the  con- 
cepts as  they  are  found  in  mind  at  all  resemble 
the  elements  of  the  world  of  meanings  as  they 
are  described  by  the  modern  logicians. 

The  first  element  of  the  description  furnished. 
by  the  neo-Hegelians   suggestive  of  the  real 
mind  is  that  the  world  of  meanings  is  typical. 
6  71 


THE  PSYCHOLOGY  OP  REASONING 

If  we  examine  any  bit  of  thinking,  particularly 
any  bit  of  abstract  representation,  we  find  that 
we  have  in  mind  not  the  image  of  any  individual 
thing,  but  a  more  general  type  that  resembles 
no  one  experience  more  than  any  other,  but 
which  stands  for  all.  This  typical  idea  is  the 
one  most  used;  the  experience  that  will  satisfy 
the  largest  number  of  practical  needs.  We  are 
likely  to  regard  the  typical  as  real,  as  opposed 
to  the  departures  from  it  that  are  treated  as 
mere  ideas.  Illustrations  are  to  be  found  most 
readily  perhaps  in  the  realm  of  space  percep- 
tion. I  have  seen  my  study  table  quite  as  often 
as  a  trapezoid  as  I  have  as  a  rectangle,  yet  I 
never  think  of  it  as  anything  other  than  as  hav- 
ing a  square  top  with  the  legs  perpendicular 
to  the  top.  All  the  other  perceptions  have  van- 
ished, this  persists.  It  alone  is  recalled  when- 
ever I  think  of  the  table.  Similar  types  or 
standards  of  reference  tend  to  grow  up  for  a 
class  as  well  as  for  the  different  forms  that  are 
assumed  by  the  same  object  under  the  condi- 
tions of  perception.  The  table  that  serves  me 
as  a  standard  of  reference  in  my  thinking  proc- 
esses is  some  piece  of  furniture  that  has  all  of 
the  essentials  of  the  class  with  none  of  the  parts 
that  are  present  for  adornment  only.    The  type 

72 


MEANING  AND  THE  CONCEPT 

in  this  instance  is  much  less  definitely  repre- 
sented, and  in  some  minds  is,  as  will  be  seen 
later,  not  definitely  pictured  at  all.  But  even 
at  that,  what  remains  is  probably  to  be  regarded 
as  a  part  or  product  of  the  typical  image. 

That  this  tendency  to  think  in  terms  of  types 
or  standards  is  very  general  is  not  assumed 
upon  the  basis  of  chance  observation  and  intro- 
spection alone,  but  has  been  demonstrated  in  a 
number  of  experimental  investigations.    In  the 

•  recognition  experiments  of  Lehmann  ^  we  have 
what  is  perhaps  the  locus  classicus,  Lehmann, 
it  will  be  remembered,  found  that  in  recogniz- 
ing grays,  there  was  always  a  tendency  to  recog- 
nize shades  in  terms  of  the  words  that  had  been 
assigned    on    the    original    presentation.    As 

•many  different  shades  could  be  recognized  on 
representation  as  there  were  words  in  the  vo- 
cabulary of  the  subject.  Early  there  were  six 
words,  and  six  shades  could  be  immediately 
recognized.  When  numbers  were  associated 
with  the  shades,  and  were  repeated  often 
enough  to  become  well  fixed,  as  many  shades 
could  be  kept  distinct  as  there  were  numbers. 
Practice  carried  the  numbers  to  nine,  and  it 

1  Lehmann :  "Ueber  das  Wiedererkennen,"  Phil.  Studien,  VII. 
4  469. 

73 

t 


THE  PSYCHOLOGY  OF  REASONING 

was  found  that  the  process  of  recognition  con- 
sisted in  assigning  the  color  that  was  presented 
to  its  number.  The  number  seemed  to  serve  as 
the  standard  for  recognition.  Similarly,  if  one 
attempts  to  recall  colors  and  grays,  it  will  be 
noticed  that  all  can  be  recalled  that  have  been 
given  definite  names,  that  correspond  to  distinct 
types.  These  results  have  since  been  con- 
firmed by  a  number  of  observers.  Moreover,  in 
some  instances  it  is  not  necessary  to  recall  the 
word,  but  the  standard  may  be  present  as  a 
vague  image  or  even  something  less  than  an 
image.  Here  the  reference  is  to  the  standard, 
but  the  standard  is  ideated  in  somewhat  indefi- 
nite terms.  Thus,  in  Dr.  Hay  den's  ^  experi- 
ments on  the  recognition  of  lifted  weights,  the 
second  weight  was  not  compared  with  the  first, 
but  each  was  compared  with  a  standard.  This 
standard  was  only  vaguely  pictured,  but  there 
was  little  difficulty  in  being  sure  that  the  weight 
offered  was  heavier  or  lighter  than  the  sub- 
jective standard.  Similar  results  have  been 
found  in  estimating  or  comparing  lengths  of 
movements.  Schumann  found  standards  of 
time  that  seemed  to  develop  in  the  course  of 

1  Hayden :  "Memory  for  Lifted  Weights,"  Am.  Jour.  Psych.f 
13,  p.  497. 

74 


MEANING  AND  THE  CONCEPT 

short  intervals  of  practice,  in  comparison  with 
which  intervals  were  judged  to  be  short  or  long. 
In  both  of  the  last  mentioned  cases  motor  ad- 
justments undoubtedly  get  established  as  the 
result  of  frequent  repetitions.  The  same  sort 
of  thing  is  to  be  seen  in  the  Einstellung  of 
Mtiller  and  Schumann  in  the  experiments  on 
lifted  weights.  Weights  seemed  very  heavy  or 
very  light  according  to  the  motor  adjustment 
that  had  been  established  by  the  earlier  experi- 
ments of  the  series.  The  sort  of  adjustment 
that  is  established  for  a  brief  interval  in  these 
experiments  can  be  found  in  the  other  cases 
to  extend  over  a  longer  period  of  time.  In  fact, 
in  some  of  the  experiments  they  were  found  to 
persist  and  to  serve  as  standards  of  reference 
from  day  to  day  and  even  throughout  the  whole 
period  of  the  experimentation. 

Turn  where  you  will  in  every  day  life,  stand- 
ards have  the  same  tendency  to  develop.  These 
serve  to  represent  the  particulars,  and  through 
frequent  use  they  come  always  to  replace  the 
particulars  in  thought.  They  are  usually  devi- 
ations from  some  one  single  element  of  those 
that  they  typify,  and  are  related  to  all.  These 
types  or  standards  are  not  confined  to  intensi- 
ties or  extents  or  qualities,  although  they  are 

75 


THE  PSYCHOLOGY  OF  REASONING 

easier  to  demonstrate  there,  but  objects  of  all 
kinds  tend  to  crystallize  about  some  one  com- 
mon form.  They  are  convenient  for  recalling 
the  particulars,  and  while  each  particular  that 
may  reappear  will  be  different  from  the  stand- 
ard in  some  respect,  the  difference  is  not  suffi- 
cient to  impair  the  value  of  the  result.  What 
we  remember  and  what  we  think  or  reason 
about  is  always  this  type,  never  the  particular. 
Even  when  we  attempt  to  recall  some  particular 
as  different  from  the  type,  we  ordinarily  recall 
the  type  first  and  then  recall  the  departures 
from  it.  In  this,  the  process  of  recall  is  not 
different  from  the  process  of  description.  If 
you  describe  a  new  object  you  recall  an  estab- 
lished type  and  state  departures  from  it.  The 
world  that  we  have  in  memory  or  in  reason  is 
not  the  sum  of  particular  experiences ;  it  is  al- 
ways the  mass  of  particular  experiences  worked 
over  and  crystallized  about  standards.  This 
simplification  of  the  world  is  an  enormous  con- 
venience. The  appearance  of  the  simplification 
marks  the  beginning  of  a  really  effective  under- 
standing. The  savage  is  said  to  remember  a 
path  by  recalling  each  turn  or  object  along  the 
way.  The  civilized  man  remembers  only  the 
general  direction  with  reference  to  north  or 


'^  UNIVERSITY  j) 


OF 


JANING  AXD  THE  CONCEPT 


south  and  by  means  of  this  reference  to  the 
compass  is  able  at  the  expense  of  less  effort  to 
accomplish  as  much  or  more  than  the  man  of 
better  concrete  memory. 

The  pictures  of  the  world  that  are  offered  by 
science  show  similar  tendencies  to  group  facts 
about  typical  forms.  The  pictures  of  the  world 
that  the  chemist  gives  us  of  a  mass  of  atoms  in 
interaction,  or  that  the  physicist  describes  in 
his  various  forms  of  energy,  are  to  be  regarded 
as  types  that  connect  and  represent  large  num- 
bers of  discrete  events.  They  are  like  all  indi- 
vidual facts,  but  are  identical  with  none.  Tak- 
ing these  various  statements  together,  we  must 
agree  with  Bradley  and  Bosanquet  that  the 
world  of  thought  and  even  the  world  of  mem- 
ory is  not  the  mass  of  absolutely  separate  con- 
crete experiences  that  is  ordinarily  used  to  ex- 
plain it.  The  real  mind  differs  from  MilPs 
mass  of  discrete  elements  in  two  respects.  In 
the  first  place  it  is  composed  of  types  rather 
than  of  concrete  impressions;  in  the  second 
place  the  various  types  are  all  interrelated, 
they  do  not  stand  in  isolation  one  from  the 
other.  In  both  of  these  particulars  the  world 
of  memory  is  like  the  neo-Hegelian  world  of 
universals.    It  differs  from  that  world  of  mean- 

77 


THE  PSYCHOLOGY  OF  REASONING 

ings,  however,  in  that  the  types  are  apparently 
not  preformed  and  in  existence  before  the  ex- 
perience of  the  individual,  but  seem  to  develop 
in  and  through  experience. 

Certain  experiments  give  a  clue  to  the  way 
in  which  types  originate  from  the  concrete  ex- 
periences. One  of  the  earlier  investigations 
that  throw  some  light  on  the  problem  was  car- 
ried on  by  Leuba.^  He  found  a  tendency  for 
impressions  when  recalled  to  group  about  the 
central  values  of  the  series  in  which  they  oc- 
curred when  first  seen.  Somewhat  the  same 
result  was  obtained  in  investigating  the  memory 
for  numbers  by  Xilliez,^  a  little  later.  The 
digits  were  displaced  in  memory  toward  the 
average.  Still  later,  Bentley  ^  found  that  there 
was  always  a  displacement  toward  the  back- 
ground,— that  colors  tended  to  be  remembered 
as  lighter  than  they  actually  were  when  exposed 
in  a  light  room  and  tended  to  become  darker 
when  shown  in  the  dark.  These  results  might 
be  interpreted  as  an  indication  that  there  is  a 

1  Leuba :  "A  Suggestion  of  a  Law  of  Sense  Memory," 
American  Journal  of  Psychology,  Vol.  5,  p.  370. 

2Xilliez:  "La  continuity  des  chiflfres  dans  la  memoire," 
L'Ann^e  psychologique,  1895,  p.  201. 

3  Bentley:  "The  Qualitative  Fidelity  of  the  Memory  Im- 
age," American  Journal  of  Psychology,  Vol.   11,  p.   1. 

78 


MEANING  AND  THE  CONCEPT 

tendency,  unconscious  and  uncontrollable,  for 
concrete  experiences  to  fuse  into  a  single  ele- 
ment and  that  the  tendency  is  for  each  element 
of  a  group  to  be  displaced  toward  the  center  of 
the  mass.  If  we  continue  the  argument  it 
would  seem  altogether  probable  that  the  mass 
that  results  from  the  fusion  would  in  time  crys- 
tallize completely  about  the  center,  and  that 
with  the  completion  of  the  process  we  should 
have  a  type  that  represented  the  mass.  As 
many  types  would  develop  as  there  were  centers 
of  crystallization,  and  the  number  of  centers 
would  be  determined  by  the  practical  necessi- 
ties. Where  a  group  of  experiences  was  of 
frequent  occurrence  and  of  great  practical  im- 
portance there  would  be  a  larger  number  of 
lines  of  cleavage  than  in  less  familiar  and  less 
important  material.  The  lines  of  cleavage 
themselves  would  similarly  correspond  to  the 
needs  of  the  individual  or  social  group  with 
which  one  has  to  do.  Among  people  of  our 
own  race,  there  are  innumerable  distinctions  of 
type.  People  all  tend  to  fall  somewhat  into 
types  consciously  or  unconsciously,  but  the 
types  are  numerous.  The  centers  of  crystal- 
lization  are  ordinarily  immediate  friends. 
However  the  groups  may  have  originated,  they 

79 


THE  PSYCHOLOGY  OF  REASONING 

serve  our  practical  purposes  of  recognition, 
memory  and  description.  In  a  race  that  is  un- 
familiar the  number  of  types  is  much  smaller, 
and  the  capacity  for  distinguishing  very  slight. 
It  is  a  familiar  saying  that  all  Chinamen  look 
alike,  and  I  presume  that  in  China  the  same 
statement  mutatis  mutandum  would  be  made  of 
Caucasians.  One  word  of  caution  may  be 
necessary  to  guard  against  the  assumption  that 
these  elements  which  fuse  are  present  as  actual 
sensations  at  all  times.  Of  course  what  is  pres- 
ent is  a  nervous  disposition,  and  the  only  evi- 
dence of  the  fusion  is  the  fact  that  after  a 
large  number  of  experiences,  we  find  the  type 
making  its  appearance  as  the  representative  of 
the  group. 

It  is  not  at  all  improbable  that  a  large  part 
of  the  development  of  the  type  is  dependent 
upon  the  results  of  a  method  of  trial  and  error. 
One  representation  is  tried  and  as  soon  as  it 
is  seen  not  to  fit  in  with  all  of  the  other  experi- 
ences it  is  rejected  or  modified  in  some  way  and 
a  new  type  or  a  modification  of  the  old  one  is 
tried.  This  process  is  continued  and  results  in 
a  constant  shifting  of  types.  The  type  of  one 
stage  will  work  for  the  experiences  that  have 
accumulated  so  far.     These  trials  are  not  con- 

80 


MEANING  AND  THE  CONCEPT 

scious,  nor  are  we  aware  that  we  are  either 
developing  types  or  testing  them.  All  that  can 
be  made  out  is  that  we  always  have  a  type  of 
one  kind  or  another  and  that  the  types  are  in 
flux,  gradual  for  our  more  familiar  objects  and 
experiences,  rather  rapid  for  the  newer  objects 
and  experiences. 

These  types  are  not  restricted  to  objects  in 
the  usual  sense  of  the  word,  but  cover  relations 
as  well.  Differences  in  duration  have  crystal- 
lized about  the  time  idea;  in  size  and  direction 
have  given  rise  to  space  differences  of  greater  or 
less  definiteness.  It  is  entirely  conceivable  that 
a  larger  number  of  relations  than  we  have  might 
have  become  fixed  in  the  chaos  of  differences, 
but  only  those  that  were  practically  important 
to  us  did  get  established.  The  directions  of  the 
compass,  for  example,  seem  grounded  in  the 
nature  of  things,  but  there  is  no  reason  why,  if 
it  had  been  convenient,  there  might  not  have 
been  six  cardinal  points  rather  than  four,  or 
seven  rather  than  six.  For  the  mariner  who 
needs  to  use  the  finer  divisions  south-southeast 
is  probably  as  much  of  a  type,  as  much  of  a 
fixed  thing,  as  north  is  to  us.  His  need  has 
by  trial  developed  his  types.  In  the  duodecimal 
system  twelve  seemed  fully  as  much  a  fixed 

81 


THE  PSYCHOLOGY  OF  EEASONING 

thing  as  ten  for  us.  There  is  no  reason  to  sup- 
pose that  there  might  not  be  a  greater  number 
of  ways  in  which  objects  might  differ  than  those 
that  we  recognize.  It  is  conceivable  that  things 
might  be  different  in  other  respects  than  in  in- 
tensity, quality,  duration  and  extent.  But  these 
by  trial  have  been  found  convenient  and  so  are 
fully  established;  the  other  differences  are 
thrown  together  under  the  general  head  of  de- 
partures from  the  four  fixed  relations.  If  we 
can  imagine  the  child  consciousness  as  existing 
without  these  types,  we  can  get  some  idea  of 
what  chaos  of  impression  might  be.  There  is 
probably  for  the  young  child  neither  up  nor 
down,  right  nor  left,  before  nor  after,  greater 
nor  less.  All  is  without  difference,  or  at  least 
without  order  in  difference.  One  would  know 
that  two  things  were  different,  but  would  have 
no  idea  how.  It  would  be  like  the  threshold 
discriminations  of  the  laboratory  where  the 
awareness  of  difference  makes  its  appearance 
before  the  awareness  of  the  direction  of  the 
difference.  Gradually  as  different  sorts  of  dif- 
ference would  get  grouped  about  some  one 
striking  type  there  would  be  the  beginning  of 
appreciation.  Growth  in  definiteness  would  be 
exactly  pari  passu  with  the  development  of  the 

82 


MEANING  AND  THE  CONCEPT 

type.  Some  of  us  who  know  little  of  music  have 
this  confusion  when  discussing  the  musical 
qualities,  or  the  qualities  of  the  simple  tones. 
Some,  I  speak  for  myself,  find  it  difficult  to  tell 
pitch  from  intensity,  or  higher  from  lower  in 
the  way  of  tonal  differences.  The  reason  lies 
undoubtedly  in  the  fact  that  no  types  have  crys- 
tallized out,  that  there  are  no  points  of  refer- 
ence. For  them,  use  of  musical  terms  is  parrot- 
like repetition,  without  meaning. 

If  we  ask  what  the  imagery  of  the  type  may 
be,  how  it  is  thought,  the  answer  is,  look  at 
your  consciousness  of  any  object  and  whatever 
you  find  there  is  the  type.  It  undoubtedly 
varies  from  individual  to  individual.  The  dif- 
ference in  imagery  is  one  example  of  the  fact. 
Some  have  found  it  convenient  to  drop  all  but 
the  visual  elements,  others  all  but  the  auditory, 
others  again  all  but  the  motor.  Some  have 
combinations  of  these,  some  seem  to  do  with- 
out any  definite  imagery  of  any  kind.  This  fact 
of  the  disappearance  of  some  elements  is  itself 
an  evidence  of  types.  Entire  sense  depart- 
ments may  drop  out  and  be  typified  by  others 
for  all  practical  purposes.  In  exactly  the  same 
way  any  one  element  of  the  sense  department 
may  disappear,  and  the  type  still  persist.    In 

83 


THE  PSYCHOLOGY  OF  REASONING 

this  case  the  consciousness  is  probably  of  the 
connections  rather  than  of  the  center.  In  brief, 
then,  types  have  developed  from  experience  to 
explain  experience,  although  they  may  be  ex- 
actly like  no  single  experience.  The  problem  of 
the  connection  between  the  type  or  meaning  and 
the  concrete  consciousness  now  presents  itself. 
How,  in  the  words  of  the  neo-Hegelian  logician, 
does  the  concrete  idea  come  to  stand  for  this 
interconnected  mass  of  meanings!  The  mass 
of  meanings  exists  even  if  it  is  not  independent 
of  and  antecedent  to  experience.  Here  again 
one  must  be  careful  not  to  attack  problems  that 
have  no  real  existence.  It  has  been  tacitly  as- 
sumed that  the  representative  and  the  type 
were  in  some  measure  identical  and  that  the 
type  is  the  representative  of  the  concrete  ex- 
periences and  of  discrete  events.  This,  I  think, 
can  be  extended  explicitly  in  the  statement  that 
the  world  of  meanings  and  the  world  of  types 
is  not  merely  the  representative  of  discrete 
antecedent  events  in  consciousness,  but  that  the 
world  of  types  or  meanings  is  throughout  the 
only  consciousness  that  we  have,  that  it  is 
identical  with  the  empirical  human  conscious- 
ness wherever  it  presents  itself.  Thought  is 
not  in  particular  mental  images.    When  we 

84 


MEANING  AND  THE  CONCEPT 

think,  the  type  or  standard  is  in  consciousness 
and  nothing  else.  Nor  is  the  monopolizing  of 
consciousness  by  types  and  standards  confined 
to  reasoning  and  memory.  In  perception  as 
well,  we  are  conscious  of  nothing  but  the  type, 
of  nothing  but  the  meaning.  What  persists  as 
we  look  at  an  article  of  furniture  is  not  the 
trapezoid  or  rhomboid  that  ordinarily  falls 
upon  the  retina,  but  is  the  rectangle  that  ex- 
periences of  other  kinds  have  taught  us  most 
accurately  represents  the  object.  We  may  go 
farther.  Not  only  do  we  not  remember  the 
trapezoids  and  rhomboids,  but  we  do  not  even 
perceive  them,  under  the  usual  conditions.  If 
a  person,  skilled  in  drawing  or  in  observation 
of  spatial  forms,  looks  at  the  table  top  carefully, 
he  can  convince  himself  that  the  image  that 
falls  upon  the  retina  is  not  rectangular,  but  if 
one  looks  in  the  ordinary  practical  way  what 
one  actually  sees  is  the  rectangular  table  top, 
not  the  rhomboid.  The  uninstructed  person 
has  probably  never  for  a  moment  thought  of 
anything  but  the  rectangle  in  connection  with 
the  table  top.  He  has  received  nothing  but  the 
meaning;  the  sensational  contributions  have 
never  really  entered  his  consciousness. 

The  same  sort  of  illustration  of  the  universal 

85 


THE  PSYCHOLOGY  OF  REASONING 

dominance  of  the  meaning  or  the  type  can  be 
found  in  any  part  of  the  field  of  space  percep- 
tion. We  always  see  objects  of  their  standard 
size,  not  of  the  size  they  may  chance  to  have 
upon  the  retina.  This  standard  size  is  the  size 
they  have  at  the  usual  distance  or,  if  tools, 
where  we  are  in  the  habit  of  using  them.  A 
person  is  of  the  size  that  he  has  upon  the  retina 
when  at  conversational  distance,  a  house  is  seen 
relatively  much  smaller  because  we  must  be 
farther  away  to  appreciate  it,  a  hammer  is  of 
the  size  that  it  would  have  at  arm's  length,  etc., 
etc.  Sensational  elements  that  are  of  no  value 
are  not  seen,  as  in  the  case  of  contrast  colors 
and  after-images.  In  hearing  a  foreign  lan- 
guage there  is  no  real  perception  until  it  is 
understood.  The  words  are  merely  a  jumble  of 
sounds  until  types  develop  within  the  language 
itself  to  which  they  may  be  referred.  Before 
that  however  they  are  not  meaningless  in  the 
absolute  sense  but  they  are  referred  to  the  cate- 
gory of  mere  noise.  As  knowledge  grows,  the 
number  of  types  or  standards  increases,  until 
with  complete  knowledge  we  have  a  complete 
set  of  preformed  types.  At  the  moment  of  per- 
ception these  start  out  to  meet  the  incoming 
stimulus  and  the  result  is  what  we  know  as  the 

86 


MEANING  AXD  THE  CONCEPT 

object  or  percept.  Of  course  in  thus  emphasiz- 
ing the  influence  of  the  type,  I  have  no  intention 
to  deny  the  importance  of  the  stimulus.  Were 
one  to  assert  that  the  type  were  everything, 
stimulus  nothing,  there  would  be  no  possibility 
of  accounting  for  the  constant  change  in  types 
and  standards  that  goes  on  in  the  individual 
and  has  gone  on  in  the  race.  But  the  type  is 
too  often  overlooked  to  the  undue  emphasis  of 
the  stimulus,  and  an  over  emphasis  upon  the 
type  may  only  serve  to  restore  the  normal  bal- 
ance. 

All  perception,  then,  as  well  as  all  thinking 
is  in  terms  of  the  meaning  rather  than  in  terms 
of  crude  discrete  memory  images.  The  mean- 
ings develop  out  of  experience,  as  well  as  serve 
to  give  order  to  experience.  In  fact  they  serve 
in  the  developed  consciousness  to  constitute  ex- 
perience, not  merely  to  give  it  form  from 
without.  If  we  compare  the  results  of  our  dis- 
cussion with  the  theory  of  the  neo-Hegelian 
logicians,  we  find  that  we  are  in  agreement 
with  them,  that  the  meaning  is  the  real  material 
of  reasoning.  We  differ  from  them,  however, 
in  insisting  that  meanings  develop  out  of  experi- 
ence, and  are  consequently  not  independent  of 
experience,  and  in  believing  that  instead  of 
7  87 


THE  PSYCHOLOGY  OF  REASONING 

standing  above  the  concrete  consciousness  they 
constitute  the  concrete  consciousness, — that  we 
know  nothing  else.  The  meaningful  and  the 
conscious  are  identical  and,  conversely,  the 
meaningless  and  the  unconscious  are  identical 
terms. 

This  raises  another  question.  If  there  is 
nothing  in  consciousness  but  meanings,  what  is 
meant  in  psychological  discussions  by  making 
sensations  and  their  associations  the  basis 
of  all  explanation?  The  answer  is  simple 
in  the  light  of  our  present  position.  Sen- 
sations and  the  laws  for  the  connection 
of  sensation  are  merely  types  that  have 
developed  in  the  course  of  the  attempts  to  ex- 
plain mental  processes  in  the  same  way  that 
right  angles  have  developed  in  the  course  of 
the  attempts  to  explain  the  articles  of  furniture 
about.  They  are  the  most  simple  forms  of  ex- 
perience that  have  been  selected  as  typical  of 
all  mental  operations,  they  serve  to  represent  I 
the  thought  processes  as  atoms  do  the  chemical 
operations,  or  nerve  cells  the  operations  of  the 
brain.  They  are  themselves  meanings,  not  sen- 
sations in  the  sense  of  being  crude  and  immedi- 
ate results  of  the  action  of  stimuli.  Just  as 
the  visual  image  is  brought  before  conscious-  | 

88 


MEANING  AND  THE  CONCEPT 

ness  to  explain  the  processes  of  perception  when 
we  become  aware  that  the  problem  exists,  so 
sensations  are  developed  to  explain  the  mental 
operations  in  general  when  we  turn  around  on 
the  mental  operation  to  ask  how  it  works  and 
what  it  is.  In  this  sense  sensation  and  the  in- 
terrelations of  sensations  may  be  regarded  as 
types,  but  the  meaning  and  other  departures 
from  the  type  may  be  fully  as  near  the  truth  of 
concrete  operation. 

Our  description  of  the  nature"  of  the  meaning 
would  be  incomplete  if  we  did  not  connect  its 
characteristic  of  constituting  a  type  with  the 
characteristic  of  being  representative  of  the  par- 
ticulars and  of  being  in  connection  with  the  par- 
ticulars that  it  is  to  represent  and  with  other 
meanings.  All  that  we  said  of  the  way  in 
which  one  mental  process  may  represent  others 
is  true  of  our  type  or  meaning.  As  has  been 
said,  the  type  is  a  product  of  a  large  number  of 
experiences,  and  that  means  probably  that  the 
nervous  connections  of  the  different  experiences 
that  go  to  make  up  the  type  are  in  a  large 
measure  identical.  In  so  far  as  the  nervous 
processes  at  the  basis  of  the  particulars  are  not 
identical  with  those  of  the  meaning  or  the  type 
and  so  in  a  state  of  activity  at  the  moment  that 

89 


THE  PSYCHOLOGY  OF  REASONING 

the  type  is  in  consciousness,  they  are  closely 
associated  with  it,  and  through  this  associative 
connection  are  undoubtedly  active  in  some 
small  degree.  The  meaning  is  then  what  it  is, 
— in  the  first  place,  because  the  nervous  proc- 
esses at  the  basis  of  the  particulars  are  in  large 
measure  identical ;  secondly,  because  those  nerve 
processes  that  correspond  to  divergent  partic- 
ulars are  also  in  some  degree  excited  by  irradia- 
tion over  association  paths.  The  consciousness 
of  meaning  like  the  consciousness  of  represen- 
tation is  undoubtedly  correlated  with  the  activ- 
ity of  a  very  wide-spread  nervous  activity. 
This  process  of  interaction  between  the  meaning 
and  the  particular  is  a  twofold  one.  Because 
of  the  close  relation  of  nerve  paths  the  meaning 
tends  to  call  up  the  particular  when  it  appears 
and  is  controlled  in  its  effect  by  that  fact ;  but, 
on  the  other  hand,  as  we  have  seen,  the  partic- 
ular when  it  appears  in  consciousness  tends  to 
arouse  the  general,  the  type  or  meaning.  For 
that  reason  no  particular  can  have  entered  con- 
sciousness without  having  aroused  the  meaning, 
and  consequently  every  particular  must  be  asso- 
ciated with  the  type  that  represents  it.  The 
type  must  have  been  present  at  its  birth.  It 
can  only  really  get  into  the  mental  world  by  the 

90 


MEANING  AND  THE  CONCEPT 

aid  of  the  meaning.  If  a  stimulus  is  to  enter 
consciousness  it  must  be  reacted  upon  and  when 
reacted  upon  it  becomes  a  meaning. 

If  one  were  to  push  the  matter  but  a  step 
farther,  one  could  find  a  sense  in  which  meaning 
could  be  designated  with  Gore  ^  as  the  reaction 
of  the  organism.  Every  group  of  particulars 
tends  to  find  expression  in  action.  There  are 
a  limited  number  of  motor  responses  and  in  con- 
sequence the  particulars  of  the  group  must  have 
a  common  motor  response,  just  as  they  must 
have  sensory  processes  that  are  in  large  part 
common  or  closely  connected.  While  I  am  not 
inclined  to  lay  as  much  stress  upon  the  motor 
side  of  the  process  as  are  many  of  my  col- 
leagues, yet  it  is  undoubtedly  true  that  the 
motor  processes  contribute  something  to  the 
total  consciousness,  and  whatever  they  do  con- 
tribute must  be  added  to  the  meaning.  I  am 
inclined  to  believe  that  particulars  have  a  com- 
mon motor  response  because  they  have  a  com- 
mon meaning  rather  than  that  they  have  a 
common  meaning  because  they  have  a  common 
motor  response.  But  this  difference  may  be 
one  of  emphasis  not  of  principle.  The  diver- 
gence in  the  theories  at  this  point  is  not  essen- 

1  Dewey:     "Studies  in  Logical  Theory,"  p.  184. 
91 


THE  PSYCHOLOGY  OF  REASONING 

tial  to  the  doctrine  of  meaning  that  has  been 
sketched,  however  wide  it  may  be  as  to  the  rela- 
tive importance  of  the  motor  processes  in  con- 
sciousness. 

If  we  turn  now  to  the  old  group  of  problems 
treated  historically  in  connection  with  the  con- 
cept, we  find  that  they  are  in  many  respects 
identical  with  the  problems  of  meaning.  The 
old  problem  that  seems  to  have  survived  most 
definitely  in  the  formal  treatises  on  pedagogy 
was  how  can  we  tell  the  concept  from  the  per- 
cept? What  is  in  consciousness  when  we  think 
a  general?  The  best  answer  that  can  be  given 
to-day  is  that  anything  may  be  in  mind  as 
this  representative,  we  might  say  anything  or 
nothing.  It  is  always  the  type.  But  the  type 
may  be  of  the  form  that  we  call  the  particular 
image,  it  may  be  a  word,  or  there  may  be  noth- 
ing at  all  of  which  one  can  be  certain.  In  fact 
what  makes  a  concept  a  concept  is  not  the  qual- 
ity or  character  of  the  conscious  element,  but 
the  connections  into  which  it  enters.  If  we 
begin  with  a  particular  as  a  well  developed 
type,  feature  after  feature  may  drop  away  and 
the  function  still  remain  the  same.  The  struc- 
ture, if  structure  there  be,  is  at  most  nothing  I 
more    than    a    center    of    crystallization.    Its 

92 


MEANING  AND  THE  CONCEPT 

essence  consists  in  the  wide-spread  connections. 
These  we  have  seen  probably  contribute  some 
conscious  quality  to  the  total  and  it  is  not  at 
all  impossible  that  the  center  may  disappear 
as  a  conscious  process  and  the  consciousness 
of  relation  still  persist.  In  fact,  if  we  look  at 
the  entire  process  as  one  of  adjustment,  the 
movements  may  undoubtedly  go  on  that  would 
be  called  out  by  a  type  after  the  consciousness 
has  worn  off.  There  is  no  reason  to  assume 
that  the  representative  function  and  even  the 
representative  or  concept  feeling  might  not  per- 
sist in  much  the  same  way  after  all  the  con- 
sciousness of  the  original  particular,  or  even  of 
the  type  as  a  structure,  had  ceased  to  appear. 
Of  more  importance  than  any  analogy  that 
would  make  it  possible  is  the  fact  that  Pro- 
fessor Woodworth  has  established  in  several 
fields  that  it  is  possible,  even  usual,  in  some 
individuals  for  the  representative  function  to 
be  present  without  any  noticeable  content.  As 
I  understand  it  he  would  agree  with  me  that 
imageless  thought  is  primarily  characterized 
by  the  fact  of  close  nervous  connection.  I  am 
not  sure  that  he  would  not  have  more  conscious- 
ness than  the  bare  awareness  of  connection 
to  which  I  have  reduced  concept  feeling,  or  at 

93 


THE  PSYCHOLOGY  OF  REASONING 

least  I  am  not  sure  that  he  would  not  insist 
that  there  must  be  a  different  kind  of  con- 
sciousness. Structurally,  then,  percept  and  con- 
cept may  be  identical.  The  same  type  might 
be  present  in  each.  What  distinguishes  is  the 
function.  Function  in  this  case  depends  ap- 
parently upon  the  connections  into  which  the 
process  may  enter. 

We  seem  to  have  practically  identified  the 
terms  meaning  and  concept.  A  meaning  is 
essentially  the  fact  that  a  mental  state,  what- 
ever its  kind,  is  typical  and  tends  to  represent 
and  to  be  connected  with  a  large  number  of 
particulars,  but  a  concept  is  a  concept  just  be- 
cause of  its  connections  with  these  particular 
impressions  that  have  been  experienced  in  the 
past.  The  concept  then  is  the  center  of  ref- 
erence plus  its  connections  considered  from  the 
particulars  inward  toward  the  center.  Mean- 
ing is" the  fact  of  reference  considered  from 
the  center  outward.  No  wonder  the  two  are 
frequently  confused! 

There  is  one  other  use  of  the  concept  that 
has  been  prominently  represented  in  the  his- 
tory of  logic,  formal  logic  more  especially. 
That  is  to  regard  it  not  as  representative  of 
particulars  but  as  itself  a  mass  of  qualities  or 

94 


MEANING  AND  THE  CONCEPT 

attributes.  Man,  for  example,  not  merely  re- 
fers to  all  particular  men  in  the  way  that  we 
have  been  considering  it  but  it  also  implies  or 
stands  for  all  human  qualities  or  characteris- 
tics. This  is  a  representative  function  of  an- 
other kind  that  depends,  however,  upon  the 
same  law  of  associative  connection.  As  was 
seen  in  the  preliminary  discussion  of  psycholog- 
ical principles,  we  are  never  conscious  at  the 
same  moment  of  all  of  the  characteristics  of 
an  object.  In  fact,  only  one  quality  is  ordi- 
narily prominent  in  perception  or  thought  at 
any  one  time.  The  different  successive  aspects 
all  tend  to  recall  each  other,  because  the  less 
prominent  characteristics  of  each  total  impres- 
sion are  common.  These  in  turn  come  to  con- 
nect the  separate  prominent  characteristics. 
An  object  comes  in  thought  to  be  made  up  of 
a  core  from  which  many  associates  irradiate; 
these  latter  give  the  real  basis  for  the  belief 
that  it  has  the  composition  asserted.  It  serves 
to  recall  all  of  the  prominent  characteristics 
that  have  been  connected  with  it.  In  this  sense 
a  concept  may  be  regarded  as  a  sum  total  of 
qualities  each  of  which  has  at  various  times 
been  selected  from  the  mass  for  special  promi- 
nence.   The    representation   is    on    the    same 

95 


THE  PSYCHOLOGY  OF  REASONING 

basis  as  the  representation  of  particular  objects. 
It  is  primarily  based  on  associative  recall. 

The  concept  snow,  for  example,  is  regarded 
as  having  the  attributes,  whiteness,  hexagonal 
form  of  crystallization,  a  melting  point  of  0° 
centigrade,  certain  optical  properties,  etc.,  etc. 
This  means,  if  we  reduce  it  to  actual  fact,  that 
when  we  have  looked  at  snow  at  one  time  we 
have  been  struck  by  its  color,  at  another  time 
we  have  noted  the  form  of  its  crystals,  at  an- 
other have  melted  it  and  determined  the  tem- 
perature when  melting.  Now  when  we  think 
of  snow  we  know  that  it  is  possible  to  regain 
all  of  these  effects.  We  do  not  necessarily 
mean  that  all  are  conscious  at  any  one  time, 
or  that  the  concept  is  the  sum  of  these  attri- 
butes in  any  real  sense.  All  that  we  have  in  the 
concept,  psychologically,  is  the  possibility  of 
recalling,  when  the  concept  is  presented,  each 
of  these  aspects,  each  of  the  perceptions  of 
these  phases.  We  may  agree  with  Sigwart 
that  the  concept  grows  out  of  separate  experi- 
ences or  judgments. 

Two  facts  stand  out  from  the  discussion  as 
the  explanation  and  solution  of  all  of  our  prob- 
lems. These  are  the  facts  of  the  wide  interre- 
lation and  connection  of  part  with  part  and  the 

96 


MEANING  AND  THE  CONCEPT 

fact  that  a  prominent  feature  of  the  conscious- 
ness of  any  thing  is  the  consciousness  of  its 
interrelations.  The  second  is  the  fact  that  sep- 
arate experiences  lose  their  identity  in  a  type. 
This  type  is  a  standard  that  has  been  found 
to  harmonize  the  various  experiences  of  the 
class  better  than  any  one  of  the  separate  expe- 
riences could.  As  a  result  it  comes  to  replace 
the  individual  in  all  of  our  thinking  and  even 
to  constitute  the  perception.  The  stimulus 
calls  it  into  consciousness  rather  than  its  own 
mere  particular  conscious  accompaniment. 
The  type  comes  to  take  over  the  representative 
function.  It  is  well  adapted  to  this  since  all 
the  elements  of  the  class  call  it  out  when  they 
enter  consciousness  and  all  have  therefore  been 
connected  with  it.  That  types  may  have  dif- 
ferent representative  functions  at  different 
times  is  due  to  the  different  associates  that  are 
in  partial  activity  at  these  different  times.  Its 
consciousness  is  at  all  times  very  largely  due 
to  the  association  paths  that  irradiate  from  it. 
These  connections  are  of  two  kinds.  They 
tend  to  lead  to  the  particular  experiences,  and 
they  tend  also  to  lead  to  the  different  aspects 
or  qualities  that  have  come  to  be  connected  with 
the  core  or  type.     The  one  group  we  call  the 

97 


THE  PSYCHOLOGY  OF  EEASONING 

particulars  that  are  represented,  the  other 
group  is  designated  the  attributes  of  the  con- 
cept. The  center  from  which  the  irradiation 
takes  place  may  be  called  the  concept ;  the  irra- 
diations themselves,  the  meaning. 


CHAPTER   IV 

JUDGMENT 

The  first  step  toward  reasoning,  as  it  is  ordi- 
narily treated,  is  the  judgment.  The  end  of 
reasoning  is  inference,  and  judgment  is  pre- 
liminary to  inference  in  practically  every  sys- 
tem. Judgment  prepares  the  way  for  infer- 
ence, either  by  interpreting  the  given,  as  in  the 
more  modern  discussions,  or  by  providing  the 
material  that  is  to  be  manipulated  in  infer- 
ence as  treated  in  the  ordinary  formal  logic. 
In  judgment,  in  either  use,  the  problems  of 
reasoning  as  an  active  process  are  approached. 
Heretofore  the  materials  or  the  signs  of  reason- 
ing alone  have  been  considered. 
I  But  before  the  judgment  can  be  discussed,  it  is 
'  necessary  to  agree  on  the  meaning  of  the  term. 
The  word  has  been  applied  in  a  number  of  dif- 
ferent ways  at  different  times,  and  there  can 
not  now  be  said  to  be  any  particular  use  that 
is  common  or  even  general.  The  earliest  use 
in  the  literature  of  logic  was  to  designate  the 

99 


THE  PSYCHOLOGY  OF  REASONING 

conjunction  of  two  concepts.  Whenever  two 
concepts  were  combined  in  a  proposition,  there 
was  said  to  be  a  judgment.  This  definition  is 
verbal  rather  than  psychological,  as  are  all  the 
definitions  of  formal  logic.  That  it  is  not  defi- 
nitely drawn  with  reference  to  the  psycholog- 
ical processes  is  well  indicated  by  the  great 
variety  of  views  that  have  been  held  as  to  the 
nature  of  the  connection  between  the  two  con- 
cepts and  the  great  difference  of  opinion  as  to 
the  nature  of  the  concept  itself.  The  two  con- 
cepts, subject  and  predicate,  that  were  regarded 
as  constituting  the  judgment  when  united,  have 
been  said  to  be  analyzed  from  a  common  whole, 
and  to  be  combined  into  a  common  unit  when 
the  elements  were  originally  discrete.  Judg- 
ment is  regarded  as  a  process  of  classification, 
as  the  statement  of  an  equation,  as  an  assertion 
of  the  existence  of  the  subject,  to  mention  only 
a  few  of  the  more  frequent  definitions. 

The  variety  and  kinds  of  relations  assigned 
are  incompatible  with  the  possibility  that  the 
judgment  has  any  close  relation  to  real  psy- 
chological processes.  This  opinion  is  strength- 
ened by  the  discussion  of  the  concept  in  the  last 
chapter.  The  concept  that  the  formal  logician 
has  in  mind  in  his   treatment  is  necessarily 

100 


JUDGMENT 

the  concept  as  a  sum  of  separate  qualities. 
This,  as  was  seen,  is  not  and  cannot  be  a  psy- 
chological process  because  we  have  in  mind  at 
any  time  not  all  the  qualities  that  are  meant 
by  the  concept,  but  one  only.  We  shall  have  to 
consider,  at  a  later  time,  the  real  relation  be- 
tween the  judgment  as  defined  by  the  formal 
logic  and  the  mental  state.  Suffice  it  now  to 
say  that  the  judgment  of  formal  logic  is  a  mat- 
ter of  language  primarily,  not  of  psychology. 
We  must  seek  the  psychological  counterpart  of 
the  judgment  elsewhere. 

In  our  search  we  may  turn  for  aid  from  for- 
mal logic  to  the  popular  uses  of  the  term  and 
to  the  theories  that  have  been  built  upon  the 
common-sense  meaning.  Two  meanings  of  the 
term  are  prominent  in  popular  usage.  These 
are  as  the  equivalent  of  comparison  and  as 
evaluation,  or  comparison  with  a  standard. 
We  speak  popularly  and  even  in  the  accepted 
psychological  nomenclature  of  the  estimation 
or  comparison  of  intensities  or  qualities  as 
judgments.  The  ^ '  judgment  of  lifted  weights ' ' 
is  a  very  familiar  term  in  the  psychological 
vocabulary.  We  judge  w^Lfiii— ^^le^-^conapara^ 
Judgment  and  comparison  in  every  day  speech 
are  interchangeable.     Still  more  primitive  and 

101 


THE  PSYCHOLOGY  OF  REASONING 

fundamental  is  the  use  of  judgment  as  equiv- 
alent to  evaluation.  This,  the  legal  use  of  the 
term,  is  probably  the  most  primitive.  When 
a  criminal  is  sentenced,  his  crime  is  appre- 
ciated with  reference  to  the  scale  of  crimes 
recognized  by  the  law,  and  the  penalty  that  has 
been  accepted  as  equivalent  to  the  crime  is 
assessed.  Objects  are  judged  in  the  same  way 
in  every  day  life.  They  are  referred  to  a  more 
or  less  definite  standard. 

In  addition  to  the  two  popular  uses  of  the 
term  two  theoretical  meanings^ /need  to  be  con- 
sidered, since  it  is  easy  to  give  them  an  imme- 
diate psychological  correlate.  These  are  the 
use  of  judgment  to  designate  belief,  Brentano  's 
definition,  and  its  use  as  equivalent  to  ascribing 
meaning,  the  definition  most  usual  in  modern 
logic.  Brentano,  one  of  the  first  of  modern 
psychologists  to  pay  much  attention  to  the  log- 
ical processes,  found  judgment  in  the  process 
of  accepting  or  rejecting  any  presentation;  in 
attaching  or  refusing  to  attach  belief  to  the 
presentation.  The  other  definition  goes  back 
to  the  conception  of  meaning  as  it  is  used,  or 
was  first  used,  by  the  neo-Hegelians.  When- 
ever an  impression  comes  to  consciousness  it  is 
necessary  that  meaning  be  attached.    To  attach 

102 


JUDGMENT 

meaning  is  to  judge.  These  two  definitions  are 
I  to  be  connected  with  the  discussions  of  the  two 
I  preceding  chapters,  and  they  consequently  need 
:  no  further  description  at  this  point.  The  only 
[  characteristic  that  these  four  uses  of  the  term 
\  judgment  have  in  common,  when  superficially 
i  regarded,  is  that  all  seem  in  some  way  to  apply 
1  to  the  process  by  which  an  impression  gains  en-  / 
r  trance  to  consciousness.  It  is  our  problem,  I 
i;  then,  to  determine  if  there  is  sufficient  similar- 
{:  ity  between  the  different  processes  that  have 
i  been  designated  judgment  to  enable  us  to  reduce 
).{  them  all  to  one,  or  if  not  to  select  some  one 
f  phase  that  we  can  justify  as  the  type  of  the 
•'!  process  as  it  is  defined  both  by  formal  logic 
i  and  by  popular  usage  and  adopt  it  arbitrarily 
I  for  our  own  use. 

As  a  preliminary  a  more  complete  examina- 
0:  tion  of  each  of  the  four  mental  operations  must 
;  be  undertaken.     For  this  it  will  be  well  to  begin 
i  with  the  ascription  of  meaning,  for  which  the 
last  chapter  was  a  preparation.    What  can  the 
modern  logician  mean  when  he  defines  judg- 
ment as  the  process  of  attaching  meaning  to 
the  given?    It  has  already  developed  that  the 
meaning  is  the  typical  while  the  given  is  as- 
sumed to  be  the  particular  presentation.    But 

8  103 


THE  PSYCHOLOGY  OF  REASONING 

it  also  appeared  that  there  was  nothing  in  con- 
sciousness but  the  meaning.  The  bare  given 
is  not  a  real  mental  state  but  so  far  as  can  be 
seen  it  is  entirely  a  psychological  or  logical 
construction.  The  difficulty  with  the  modern 
logician's  definition  of  judgment  as  the  appli- 
cation of  meaning  to  the  given,  is  not  with  the 
final  result  but  with  the  starting  point,  the 
implication  that  the  given  exists  as  meaningless 
before  it  is  given  meaning.  It  is  not  necessary 
to  attach  meaning  to  the  given  because  the  given 
does  not  exist  except  as  the  meaningful.  Be- 
fore it  takes  on  meaning  the  process  can  at  most 
be  nothing  other  than  the  physiological  or  the 
physical.  Entrance  into  consciousness  and 
taking  on  meaning  are  identical.  To  assert  that 
judgment  is  the  attachment  of  meaning  to  the 
given,  then,  comes  to  mean,  in  the  light  of  psy- 
chological investigation,  nothing  more  than  the 
process  of  entering  consciousness.  Judgment 
and  entrance  into  consciousness  are  identical. 
Judgment  must  apply  only  to  perception,  not 
to  memory. 

It  is  necessary,  then,  to  determine  what  is 
involved  in  entering  consciousness  that  is  per- 
tinent to  the  logical  operation.  Perhaps  this 
may  be  brought  out  most  easily,  if  we  use 

104 


JUDGMENT 

Mill's  psychology  as  a  corpus  vile,  as  did  Brad- 
ley, to  emphasize  the  importance  of  the  more 
recent  advances.  A  corpus  vile  probably  could 
not  remain  a  corpus  vile  long  if  treated  sym- 
pathetically, so  we  shall  follow  our  model  in 
departing  from  the  truth,  if  at  all,  by  empha- 
sizing the  crudities  of  MilPs  position  rather 
than  the  points  in  which  it  serves  in  some  meas- 
ure to  explain  the  actual  workings  of  mind. 
For  Mill  mental  states  were  assumed  to  be  par- 
ticular until  they  made  themselves  universal. 
He  apparently  believed  that  it  was  possible  for 
a  group  of  stimuli  to  act  upon  consciousness 
from  without  through  the  sense  organ,  and  to 
remain  just  a  group  of  sensations  that  corre- 
sponded to  those  stimuli  when  they  appeared  in 
consciousness.  Amalgamation  with  anything 
already  in  consciousness  was  incidental,  and 
then  was  amalgamation  only  with  the  few  past 
associates.  As  opposed  to  this  we  have  been 
endeavoring  to  show,  and  I  think  practically  all 
psychologists  would  agree  to-day,  that  there  is 
some  kind  of  reception  of  the  group  of  stimuli 
into  a  predeveloped  system.  That  this  system 
is  necessarily  aroused  when  the  stimulus  pre- 
sents itself  and  that  what  is  seen  is  not  primar- 
ily, at  least  not  alone,  the  group  of  sensations, 

105 


THE  PSYCHOLOGY  OF  EEASONING 

but  is  some  sort  of  reaction  of  consciousness  as  a 
whole  upon  the  occasion  of  the  stimulus.  This 
reaction  results  in  the  appearance  of  a  mental 
state  that  is  not  merely  compounded  from  the  | 
sensations  themselves.  In  many  cases  it  is 
nothing  at  all  like  them,  but  is  some  mental 
construction  that  in  the  past  has  been  found 
best  to  fit  the  particular  set  of  circumstances. 
This  mental  construction  we  shall  not  go  far 
wrong  in  describing  as  a  type  or  standard 
that  develops  gradually  in  consciousness  as  a 
result  of  the  manifold  experiences  of  the  indi- 
vidual. In  our  old  instance  we  see  the  rectan- 
gular table  top  where  there  is  on  the  retina 
only  the  rhomboid.  We  see  the  rectangle  be- 
cause experience  teaches  that  if  we  are  to  use 
the  table  in  any  way  we  succeed  in  our  purpose 
if  we  treat  it  as  a  square ;  we  fail  if  we  assume 
that  the  angles  are  oblique.  It  fits  into  what 
we  know  as  square  corners,  it  will  not  fit  either 
obtuse  or  acute  angle  spaces.  We  overlook 
the  shadows  cast  by  the  retinal  blood  vessels 
because  we  have  learned  that  the  objects  are  to 
be  dissociated  from  this  accompaniment  of 
all  observations.  The  meaning  then  is  the 
retinal  image  minus  the  blood  vessels,  and  we 
can  perceive  the  blood  vessels  now  only  by 

106 


JUDGMENT 

taking  somewhat  elaborate  precautions.  In 
every  case  the  perception  is  something  that 
on  the  basis  of  nmnerous  tests  will  fit  in 
with  and  serve  to  explain  the  disconnected  dis- 
crete experiences.  We  are  not  conscious  of  the 
discrete  experiences  themselves.  We  do  not 
see  the  retinal  blood  vessels  and  then  by  a  more 
or  less  elaborate  process  of  reasoning  decide 
that  they  are  not  real.  They  are  no  more  in 
our  consciousness  in  ordinary  vision  than  are 
the  canals  on  Mars  as  we  look  with  the  naked 
eye.  We  do  not  first  get  the  crude  image  and 
then  standardize  and  correct  it;  we  see  the 
thing  as  all  our  experience  up  to  the  present 
moment  tells  us  it  would  appear  were  we  look- 
ing under  the  most  favorable  conditions. 

In  the  light  of  these  facts,  if  we  assume  that 
the  given  is  in  consciousness  in  advance  of  the 
meaning,  it  is  not  possible  to  hold  that  judg- 
ment is  the  attribution  of  meaning  to  the  given. 
On  the  contrary  meaning  makes  its  appearance 
at  once,  and  the  so-called  given,  the  discrete 
sense  process,  is  never  in  consciousness  except 
as  it  is  itself  made  a  meaning  to  explain  con- 
sciousness. What  is  seen  is  always  the 
predicate  of  the  judgment  in  the  terms  of  the 
definition  in  question ;  the  subject  is  for  us  non- 
107 


THE  PSYCHOLOGY  OF  EEASONING 

existent.  The  process  of  ascribing  meaning  is 
the  process  of  entering  consciousness.  The 
t5^e  must  appear  when  anything  makes  its  real 
appearance  in  the  mind.  To  judge  and  to  per- 
ceive become  on  this  definition  identical  terms, 
so  far  as  the  structural  relations  of  the  terms 
are  concerned. 

There  is  much  more  in  common  between  the 
perception  process  as  thus  defined  and  the  judg- 
ment process  of  Bradley  and  Bosanquet  than 
there  is  common  to  it  and  the  entrance  to  con- 
sciousness of  Mill,  or  at  least  in  the  psychology 
that  they  attribute  to  Mill.  There  is  no  reason 
why  we  should  not  take  the  denotation  rather 
than  the  connotation  of  their  term,  and  identify 
the  perception  process  with  their  judgment. 
Both,  then,  apply  to  the  entrance  of  a  stimulus 
or  its  concomitant  to  consciousness.  In  neither 
does  anything  intervene  between  the  physical 
or  physiological  and  the  appreciation  of  the 
type,  fully  interpreted.  With  this  agreement 
upon  the  definition  and  its  application,  there  is 
nothing  left  but  to  turn  to  examine  the  condi- 
tions antecedent  to  the  judgment.  These  are 
to  be  found  in  the  context  and  the  purpose  that 
dominates  the  individual  at  the  moment.  How 
we  shall  interpret  anything,  what  meaning  we 

108 


JUDGMENT 

shall  attach  to  it,  depends  upon  the  context  into 
which  the  entering  impression  is  to  be  received. 
Whether  an  object  be  one  thing  or  another  de- 
pends not  upon  itself,  but  upon  the  way  it  is 
to  be  used  in  the  consciousness  of  the  moment. 
Of  the  word  that  I  write  I  see  one  meaning  in 
one  connection,  another  in  a  different  connec- 
tion. Sometimes  I  am  not  concerned  with  the 
use  or  meaning  of  the  word  at  all  but  with  how 
to  spell  it  or  whether  it  will  be  legible  when  I 
return  to  it  at  another  time.  In  the  way  we 
have  been  looking  at  the  matter  there  are  a 
large  number  of  types  available  at  any  mo- 
ment, and  we  apply  now  one,  now  another  to 
the  stimulus  that  presents  itself.  The  result- 
ing consciousness  is  quite  as  largely  made  up 
of  the  type  as  of  the  occasion  that  calls  out 
the  type.  The  occasion  supplies  the  cue,  the 
type  the  material  that  is  perceived,  and  the 
problem  that  is  concerning  consciousness  at  the 
moment,  the  mental  context,  serves  to  select 
the  meaning  that  shall  be  aroused  on  that  occa- 
sion. When  we  were  discussing  the  nature  of 
meaning  we  were  somewhat  troubled  to  deter- 
mine its  relation  to  the  particular;  now  when 
discussing  the  concrete  particular  we  have  great 
difficulty,  in  fact  are  compelled  to  admit  the  im- 

109 


THE  PSYCHOLOGY  OF  EEASONING 

possibility,  of  keeping  it  distinct  from  tlie  type, 
the  meaning. 

What  is  essential  to  the  judgment  then  on 
this  first  definition  is  the  arousal  of  the  type 
on  the  occasion  of  the  stimulus,  and  the  selec- 
tion of  some  type  in  harmony  with  the  momen- 
tary set  of  consciousness,  the  problem  that  is 
before  it  at  the  moment.  These  elements  we 
shall  find  involved  in  some  degree  and  with 
appropriate  changes  in  all  of  the  other  proc- 
esses that  are  designated  as  judgment.  The 
one  exception  is  perhaps  the  definition  of  Bren- 
tano  that  makes  judgment  the  equivalent  of 
accepting  any  statement  or  object  as  true  or 
real.  Even  with  this  definition  however  there 
are  many  points  of  similarity.  In  the  first 
place  belief  attaches  to  practically  every  per- 
ception at  the  moment  that  it  becomes  a  per- 
ception. Acceptance  and  rejection  are  inevi- 
table when  anything  is  experienced.  It  is  part 
of  the  process  of  entering  consciousness. 
Brentano,  too,  was  one  of  the  first  men  to  assert 
that  the  judgment  was  not  made  up  of  two 
parts,  but  was  always  single.  The  operation 
of  judgment  involved  but  one  term;  there  was 
no  necessity  in  the  mind  of  himself  and  his 
school  to  put  things  together  in  order  to  obtain 

110 


JUDGMENT 

the  judgment.  In  this  their  definition  would 
be  identical  with  the  one  we  have  been  con- 
sidering, or  at  least  with  the  interpretation 
we  have  given  to  the  definition  of  the  neo-He- 
gelians.  Again,  it  has  been  shown  that  belief 
arises  from  the  interaction  of  the  accumulated 
results  of  experience  with  the  interpretation 
that  is  being  made  at  the  moment.  Meaning, 
too,  has  been  described  as  a  process  that  has 
grown  out  of  experience,  and  has  its  valid- 
ity only  in  so  far  as  it  represents  experiences, 
past  as  well  as  present.  Both  might  be  de- 
scribed as  common  results  of  interacting  ex- 
periences expressed  in  a  single  process  or 
operation.  In  at  least  three  points  there  is 
something  in  common  between  belief  or  its 
acquirement,  and  the  ascription  of  meaning. 
The  only  point  at  which  it  is  necessary  to  em- 
phasize the  difference  between  the  two  proc- 
esses is  in  taking  issue  with  Brentano  that  an 
experience  might  be  conscious  and  be  neither 
affirmed  nor  denied;  that  it  is  possible  to  hold 
an  entering  impression  in  a  psychological 
purgatory  before  it  is  passed  upon  and  either 
accepted  or  rejected.  We  were  led  to  believe 
that  acceptance  or  rejection  is  immediate,  and 
one  of  the  conditions  of  entering  conscious- 
Ill 


THE  PSYCHOLOGY  OF  REASONING 

ness.  If  we  are  permitted  to  make  this  change 
in  his  statement  which  it  will  be  recalled  is  the 
same  change  or  an  analogous  one  to  that  made 
in  the  definition  of  Bradley  with  reference  to 
meaning,  the  two  definitions  become  identical 
except  for  a  difference  in  emphasis.  Both  have 
reference  to  a  process  that  takes  place  at  the 
moment  of  entrance  to  consciousness,  both  by 
implication  have  but  a  single  cognitive  element 
involved  in  the  judgment,  and  both  are  the  out- 
come of  the  reaction  of  knowledge  as  a  whole 
upon  the  entering  element.  The  difference  lies 
in  the  characteristic  of  the  entrance  to  con- 
sciousness that  each  emphasizes.  One  consid- 
ers merely  the  truth  or  falsity,  the  other  the 
essential  quality  of  the  resulting  impression. 
If  one  must  choose  between  the  two,  there  is  no 
doubt  that  the  interpretation  put  upon  the  en- 
tering impression  is  more  important  for  logic 
than  the  mere  acceptance  or  rejection  of  the 
object  or  statement,  important  as  that  is. 
While  then  there  is  agreement  between  the  two 
definitions  on  many  essential  points,  it  seems 
that  the  definition  as  the  application  of  mean- 
ing covers  more  of  the  aspects  that  are  essential 
for  logic  than  does  Brentano's  definition  in 
terms  of  belief. 

11» 


JUDGMENT 

The  other  two  definitions  that  would  make 
judgment  comparison  and  that  would  make 
it  evaluation  have  much  in  common  with  the 
definition  of  judgment  as  ascription  of  mean- 
ing. It  might  seem  at  first  sight  that  the  judg- 
ment of  comparison  involves  at  least  two  terms 
and  in  so  far  there  is  an  immediate  disparity 
between  the  two.  In  fact,  this  is  the  tacit 
assumption  of  many  logicians,  ancient  and  mod- 
ern. As  a  matter  of  fact,  however,  modern 
psychological  investigation  seems  unanimous  in 
the  statement  that  there  is  but  one  act  in  the 
process  of  comparison,  and  that  there  need  be 
but  one  term  explicitly  in  consciousness.  When 
one  compares,  consciousness  is  not  of  two  ele- 
ments as  discrete,  but  of  one  whole  made  up 
of  two  parts.  Comparison  arises  whenever 
two  objects  are  united  in  a  single  experience, 
and  are  regarded  in  the  light  of  the  question 
which  is  heavier,  lighter,  or  what  not.  When 
an  object  is  presented  that  can  be  re- 
garded as  made  up  of  parts  and  that  object  is 
viewed  with  reference  to  any  quality  of  those 
two  parts,  comparison  results.  It  is  like  the 
attachment  of  meaning  in  two  important  re- 
spects. First,  that  the  result  of  the  comparison 
is  stated  in  the  form  of  a  typical  difference; 

113 


THE  PSYCHOLOGY  OF  SEASONING 

second,  that  the  difference  recognized  is  de- 
pendent upon  the  purpose.  We  never  express 
in  the  judgment  the  results  of  comparisons  that 
have  not  proved  important  in  iDractice.  They 
are  judged  with  reference  only  to  size  or  in- 
tensity, duration  or  quality,  they  are  compared 
in  those  ways  alone  that  have  proved  effective 
in  the  practical  ordering  of  our  world.  These 
ways  of  comparing  again  have  established  re- 
sults that  are  schematized  or  standardized  in 
relations  that  are  almost  as  firmly  established 
as  are  the  types  of  things  or  of  persons.  Which 
one  of  the  many  ways  in  which  two  objects  may 
be  compared  is  selected  in  terms  of  the  imme- 
diate needs  or  interests?  Two  lines  will  be 
compared  at  one  time  with  reference  to  their 
length,  at  another  with  reference  to  thickness 
or  brightness  or  some  other  quality.  Only  the 
comparison  results  that  is  valuable  at  the  par- 
ticular moment.  In  this  sense  the  comparison, 
like  the  meaning,  is  an  expression  not  of  the 
two  elements,  but  of  the  whole  consciousness  of 
the  moment.  Again  the  consciousness  of  dif- 
ference is  immediate.  Nothing  intervenes  be- 
tween the  entrance  of  the  two  objects  and  the 
attachment  of  the  result  of  the  comparison. 
They  may  not  be  appreciated  in  any  other  way 

114 


JUDGMENT 

than  as  just  brigliter,  or  larger,  or  whatever 
the  result  of  the  comparison  may  be.  In  its 
mechanism  comparison  is  on  exactly  the  same 
level  as  the  appreciation  of  any  other  mean- 
ing. We  may  go  so  far  as  to  say  that  when  two 
objects  are  compared,  they  become,  in  the  proc- 
ess of  comparison,  not  two  objects  but  one  and 
that  the  comparison  is  the  attachment  of  a 
meaning  to  this  single  object  in  just  the  same 
way  that  appreciation  of  its  color,  or  the  appre- 
ciation that  it  is  an  object  of  one  kind  not 
another  is  the  attachment  of  meaning.  The 
resulting  concept  is  in  a  degree  different  from 
others  in  that  according  to  Woodworth  the  con- 
tent of  the  concept  of  relation  is  difficult  to 
make  out.  But  as  we  have  seen  in  the  discus- 
sion of  the  concept,  deficiency  in  content  is  not 
fatal  to  the  concept.  In  many  cases,  the  con- 
cept seems  to  fulfill  its  function  with  little  or  no 
content.  The  fact  of  interconnection  is  the 
essential  element,  and  this  the  relation  has  in 
full  measure. 

The  experiments  on  comparison  already  men- 
tioned still  farther  reduce  the  essentials  of  the 
process.  It  will  be  recalled  that  when  some 
time  has  elapsed  between  the  presentation  of 
the  first  and  the  second  of  two  things  to  be 

115 


THE  PSYCHOLOGY  OF  REASONING 

compared,  it  is  not  necessary  that  the  first  be 
recalled  in  order  that  the  comparison  result 
or  even  that  it  be  accurate.    If  one  has  the 
intention  of  making  the  comparison,  the  concept  ■ 
of  relation  is  aroused  on  the  basis  of  the  pres- 
ence of  the  one  that  is  presented,  without  any 
representation  of  the  first  in  sensory  terms. 
The  purpose  or  attitude  in  this  case  seems  to 
bridge  the  gap  of  time  and  to  call  out  the  con- 
cept of  relation  without  definite  consciousness 
of  the  first  member  of  the  pair.    What  the 
nervous  basis  of  the  process  may  be,  we  do  not 
know.    Here  too  we  get  another  effect  of  the 
type  or  standard  similar  to  that  which  it  has 
in  the  more  usual  forms.    The  comparison  is 
mediate  between  the  first  and  the  standard,  j 
and  the  second  and  the  standard;  it  is  not  a 
direct  comparison.    The  result  of  the  two  com- 
parisons and  the  third  that  combines  them  is  \ 
immediate,  no  extra  time  is  required  for  the  ' 
triple  act.    The  upshot  of  the  study  of  the  re- 
sults of  comparison  is  that  comparison,  like  the  ^ 
attachment  of  meaning  is  a  single  process,  and  '< 
even  ordinarily  a  process  that  in  strictness  in-  j 
volves  but  a  single  object. 

The  tendency  to  regard  comparison  and  re-  j 
lated  processes  as  made  up  of  more  than  a  ' 

116 


JUDGMENT 

single  term  has  led  to  a  large  amount  of  con* 
fusion  in  the  logical  discussions,  and,  I  think, 
leads  to  the  classification  as  inferences  of  many 
processes  that  are  really  judgments  in  our  sense 
and  still  more  certainly  not  inferences  in  the 
accepted  definition  of  the  logicians.  Thus 
Bradley  has  a  long  discussion  of  space  relations 
such  as  that  ^4f  A  is  to  the  left  of  B  and  C  to 
the  right  of  B,  then  C  must  be  to  the  right 
of  A.'^  Bradley  assumes  that  the  first  state- 
ments are  in  some  way  the  premises  from  which 
the  final  statement  is  established  as  a  conclu- 
sion. This  we  shall  see  does  not  at  all  agree 
with  any  of  the  interpretations  of  the  nature 
of  the  premises  that  are  ordinarily  given,  or 
that  may  be  easily  given  to  the  syllogism.  The 
first  term  is  in  no  sense  a  major  premise  with 
the  second  subordinate  to  it.  It  is  not  a  uni- 
versal statement  or  even  a  general  statement. 
We  are  not  prepared  to  bring  forward  all  of 
the  reasons  for  regarding  it  as  of  a  different 
sort  from  the  relations  involved  in  the  syllo- 
gism, but  can,  I  think,  show  that  it  is  really 
of  the  same  nature  as  the  judgment  which  we 
have  been  treating.  The  first  two  terms  merely 
serve  to  define  the  spatial  conditions  that  would 
be  ordinarily  presented  to  consciousness  at  a 

117 


THE  PSYCHOLOGY  OF  REASONING 

single  glance.  As  we  look  at  an  actual  series 
of  points  arranged  as  these  are,  the  relation 
of  A  and  C  would  be  appreciated  at  once. 
When  the  relation  of  A  and  B,  and  of  C  and  B, 
are  described,  we  are  enabled  to  picture  or  to 
appreciate  conceptually  the  relation  that  A  and 
C  have  in  the  same  immediate  way  that  we  ap- 
preciate the  relation  of  two  points  that  are 
directly  seen.  The  process  is  exactly  on  a  level 
with  a  descriptive  narrative  that  presents  to  us 
in  concrete  form  the  characteristics  of  two  per- 
sons and  permits  us  to  compare  them  with  refer- 
ence to  some  one  characteristic  on  the  basis  of  the 
description.  We  are  then  in  no  sense  inferring 
a  certain  conclusion  from  the  description  of  the 
series  of  acts ;  we  are  interpreting  them  on  the 
basis  of  a  description  that  takes  the  place,  for 
us,  of  immediate  observation.  There  are  many 
similarities  between  such  a  process  of  compari- 
son and  the  one  involved  in  our  appreciation  of 
the  relation  in  space  between  two  points  when 
the  relation  of  each  to  the  common  third  point 
is  stated.  Bradley  himself  recognizes  the  fact 
that  there  is  no  major  premise  in  such  syllo- 
gisms or  statements.  The  major  he  would  sup- 
ply is  some  statement  to  the  effect  that  *'the 
nature  of  space  is  such  that  A  is  to  right  of 

118 


JUDGMENT 

C  when/^  etc.  The  nature  of  space  is  implied 
in  our  interpretation  of  the  relation;  but  this 
would  be  implied  in  the  same  way  that  our 
earlier  and  classified  knowledge  is  concerned 
in  making  any  judgment,  in  the  attachment  of 
any  meaning.  There  is  no  express  formula- 
tion that  gives  warrant  for  the  relation  and  this 
is  necessary  if  we  are  to  have  the  syllogism. 

It  is  the  same  misinterpretation  of  the  nature 
of  space  and  intensive  relations  that  detracts 
from  the  otherwise  valuable  work  of  Storring 
on  the  process  of  inference  that  has  been  pub- 
lished recently.^  Storring  devotes  many  pages 
to  the  description  of  the  processes  that  are  in- 
volved in  deciding  what  the  relations  of  two 
points  or  intensities  are  to  each  other  from 
statements  of  other  relations  of  the  same  points 
or  intensities.  His  results  are  exactly  what 
one  would  expect  from  the  other  work  that  has 
been  done  on  the  nature  of  comparison.  The 
essential  elements  in  the  process  are  the  atti- 
tude that  is  taken  toward  the  problem;  and  the 
resulting  statement,  the  reference  of  the  rela- 
tion to  its  appropriate  concept  or  type.    As  in 

1  storring:  Experimentelle  Untersuchungen  uber  einfache 
Schlussprocesse.  Archiv  fUr  die  gesammte  Psychologie,  Vol.  11, 
p.  1. 

9  119 


/ 


THE  PSYCHOLOGY  OF  EEASOXING 

other  forms  of  comparison  there  is  little  appre- 
ciation of  the  mediating  process.  In  some  cases 
the  relations  that  are  described  are  pictured, 
in  others,  particularly  after  practice,  even  the 
visualizing  disappears  and  the  concept  that  re- 
sults is  the  only  consciousness  that  is  involved 
in  the  entire  process.  These  results  make 
much  more  for  than  against  the  statement  that 
we  have  to  deal  in  all  such  processes  not  with 
an  inference,  as  the  author  supposes,  but  with 
a  process  of  interpretation  that  is  in  some  cases 
a  direct  or  mediate  comparison,  in  others  an 
interpretation  of  a  relation  that  is  made  on  the 
basis  of  a  preliminary  description.  This  in- 
terpretation or  appreciation  is  made  on  the 
same  warrant  and  by  the  same  methods  as  the 
ordinary  comparison.  That  we  have  several 
sentences  or  statements  involved  is  due  to  the 
fact  that  it  is  necessary  to  employ  several  words 
to  take  the  place  of  what  is  ordinarily  given  in 
immediate  presentation.  Here,  too,  we  have 
judgment  as  a  process  of  referring  entering 
processes  to  concepts. 

Comparison  and  the  judgments  of  relation  in 
general,  then,  are  in  three  respects  closely  sim- 
ilar to  the  ascription  of  meaning.  (1)  The  sort 
of  relation  that  is  appreciated  is  determined 

120 


JUDGMENT 

by  the  mental  context,  the  momentary  purpose. 
This  decides  in  what  respect  the  processes  are 
to  be  compared,  or  what  relation  is  to  be 
affirmed  to  exist  between  them.  (2)  The  process 
of  comparison  is  always  a  single  act,  no  matter 
how  many  elements  may  be  concerned,  and  in 
many  instances  that  seem  to  involve  several 
elements  all  are  really  combined  into  one  at  the 
moment  the  comparison  is  made.  (3)  The  result 
of  the  process  is  the  taking  over  of  the  relation 
or  of  the  elements  to  be  considered  into  a  pre- 
determined conceptual  relation,  a  relation  that 
stands  to  the  particular  relation  considered  in 
very  much  the  same  way  that  the  concept  of  a 
thing  stands  to  the  particular  thing.  The  only 
difference  that  distinguishes  th'^  process  from 
the  ascription  of  meaning  is  that  the  material 
involved  may,  from  other  points  of  view  than 
that  which  prevails  at  the  moment  of  compar- 
ing, be  regarded  as  made  up  of  two  or  more 
elements  rather  than  of  one.  The  similarities 
are  certainly  more  numerous  and  more  impor- 
tant than  the  differences. 

The  fourth  process  that  we  must  consider, 
the  process  of  evaluation,  is  one  that  has  come 
into  marked  prominence  in  very  recent  years. 
It  is  particularly  desirable  that  it  be  brought 

121 


THE  PSYCHOLOGY  OF  REASONING 

into  liarmony  with  tlie  other  forms  because  of 
the  tendency  to  make  it  the  basis  of  an  entirely 
distinct  process  of  reasoning,  to  ground  upon 
it,  in  fact,  an  entirely  distinct  discipline.  It 
has  struck  many  of  the  modem  writers  that 
there  are  certain  important  conclusions  which 
do  not  fall  within  the  range  of  the  ordinary 
logic  and  which  do  not  find  their  explanation 
in  the  principles  of  any  of  the  philosophical 
sciences.  In  consequence  a  foundation  has 
been  sought  for  them  in  the  feelings  or  in  other 
sources  not  usually  taken  into  account  in  logic 
or  in  psycholog}^  in  the  processes  ordinarily 
regarded  as  the  basis  of  cognitive  knowledge. 
More  ultimate  apparently  than  the  materials 
usually  considered  in  logic  are  the  decisions  as 
to  what  we  shall  consider  fundamentally  desir- 
able, is  our  choice  of  the  ultimate  ends  of  life 
towards  which  we  shall  strive,  and  of  the  evils 
that  we  shall  flee.  Not  only  do  we  pass  these 
judgments  of  value  upon  remote  and  abstract 
goods  and  ends,  but  we  are  constantly  deciding 
on  little  if  any  rational  ground  that  certain 
things  are  to  be  chosen,  others  to  be  abjured. 
One  can  apparently  say  only  that  the  decision 
is  made  and  affirmed,  often  with  great  emphasis 
and  warmth;  the  grounds  are  not  capable  of 

123 


JUDGMENT 

statement  in  the  ordinary  terms.  These  asser- 
tions must  be  accepted  as  true;  they  are 
accepted  as  true  in  the  most  important  matters 
of  life.  The  only  question  is  as  to  their  justifi- 
cation. Why  are  they  made^  How  are  they 
true? 

Two  alternatives  are  open.  The  one  most 
favored  at  present,  apparently,  is  to  seek  to 
establish  on  them  a  new  and  independent  sort 
of  truth,  or  at  least  a  new  and  independent 
source  of  truth.  This  is  open  to  the  objection 
that  it  would  complicate  all  explanation  and 
make  impossible  any  unification  of  the  kinds 
of  knowledge.  It  would  have  the  disadvantage, 
too,  of  making  all,  or  at  least  by  far  the  greater 
part,  of  our  knowledge  go  back  for  its  ultimate 
guarantee  to  vague  feeling  processes.  This 
disadvantage  is  all  the  greater  and  the  course 
the  more  lamentable  because  up  to  the  present 
there  is  a  tendency  to  make  a  mystery  of  the 
whole  matter,  to  assert  that  we  must  accept 
these  results  without  reason  and  without  any 
hope  of  discovering  a  reason.  In  consequence 
anything  that  anyone  asserts  to  be  true  must 
be  true  for  him  and  there  is  no  means  of  con- 
testing its  truth.  All  that  can  be  done  is  to 
assert  the  negative  with  greater  warmth  than 

123 


THE  PSYCHOLOGY  OF  REASONING 

was  shown  in  his  assertion  of  the  original 
affirmative.  All  major  premises  of  formal 
logic  would  go  back  ultimately  to  grounds  of 
this  kind,  and  most  appreciations  that  could 
not  be  derived  syllogistically  would  depend  im- 
mediately upon  determinations  of  the  sort  we 
are  considering.  If,  then,  feeling  processes 
alone  determine  evaluation  they  establish  the 
truth  of  most  of  the  important  facts  of  life. 

The  other  alternative  is  to  take  these  some- 
what vague  justifications  over  into  our  logic. 
Admit  that  ultimately  large  and  important 
fields  of  knowledge  depend  upon  them  and  then 
do  the  best  that  we  can  to  trace  the  conditions 
and  reasons  for  the  judgments  to  their  sources 
wherever  we  may  find  them.  The  alternatives 
present  themselves  of  letting  feeling  or  other 
vague  processes  swallow  up  the  cognitive,  or  to 
widen  our  logical  and  psychological  system  to 
inolude  the  vaguer  kinds  of  knowledge,  or  the 
knowledge  that  has  a  less  definite  warrant.  We 
have  already  gone  a  considerable  distance  in 
the  latter  direction  in  the  discussion  of  the  na- 
ture of  belief.  There  we  found  that  the  war- 
rant for  the  acceptance  or  rejection  of  any 
object  or  statement  is  to  be  found  in  the  earlier 
experience  in  the  widest  sense  of  the  term,  and 

124 


JUDGMENT 

that  but  a  small  number  of  the  sources  of  tbe 
belief  in  anything  or  by  any  person  are  open 
to  observation  at  any  time.  The  process  of 
evaluation  may  very  well  rest  upon  similar 
grounds.  Our  problem  in  this  connection  is  to 
trace  the  mechanism  by  which  we  attain  to  such 
evaluations,  with  particular  reference  to  its 
similarity  to  the  other  forms  of  judgment. 

The  process  of  evaluation  shows  at  least  two 
evidences  of  having  some  close  dependence 
upon  experience.  In  the  first  place  the  stand- 
ard changes  with  experience.  What  is  good  for 
one  man  is  bad  for  another.  My  luxuries  may 
be  your  necessities,  my  virtues  may  be  your 
vices.  The  luxuries  of  one  period  of  life  may 
become  the  necessities  of  a  later  period.  Sums 
of  money  that  are  of  large  moment  to  the  child 
are  of  insignificance,  or  may  be,  to  the  adult. 
Changes  of  standards  of  living  and  of  morality 
are  constantly  seen  both  in  the  individual  and 
in  society.  Secondly,  the  kind  of  evaluation 
depends  very  definitely  and  clearly  upon  the 
more  immediate  experience  at  the  moment  the 
evaluation  is  made.  Everything  may  be  evalu- 
ated, as  it  may  be  compared,  in  a  very  large 
number  of  ways.  The  evaluation  is  always 
with  tacit  reference  to  the  context.    A  man  may 

125 


THE  PSYCHOLOGY  OF  REASONING 

be  a  good  man  from  the  point  of  view  of  the 
judge  and  a  bad  man  in  the  estimation  of  the 
world  at  large.  He  may  be  a  good  man  when 
judged  from  the  standpoint  of  a  political  boss 
when  evaluated  in  reference  to  his  candidacy 
for  an  office,  and  a  bad  man  when  evaluated  by 
the  voter.  He  may  be  a  good  man  when  spoken 
of  in  connection  with  an  athletic  contest  and 
not  a  good  one  when  considered  from  the  point 
of  view  of  academic  scholarship.  Similar  dif- 
ferences in  judgment  with  the  variations  in  the 
standard  of  reference  may  be  traced  in  every 
object  at  any  moment.  There  is  probably  noth- 
ing that  can  be  judged  in  one  way  alone,  and  in 
consequence,  nothing  upon  which  only  one  value 
can  be  set.  The  evaluation  of  any  object  will 
change  slowly  with  the  change  in  the  experi- 
ence of  the  individual  or  of  a  community;  it 
will  change  almost  instantly  as  it  presents  itself 
from  different  points  of  view  or  in  different 
contexts. 

Values  then  are  not  fixed  once  and  for  all, 
but  are  growing  and  changing  with  growth  and 
change  in  experience.  While  one  can  not  easily 
go  behind  the  value  that  is  set  upon  anything 
by  an  individual  and  even  more  truly  can  not 
go  behind  the  value  that  is  set  upon  an  act 

126 


JUDGMENT 

or  object  by  a  community  or  race,  it  is  never- 
theless possible  to  point  out  that  these  stand- 
ards are  not  all  fixed.  They  belong  to  the  tran- 
sient empirical  realm,  not  to  the  realm  of  eternal 
verities.  One  may  even  hope  to  be  able  to 
change  the  values  of  a  people  by  pointing  out 
the  disadvantages  in  practice  that  inhere  in 
customs  long  established,  and  one  can 
more  certainly  prophesy  that  even  the  most 
definitely  established  values  may  change,  unless 
they  happen  to  be  rooted  in  the  instincts  of  the 
race,  or  have  other  permanent  warrant  in  the 
nature  of  man  or  the  world.  A  study  of  the 
shift  of  values  as  represented  in  money  can  be 
empirically  made  in  connection  with  any  com- 
modity or  with  a  stock  on  the  exchanges. 
These  changes  show,  as  is  clear  to  anyone,  the 
influence  of  new  experiences  in  connection  with 
that  value,  the  effect  of  new  facts  that  are  no 
more  easy  to  describe  than  to  say  that  they 
relate  to  popular  sentiment.  The  choice  of 
fundamental  ways  of  living  seems  to  be  deter- 
mined in  the  same  immediate  way  and  to  be 
determined  when  disturbed  by  factors  that  are 
as  little  open  to  investigation  although  they  too 
would  probably  be  traceable  either  to  instincts 
or  to  the  influence  of  some  chance  environ- 

127 


THE  PSYCHOLOGY  OF  REASONING 

mental  factor,  or,  what  is  more  probable,  to  a 
combination  of  both.  Observation  of  individ- 
uals who  are  suddenly  called  upon  to  readjust 
the  habits  and  standards  of  a  lifetime  through 
some  change  in  their  material  possessions  shows 
how  largely  the  common  standards  of  comfort 
and  extravagance  are  the  outgrowth  of  long 
experience.  It  is  probable  from  my  own  lim- 
ited observation  that  individuals  who  suddenly 
rise  from  poverty  to  affluence  either  refuse  to 
give  over  the  old  standards,  or  they  are  for  a 
considerable  time  altogether  without  standards. 
In  the  one  case  the  individual  is  characterized 
as  a  miser  because  his  old  standards  of  economy 
and  extravagance  are  entirely  out  of  harmony 
with  his  new  conditions,  or  else  he  becomes  a 
profligate  and  spendthrift  with  no  idea  what- 
soever as  to  how  far  his  new  income  will  permit 
him  to  indulge  his  desires.  In  either  case  it  is 
only  with  the  lapse  of  considerable  time  and 
through  the  influence  of  many  experiences  that 
a  new  set  of  standards  develops  and  the  man 
learns  to  use  his  money.  Similar  dependence 
of  moral  standards  upon  experience  is  evi- 
denced by  the  periods  of  sudden  change  in  social 
organization.  Social  catastrophes  like  the 
French  Revolution  bring  with  them  the  disap- 

128 


JUDGMENT 

pearance  of  all  moral  standards  and  a  resulting 
moral  chaos.  Again  time  and  experience  alone 
will  avail  for  the  development  of  new  values  on 
a  somewhat  stable  basis.  The  temporary  in- 
competence of  judgment  that  follows  the  change 
of  residence  between  countries  of  different  civ- 
ilizations or  of  different  monetary  units,  to- 
gether with  the  relatively  slow  adjustments  to 
the  new  conditions,  are  both  further  evidence 
of  the  influence  of  experience  in  the  develop- 
ment of  what  often  seem  to  be  ultimate  stand- 
ards of  moral  and  material  values. 

It  is  true  that  processes  very  similar  to  feel- 
ings are  effective  in  the  establishment  of  values 
even  in  the  most  important  of  our  practical  as 
well  as  in  our  aesthetic  life.  Instincts  undoubt- 
edly play  a  considerable  part  and  accumulated 
experience  even  a  larger  part.  Values  like  feel- 
ings change,  too,  if  slowly,  and  the  course  of 
the  change  depends  upon  the  nature  of  the 
experience  to  which  the  race  or  the  individual 
may  be  subjected.  This  dependence  upon  ex- 
perience is  common  to  evaluation  and  belief,  as 
well  as  to  evaluations  and  feelings  and  it  seems 
more  satisfactory  on  the  whole  to  bring  the 
process  into  relation  with  belief  than  with  feel- 
ing.   Belief  is  equally  capable  of  accounting  for 

129 


THE  PSYCHOLOGY  OF  REASONING 

the  immediacy  of  the  process,  and  offers  a  more 
adequate  explanation  of  its  sources.  This 
classification  will  serve,  too,  to  bring  it  into 
relation  with  the  other  cognitive  processes, 
rather  than  leave  it  with  a  different  warrant 
from  that  which  suffices  for  the  other  cognitive 
states.  It  does  not  do  injustice  to  the  vague- 
ness of  the  guarantees  of  the  knowledge,  but  it 
makes  that  vagueness  and  apparent  immediacy 
apologetic  rather  than  defiant.  The  attitude 
toward  reasoning  of  the  ordinary  sort  is  not, 
**This  is  my  dictum;  what  right  have  you  to 
examine  meT'  but  it  is,  *^I  can  not  avoid  com- 
ing to  this  conclusion,  I  believe  it  to  be  true, 
but  I  am  sorry  to  say  that  the  warrant  for  its 
existence  can  not  be  stated,  or  even  traced 
through  the  mass  of  experience  from  which  I 
believe  it  to  be  derived."  One  might  push  the 
position  a  step  farther,  and  add,  *'If  the  belief 
process  were  carefully  examined,  I  have  no 
doubt  it  would  be  found  that  belief,  too,  is  in 
the  same  position." 

Two  results  are  apparent  from  the  examina- 
tion of  the  process  of  evaluation.  The  process 
of  evaluation  is  essentially  a  process  of  com- 
paring the  given  presentation  with  a  standard. 
Secondly,  the  standard  with  which  the  compari- 

130 


JUDGMENT 

son  is  made  has  developed  from  experience,  is 
not  independent  of  it.  At  the  same  time  the 
standard  at  the  moment  of  judging  is  for 
the  individual  ultimate  and  immediate ;  it  gives 
no  evidence  of  its  derivation  from  and  through 
experience.  We  have  had  occasion  to  indicate 
that  it  is  similar  in  its  warrant  to  belief  if  not 
merely  a  subhead  under  belief.  It  is  also,  how- 
ever, closely  related  to  two  of  the  forms  of  the 
judgment  that  have  already  been  considered. 
It  has  two  characteristics  in  common  with  the 
judgment  processes  we  have  discussed.  It  is 
similar  to  the  ascription  of  meaning  in  that  the 
developed  type  or  standard  is  called  out  at 
the  moment  evaluation  is  made,  which  may  be 
at  the  moment  that  the  object  enters  conscious- 
ness. It  differs  from  this  ascription  of  mean- 
ing only  in  that  the  type  does  not  replace  the 
particular,  but  serves  merely  to  give  it  value. 
It  is  similar  again  in  so  far  as  the  evaluation 
is  immediate  when  the  purpose  of  evaluation 
is  present.  It  need  not  be  true  that  the  object 
is  present  as  a  meaning  first  and  then  evaluated. 
More  frequently  when  presented,  the  object  is 
evaluated  and  perceived  at  the  same  moment. 
Evaluation  is  also  a  single  operation,  with  no 
explicit  presence  of  any  thing,  not  even  of  the 

131 


THE  PSYCHOLOGY  OF  REASONING 

standard  that  serves  to  give  it  value.  If  evalu- 
ation has  a  touch  of  the  reference  to  type  that 
is  characteristic  of  the  ascription  of  meaning, 
it  is  similar  to  the  judgment  of  comparison  in 
view  of  the  fact  that  it  involves  comparison 
with  that  type.  It  may  be  brought  into  still 
closer  relation  to  the  judgment  of  comparison 
if  the  results  of  the  investigations  of  recogni- 
tion by  Lehmann  and  others  are  recalled.  It 
will  be  remembered  that  in  the  comparison  of 
two  qualities  presented  at  different  times  the 
comparison  is  ordinarily  not  of  one  with  the 
other,  but  of  each  with  a  standard.  We  might 
say  that  the  process  is  an  evaluation  of  each 
and  then  a  comparison  of  the  evaluations  rather 
than  a  direct  comparison.  The  standard  with 
which  each  is  evaluated  is  probably  closely  re- 
lated to  the  standard  of  absolute  evaluation. 
It  comes  to  seem  absolute  from  frequent  use. 
In  fact,  in  Lehmann  \s  investigation  of  the  color 
recognition  it  was,  if  we  may  trust  the  intro- 
spection of  the  observers,  the  absolute  standard 
that  was  brought  into  play.  In  general,  the 
process  of  evaluation  may  be  said  to  be  inter- 
mediate between  the  judgment  as  ascription  of 
meaning,  and  the  judgment  as  comparison.  It 
has  certain  elements  that  are  common  to  each 

132 


JUDGMENT 

of  them.    No  element  is  involved  in  it  that  is 
entirely  unfamiliar  to  the  other  two. 

The  mechanism  of  evaluation  is  also  similar 
in  every  respect  to  the  mechanism  of  the  other 
forms  of  judgment.  As  we  have  seen,  the  men- 
tal antecedents  of  the  process  are  identical  with 
the  mental  antecedents  of  ascription  of  mean- 
ing. Just  as  the  context  and  the  purpose  of 
the  moment  determine  what  type  shall  be 
called  out  by  the  object  as  it  enters,  what  mean- 
ing shall  be  ascribed  to  it,  so  here  the  purpose 
and  context  determine  what  value  shall  be 
placed  upon  it,  with  which  of  the  many  appo- 
site standards  it  may  be  compared.  The  proc- 
ess is  not  ordinarily  accompanied  by  any  pecul- 
iar psychological  experience.  The  purpose  is 
ordinarily  vaguely  conscious  and  the  result  is 
given  some  fairly  distinct  sort  of  representa- 
tion in  some  of  the  concepts  of  value,  but  noth- 
ing else  is  apparent.  You  decide  that  a  paint- 
ing is  valuable  or  worthless  immediately. 
Even  the  standard  in  this  case  is  not  definitely 
ideated.  In  many  cases  it  would  be  very  diffi- 
cult to  give  any  ideational  form  to  the  standard. 
The  essentials  here  as  everywhere  are  the  pur- 
pose in  observation  and  the  resulting  estimate. 
Nothing  much  intervenes.    The  standard,  while 

133 


THE  PSYCHOLOGY  OF  REASONING 

essential  to  the  process,  does  not  appear  in  the 
foreground  of  the  conscious  life.  This,  the 
most  ancient  and  frequent  use  of  the  term  judg- 
ment, shows  many  points  in  common  with  the 
others  that  have  grown  up  since  and  are  com- 
mon in  popular  or  technical  use. 

We  can  bring  together  the  results  of  this  ex- 
amination in  the  statement  that  the  process  of 
judging  is  always  simple,  the  results  of  the 
judgment  are  always  to  be  found  in  a  concept 
or  a  type,  the  direction  of  the  judgment  is  al- 
ways in  terms  of  the  momentary  context  or 
purpose.  All  forms  of  judgment  are  alike,  too, 
in  that  their  occasion  is  furnished  by  some 
stimulus.  All  begin  in  some  stimulus  and  end 
in  a  meaning  or  concept.  The  concept  alone  is 
actually  conscious.  The  meaning  that  is  added 
may  be  a  type  of  the  simple  kind  that  makes 
the  object,  it  may  be  a  statement  of  relative  in- 
tensity between  different  parts  of  the  total,  or 
it  may  be  an  appreciation  of  the  value  of  the 
presented  with  reference  to  some  established 
standard.  In  any  case  it  is  the  reception  of 
a  presented  stimulus  into  the  unified  experience. 
This  reception  first  gives  the  stimulus  con- 
sciousness, first  permits  it  to  become  a  psychical 
somewhat  rather  than  a  mere  physical  stimulus. 

134 


JUDGMENT 

The  type  of  the  three  forms  of  judgment  is 
susceptible  of  a  single  statement  as  the  ascrip- 
tion of  meaning  to  the  presented.  Sometimes 
the  meaning  is  a  simple  concept  or  type,  some- 
times it  is  a  typical  relation,  sometimes  a  type 
or  concept  of  value.  It  is  always  some  type 
that  has  developed  out  of  experience  to  unify 
experience.  It  is  always  added  immediately 
and  the  entering  impression  is  nothing  con- 
scious until  it  has  been  added.  As  the  result 
of  interpretation  is  determined  by  remote  ex- 
perience, the  particular  course  or  sort  of  inter- 
pretation is  determined  by  immediate  experi- 
ence, by  the  context  and  the  purpose  of  the 
thinking  at  the  moment. 

If  these  three  forms  of  judgment  can  be 
brought  under  a  single  head,  it  is  also  possible 
to  show  that  the  judgment  as  affirmation  or  be- 
lief of  Brentano,  accepted  as  the  definition  of 
judgment  by  Baldwin,  also,  with  some  reserva- 
tions, has  the  same  general  character,  the  same 
warrant  and  the  same  occasion.  If  the  ascrip- 
tion of  meaning  is  an  expression  of  ordered 
experience  in  its  widest  relations,  belief  is 
another  expression  of  the  same  experience  ap- 
plied to  the  same  object  at  the  moment  of  enter- 
ing consciousness.  We  believe  at  the  same 
10  135 


THE  PSYCHOLOGY  OF  REASONING 

time  that  we  interpret  and  for  the  same  reasons, 
because  experience  as  a  whole  is  guiding  the 
interpretation.  The  only  question  is  as  to 
which  of  the  two  outcomes  of  the  process  are 
to  be  regarded  as  more  important,  the  content 
or  the  belief  that  attaches  to  the  content.  Per- 
sonally, I  am  inclined  to  prefer  the  content  and 
to  define  judgment  as  the  ascription  of  meaning 
to  the  presented,  or  as  the  reception  of  the 
entering  impression  into  the  organized  con- 
sciousness. 


CHAPTER  V 

JUDGMENT   AND   LANGUAGE 

It  has  been  possible  to  combine  in  a  single 
definition  the  uses  of  judgment  prevalent  in 
popular  language  and  that  generally  accepted 
by  modern  logic.  But  the  definition  of  formal 
logic  that  has  been  accepted  for  so  many  ages 
certainly  will  not  fall  readily  into  the  same 
class.  For  formal  logic,  the  judgment  was  al- 
ways made  up  of  two  elements  that  were  com- 
bined into  a  single  somewhat  in  the  act  of  judg- 
ing. Two  concepts,  two  things,  were  in  some 
way  related.  It  did  not  deal  with  a  single  con- 
cept or  a  single  act.  The  modern  logician  has 
attempted  to  apply  his  definition  to  the  process 
designated  judgment  by  the  scholastic,  by  as- 
suming that  the  subject  represented  the  given 
before  it  was  appreciated;  the  predicate  the 
meaning  that  was  attached  to  it,  the  type  to 
which  it  was  referred.  But  we  have  seen  that 
the  bare  given  is  not  in  consciousness,  that  to 
become  conscious  the  meaning  must  be  attached. 

137 


THE  PSYCHOLOGY  OF  REASONING 

Evidently  this  simple  device  will  not  serve  to 
make  the  definition  of  the  modern  logician  ap- 
plicable to  the  process  designated  judgment  by 
formal  logic. 

As  a  preliminary  to  harmonizing  the  defini- 
tions, we  must  see  that  the  problem  of  the  logi- 
cian and  his  method  of  attacking  the  problem 
are  both  essentially  different  from  our  own. 
We  have  been  considering  the  actual  mental 
operation,  the  logician  considers  the  result  as  it 
is  expressed  in  language.  This,  too,  he  treats 
altogether  apart  from  its  context.  He  consid- 
ers not  what  the  speaker  actually  did  mean  by 
his  statement  in  the  connection  in  which  it  was 
given,  but  what  the  sentence  might  mean  as  it 
stands  out  of  its  context.  Each  of  these  differ- 
ent points  of  view  gives  different  methods  of  ap- 
proaching the  problem,  of  determining  how  the 
judgment  as  ascription  of  meaning  is  related 
to  the  judgment  as  combination  of  subject  and 
predicate.  The  first  problem  would  be,  *^What 
is  the  psychological  relation  between  what  is 
denoted  by  the  subject  and  by  the  predicate?'' 
The  second  is,  **How  is  that  judgment  ex- 
pressed in  language?" 

To  attack  the  first  problem  we  must  put  our- 
selves at  the  point  of  view  of  the  logician  and 

138 


JUDGMENT  AND  LANGUAGE 

consider  the  judgment  out  of  its  setting  as  just 
two  words  or  terms  joined  by  the  copula.  The 
question  for  him  was  if  one  has  just  this  state- 
ment and  nothing  else,  what  can  one  imagine 
the  copula  or  the  copulation  to  do  for  the  terms. 
This  is  to  omit  all  consideration  of  the  mental 
operation  that  gave  rise  to  the  connection  and 
to  take  no  account  of  the  purpose  that  found 
its  fulfillment  in  the  judgment.  If  we  take  this 
point  of  view  and  ask  how,  given  a  dead  judg- 
ment made  of  subject  and  predicate,  the  two 
may  be  conceived  as  connected,  we  find  that 
there  are  a  large  number  of  widely  divergent 
theories.  The  diversity  is  in  part  due  to  the 
fact  that  the  different  theorists  were  dealing 
with  different  kinds  of  judgment  indiscrimi- 
nately and  that  all  were  brought  under  one 
general  head  while  in  reality  they  belonged  in 
a  number  of  different  classes.  Some  one  sort 
of  connection  which  had  application  to  but  one 
alone  was  assumed  to  be  true  for  all  alike. 
Some  attempted  to  bring  the  judgment  under 
the  head  of  a  mathematical  relation,  others  to 
connect  it  with  psychological  operations.  Dif- 
fering views  of  the  nature  of  the  concept  as 
well  as  different  psychological  theories  are  re- 
flected in  the  theories  of  the  judgment,  and  each 

139 


THE  PSYCHOLOGY  OF  EEASOMNG 

in  consequence  tends  to  be  true  for  the  par- 
ticular phase  of  the  judgment  or  kind  of  judg- 
ment of  which  the  theorist  was  thinking,  but  it 
will  not  hold  of  all  judgments  or  of  all  aspects 
of  any  judgment.  Before  we  can  hope  to  har- 
monize them  or  to  do  justice  to  the  judgment  as 
expressed  in  words  we  must  distinguish  the  dif- 
ferent classes  and  discuss  each  separately. 

Some  of  the  oldest  and  simplest  may  be 
grouped  together  in  the  statement  that  the 
judgment  asserted  some  relation  between  sub- 
ject and  predicate.  The  most  familiar  of  these 
is  the  statement  of  the  mathematical  logicians 
that  the  *4s''  is  a  sign  of  equality.  Similarity 
or  partial  identity  might  be  brought  under  the 
same  head.  Such  judgments  as  ^^A"  is  equal 
to  ''B,''  or  *^A''  is  similar  to  ^^B''  would  then 
be  typical  of  all  predication.  These  are  most 
closely  related  to  the  psychological  judgment 
with  which  we  have  been  dealing  up  to  this 
point.  In  fact  we  might  agree  that  they  are 
phases  of  the  judgment  of  comparison  that  were 
discussed  in  the  last  chapter.  The  only  objec- 
tion that  we  could  make  to  the  ordinary  treat- 
ment is  that  psychologically  the  judgment  of 
comparison  is  one  operation,  not  two,  or  at  the 
very  least  the  process  of  predication  is  not 

140 


JUDGMENT  AND  LANGUAGE 

properly  represented  by  the  division  of  the 
total  as  expressed  in  words.  Psychologically 
when  processes  are  compared  the  two  objects 
form  a  unit  and  the  relation  is  added  to  them. 
In  the  attitude  of  the  moment  the  distinction 
between  the  two  terms  is  not  actually  recog- 
nized and  they  fuse  for  the  purpose  in  hand 
into  a  single  whole.  The  translation  into  lan- 
guage that  would  most  accurately  represent  the 
mental  operation  would  be  **A''  and  **B^'  are 
equal  or  similar  or  identical.  That  the  judg- 
ment as  ordinarily  expressed  makes  ^^A''  the 
subject,  **B''  the  predicate  is  due  to  the  vaga- 
I  ries  of  language  not  to  the  nature  of  the  mental 
operation.  As  we  have  pointed  out,  it  is  more 
than  likely  that  the  two  elements  compared  are 
not  in  consciousness  as  distinct  objects  before 
or  even  after  the  comparison,  but  that  they 
first  come  to  consciousness  as  **A''  and  *^B^^ 
equal.  When  one  looks  with  that  question  in 
mind,  the  appreciation  is  of  the  equality,  as  a 
single  mental  content  rather  than  a  series  of 
mental  processes,  first  *^A,"  then  **B,"  then 
their  equality.  All  judgments  of  relation  in 
space  and  time,  like  all  comparisons  in  what- 
ever respect,  fall  under  this  same  classification, 
as  has  been  pointed  out  in  detail,  and  I  hope 

141 


THE  PSYCHOLOGY  OF  KEASONING 

made  clear,  in  the  earlier  connection.  The  du- 
plicity in  this  whole  group  of  judgments  is 
linguistic  only;  the  mental  operation  is  single. 
The  mental  operation  is  one  of  the  types  of 
judgment  that  has  already  found  a  place  in  the 
psychological  discussion. 

Not  only  is  the  psychological  operation  in 
ascribing  equality  to  two  objects  not  what  lan- 
guage represents  it  to  be,  but  not  all  forms  of 
predication  can  be  brought  under  this  head. 
When  we  assert  in  the  judgment  of  perception 
that  **a  tree  is  green,''  or  in  a  general  judgment 
that  *^man  is  mortal,''  we  very  evidently  have 
no  intention  of  asserting  that  the  tree  is  equiva- 
lent to  greenness  or  that  the  two  are  similar 
or  even  that  man  and  mortality  are  in  part 
identical.  The  same  holds  of  the  judgments  of 
naming,  *4hat  is  a  tree,"  and  of  a  great  many 
other  sorts  of  predication.  Evidently  other 
classifications  must  be  considered  before  we  can 
dispose  of  these  various  judgments. 

A  second  definition  of  judgment  would  be 
more  appropriate  here.  This  is  the  group  that 
makes  the  subject  and  predicate  each  a  con- 
cept and  endeavors  to  interrelate  the  concepts 
in  some  more  or  less  arbitrary  fashion.  Here 
falls  the  relation  of  subsumption  of  Euler,  the 

U2 


JUDGMENT  AND  LANGUAGE 

relation  of  substance  and  attribute,  with  the 
related  if  not  identical  theories  that  the  judg- 
ment is  a  process  of  classification  of  some  sort 
or  other.  This  entire  group  assumes  two  re- 
lations that  are  not  in  harmony  with  the  psycho- 
logical operation.  In  the  first  place  most  actual 
thinking  has  reference  not  to  all  the  meanings 
of  the  concept,  but  to  a  restricted  few.  The 
concept  as  Euler  uses  the  term  is  the  sum  of 
all  the  meanings  that  might  attach  to  the  term 
or  object,  includes  all  of  the  ways  in  which 
it  could  be  appreciated.  When  we  use  the  term, 
we  think  of  but  one  or  a  very  few  of  the 
aspects  of  the  thing,  the  others  are  for  the  mo- 
ment as  if  non-existent.  Iron  in  the  sense  it 
is  used  by  Euler  is  the  sum  of  its  physical, 
chemical  and  physiological  qualities.  It  is 
magnetic,  has  a  certain  resistance  to  the  electric 
current,  has  a  certain  weight,  color,  chemical 
affinities,  atomic  weight,  and  indefinite  other 
properties  or  attributes.  Every  interpretation 
or  appreciation  of  iron  that  had  ever  been  made 
might  be  regarded  as  an  attribute  or  quality  of 
the  iron.  Another  concept  might  be  treated  in 
the  same  way.  Metal  would  have  a  smaller 
number  of  ways  in  which  it  might  be  appreci- 
ated, but  more  objects  might  be  appreciated  in 

143 


THE  PSYCHOLOGY  OF  REASONING 

that  way.  The  process  of  judging  would  con- 
sist, then,  in  asserting  that  all  of  the  attributes 
that  attach  to  the  more  general  attach  also  to 
the  less  general,  or  that  all  objects  that  could 
be  put  into  a  more  particular  class  could  also 
be  brought  under  a  concept  with  fewer  attri- 
butes. A  concept  in  this  use  is  the  sum  of  the 
meanings  that  could  be  attached.  Where  the 
concept  is  regarded  as  an  object  it  would  be  the 
sum  of  all  the  judgments,  in  our  sense,  that 
might  be  made  concerning  it.  While  conceiv- 
ably this  might  be  accepted,  it  is  none  the 
less  true  that  but  few  of  these  separate 
meanings  play  any  part  in  the  actual  judgment. 
When  considering  iron  for  any  practical  pur- 
pose one  is  concerned  only  with  relevant  quali- 
ties of  the  iron.  Wlien  making  a  magnet  only 
the  magnetic  properties  need  be  considered,  not 
the  fact  that  it  may  have  some  therapeutic 
qualities,  or  even  that  it  has  a  certain  chemical 
valence.  In  practice  one  is  never  concerned 
with  all  the  attributes  that  the  logician  ascribes 
to  iron.  Even  when  the  object  of  the  moment 
is  to  give  a  scientific  classification,  no  account 
can  be  taken  in  any  one  system  of  all  the  prop- 
erties. The  physicist  would  classify  in  one 
way,  the  chemist  in  another,  the  pharmacologist 

144 


JUDGMENT  AXD  LANGUAGE 

n  a  third  way.  The  group  into  which  a  sub- 
stance falls  or  at  least  its  place  in  the  group, 
lepends  upon  the  purpose  of  the  classification 
ind  the  context  at  the  moment.  The  statement 
hat  predication  is  a  process  of  subsumption  in 
Vhich  all  the  attributes  must  be  considered,  and 
II  are  of  equal  value,  would  be  true  only  when 
he  purpose  of  judging  were  to  classify  the 
bject,  and  then  would  be  true  only  with  limi- 
ations.  Even  the  process  of  classification  in- 
volves prejudice  of  one  kind  and  another.  No 
single  classification  can  arrange  in  an  orderly 
way  all  of  the  qualities  of  any  object,  even  if 
the  purpose  be  merely  to  classify.  A  system- 
atic Zoology,  for  example,  can  arrange  animals 
only  with  reference  to  an  orderly  classification 
of  structural  features.  It  must  omit  functions 
so  far  as  function  and  structure  do  not  run 
parallel,  it  must  certainly  omit  classification 
according  to  edibility  and  many  other  practical 
aspects  with  reference  to  which  the  popular 
mind  would  be  much  more  ready  to  arrange 
them.  Again,  then,  we  have  in  the  judgment 
of  subsumption,  or  ascription  of  attributes,  a 
form  of  the  judgment  that  represents  one  class 
of  judgments,  the  judgments  of  classification, 
fairly  well,  but  which  will  not  apply  to  judg- 

145 


THE  PSYCHOLOGY  OF  REASONING 

ments  of  relation  or  to  the  judgment  of  percep- 
tion.   Even  the  judgments  of  classification  are 
never  made  in  the  impartial  way  that  the  defi-  i  ^ 
nition  in  question  implies,  but  are  always  col- 
ored by  the  immediate  purpose  of  the  man  who  i 
is  classifying.    They  mean  at  once  more  andf 
less. 

Brentano  and  his  school  interpret  the  spoken 
form  to  assert  mere  existence  or  belief.  ^'The 
tree  is  green '^  is  translated  by  them  into  *Hhe 
green  tree  is,'' — it  asserts  belief  in  the  exist- 
ence of  the  green  tree.  While  there  can  be  no 
doubt  that  belief  in  the  existence  of  the  objects 
is  involved  in  the  judgment  process,  there  can  ; 
also  be  no  doubt  that  much  more  than  that  is 
involved,  that  the  belief  is  merely  incidental  to 
the  assertion  in  question,  as  it  is  to  the  appre- 
ciation or  interpretation  of  anything.  Again 
we  have  a  definition  that  makes  a  single  aspect 
of  the  judging  process  take  the  place  of  the 
entire  process.  Many  of  the  psychological  defi- 
nitions of  judgment  are  open  to  the  same  • 
criticism.  So  Sigwart  would  have  us  believe 
that  the  process  of  predication  refers  the  newly 
entering  idea,  the  subject,  to  an  old  idea,  the 
predicate.  This  may  occasionally  happen,  but ; 
is  certainly  not  the  universal  process.     Even  in  . 

116 


JUDGMENT  AND  LANGUAGE 

the  judgment  of  recognition  or  the  process  of 
recognition  psychologists  are  at  present  agreed 
that  there  is  no  necessary  reference  to  a  single 
idea.  Even  if  one  were  to  interpret  Sigwart's 
old  idea  as  our  type  or  concept,  it  would  be 
highly  doubtful  whether  the  subject  of  the  judg- 
ment stood  for  the  new  idea,  or  if  the  unref erred 
somewhat  were  in  consciousness  at  all,  as  has 
been  shown  in  connection  with  the  definition  of 
Bradley  and  other  modern  logicians.  The  defi- 
nition of  Sigwart  is  a  psychological  definition 
that  does  not  do  justice  to  the  mental  operations 
actually  involved. 

Whether  the  judging  operation  is  a  process 
of  analysis,  as  Wundt  would  have  us  believe 
or  is  a  process  of  synthesis  as  most  of  the  other 
definitions  assert  or  imply,  seems  to  depend 
again  upon  the  presuppositions  as  to  what  is 
present  in  consciousness  before  the  judging  be- 
gins. If  we  regard  the  object  as  a  mass  of 
elements  standing  in  consciousness  before  judg- 
ment has  operated  at  all,  then  it  is  possible  to 
say  that  as  we  attend  to  the  mass  we  pick  out 
one  aspect  that  constitutes  the  subject  and  then 
another  element  that  constitutes  the  predicate 
and  that  they  are  held  together  by  the  fact  that 
both  were  found  together  in  the  original  un- 

U7 


;i 


THE  PSYCHOLOGY  OF  SEASONING 

analyzed  mass.  The  judgment  process  is  cer- 
tainly analytic.  If  we  assume  that  the  two  ele- 
ments were  present  in  consciousness  as  distinct 
elements  before  the  judging  process  and  that 
they  are  combined  only  in  the  judging  opera- 
tion, then  judgment  is  synthetic.  The  great 
difficulty  with  either  view  is  that  the  elements 
cannot  be  shown  to  be  present  in  the  unanalyzed 
state  before  the  operation  of  judging.  The 
mass  is  assumed  only  to  explain  the  final  out- 
come. When  we  look  at  it  as  a  mass  it  is  not 
present  at  all  or  it  is  not  present  with  the 
qualities  that  come  out  of  it  in  the  process  of 
judging.  These  latter  we  know  only  when  we 
judge  it  in  the  one  particular  way.  At  other 
times  it  is  always  something  else  even  if  we  do 
call  it  by  the  same  name  at  all  times.  On  the 
other  hand,  the  two  elements  of  the  synthetic 
judgment  are  not  present  in  consciousness  be- 
fore they  are  connected.  The  operation  of  con- 
necting and  of  generating  the  elements  is  a 
single  one.  When  the  process  is  completed,  we 
have  two  elements  united;  we  do  not  have  first 
one  then  the  other,  then  the  union.  Neither 
the  statement  of  synthesis  or  of  analysis  is 
quite  properly  made.  Of  the  processes  that  are 
usually  called  judgment,  some  fall  more  nearly 

148 


JUDGMENT  AXD  LANGUAGE 

under  the  head  of  synthesis,  others  more  nearly 
under  the  head  of  analysis,  but  the  classifica- 
tion with  reference  to  the  distinction  can  be 
left  over  for  the  sake  of  convenience  until  we 
have  given  further  discussion  of  the  judgment 
from  the  descriptive  point  of  view. 

It  is  evident  from  the  theories  of  judgment 
that  there  are  a  number  of  different  operations 
currently  designated  as  judgment,  and  that, 
when  the  definitions  apply  to  the  same  general 
process,  different  phases  of  the  process  are  em- 
phasized to  the  exclusion  of  others  that  might 
equally  well  be  regarded  as  essential.  Each  of 
these  operations  and  phases  must  be  kept  dis- 
tinct, and  the  definite  presuppositions  that  lie 
at  the  basis  of  the  definitions  must  be  distin- 
guished before  we  can  hope  to  find  the  kernel 
of  agreement  or  sharply  oppose  the  disagree- 
ment between  the  theories.  In  the  first  place 
we  must  distinguish  definitions  that  apply  to 
language  and  the  completed  operation,  from 
those  that  apply  to  the  mental  operation  and 
the  judgment  in  its  genesis  and  origin.  Much 
that  is  involved  in  the  production  of  the  judg- 
ment does  not  find  expression  in  words  at  all, 
and  if  we  regard  the  judgment  as  isolated  from 
its  context  there  is  often  no  indication  of  many 

149 


THE  PSYCHOLOGY  OF  REASONING 

of  the  circumstances  that  are  vital  to  the  opera- 
tion as  a  mental  process.  On  the  other  hand, 
the  translation  of  the  mental  operation  into 
words  may  not  be  complete.  In  fact,  we  shall 
see  that  there  is  no  necessary  one  to  one  rela-  t| 
tion  between  the  judgment  as  a  mental  opera- 
tion and  the  resulting  expression.  Elements 
that  are  important  for  thought  are  omitted  in 
expression,  and  factors  that  are  made  promi- 
nent in  expression  may  be  the  result  of  conven- 
tion rather  than  of  the  thought  process.  If  we 
are  to  make  much  headway  in  the  process  of 
ordering  the  judgment  forms  we  must  turn  to 
study  the  judgment  in  the  making  and  see  how 
the  simple  apprehension  processes  are  trans- 
lated into  language. 

The  first  problem  in  this  connection  is  to  see 
how  the  different  kinds  of  judgment  in  the 
earlier  descriptions  are  actually  translated  into 
language.  To  study  the  dead  product  when  one 
has  access  to  the  operation  of  producing  is 
very  much  the  same  as  to  spend  time  specu- 
lating what  purpose  a  gear  found  in  the  road 
may  have  when  one  can  go  a  little  farther  and 
see  in  actual  operation  the  machine  from  which 
it  fell.  If  one  studies  the  judgment  as  the  dead 
result,  the  conclusions  are  very  much  like  the 

150 


JUDGMENT  AND  LANGUAGE 

results  of  the  seven  blind  men  of  the  story  book 
who  studied  the  elephant.  Each  is  an  interpre- 
tation of  a  part,  but  no  understanding  of  the 
whole  can  be  obtained  until  the  parts  are  con- 
sidered together. 

If  we  begin  with  the  judgment  of  perception 
as  is  customary  at  present  with  logicians  as 
well  as  with  psychologists,  our  first  problem  is 
how  our  appreciation  of  an  object  or  situation 
is  expressed  in  language.  The  most  immediate 
translation  and  the  one  that  perhaps  best  ex- 
presses it  is  the  interjection,  the  cry  of  ^^wolf  !'^ 
or  ^^fire!''  when  the  animal  or  object  is  recog- 
nized. The  single  cry  arouses  in  the  mind  of 
the  hearer  the  same  appreciation  that  it  does 
in  the  mind  of  the  observer  and  speaker,  and  if 
the  context  is  the  same  there  is  the  same  aware- 
ness of  the  exigencies  of  the  situation.  It  pre- 
pares for  the  same  set  of  activities.  There  is 
but  a  single  mental  operation  in  the  interpre- 
tation, there  is  similarly  but  a  single  word  in 
the  judgment.  All  else  that  is  necessary  to  an 
I  understanding  is  supplied  by  the  context,  by 

!  the  hearer's  knowledge  of  the  situation.     This 

i  ^^ 

is  the  type  of  the  linguistic  judgment.     The 
second  stage  in  the  advancing  complexity  of 
expression  is  the  impersonal  judgment,  **It*s 
11  151 


THE  PSYCHOLOGY  OF  REASONING 

ig,"  or  in  the  same  situation  as  above, 
^^ It's  a  wolf.''  What  to  do  with  the  ^^ it"  has 
long  been  a  bone  of  contention  between  logi- 
cians and  grammarians.  It  has  been  often 
conjectured  that  ^'it"  stood  for  nature,  for  the 
deity  and  similar  hj^^otheses.  These  are  evi- 
dently not  satisfactory,  or  they  would  not  vary 
so  greatly.  Marty,  a  disciple  of  Brentano,  is 
much  nearer  the  mark  when  he  asserts  that  only 
one  process  is  involved  in  the  impersonal  judg- 
ment and  that  is  the  appreciation  or  perception 
of  the  presence  of  the  animal  or  the  rain  plus 
the  assertion  of  its  existence.  Both  of  these 
factors  are  undoubtedly  involved,  but  as  has 
been  insisted  so  often  there  is  probably  no 
express  assertion  of  belief  in  the  truth  of  the 
perception.  That  is  taken  for  granted  here  as 
everywhere.  AVhat  is  of  importance  is  the 
character  of  the  object  and  the  fact  that  it  is 
present  rather  than  that  it  is  merely  existent. 
In  brief,  the  impersonal  judgment  involves 
nothing  more  than  the  interjectional.  It  ex- 
presses the  appreciation  of  the  object  or  the 
-quality  that  presents  itself  and  nothing  more. 
One  might  ask  why  then  the  *4t"  and  the 
copula?  The  answer  is  that  the  linguistic  con- 
vention of  subject  and  predicate  has  become  so 

152 


JUDGMENT  AND  LANGUAGE 

:liorouglily  establislied  that  any  other  expres- 
uon  seems  awkward.  Nothing  is  meant  by  the 
'it."  Nothing  in  mind  corresponds  to  it.  Its 
presence  is  due  to  a  mere  habit  of  language. 

If  the  same  kind  of  appreciation  is  present  in 
both  the  interjectional  and  the  impersonal  judg- 
[uent,  the  question  might  easily  arise  why  is 
it  that  one  form  is  employed  at  one  time  and 
the  other  at  another.  The  answer  to  this 
question  is  to  be  found,  not  in  the  mental  opera- 
tion itself,  but  in  a  second  set  of  controls  that 
are  at  work  in  expression.  This  is  the  appreci- 
ation of  the  social  situation,  of  the  men  about 
and  their  attitude  toward  the  speaker,  their 
distance  from  him  and  other  similar  factors. 
If  the  men  are  near  and  the  general  situation 
is  appreciated,  the  impersonal  form  of  judgment 
is  the  more  likely  to  be  used.  If  the  speaker  is 
remote  from  the  others  and  the  danger  is  great 
and  immediate,  he  will  employ  the  interjectional 
form.  For  some  reason  hidden  in  the  obscur- 
ity of  the  development  of  language,  the  inter- 
jection is  the  form  of  emotion  and  of  long 
distance  communication.  Undoubtedly  the  rea- 
son is  to  be  found  in  part  in  the  practical  effi- 
ciency of  the  one  word  as  a  cry.  It  requires 
less    time    to    complete    and    is    more    easily 

153 


THE  PSYCHOLOGY  OF  REASONING 

shouted,   will   carry   farther   than   the   longer 
form.     If  walking  with  a  companion,  and  the 
character  of  some  object  has  been  under  discus 
sion,  the  first  man  to  identify  it  would  say,  i 
^^ There's  a  wolf,''  or  ^'It's  a  wolf."    If  he 
is  alone  or,  if  coupled  with  the  determination  j 
is  the  appreciation  that  flocks  are  in  danger 
and  can  be  saved  by  immediate  action  on  the 
part  of  men  at  a  distance,  the  impersonal  ex- 
pression would  give  place  to  the  cry.     This  ap- 
preciation of  the  social  circumstances  and  needs  ■ 
exerts  the  same  sort  of  directing  influence  upon 
the  expression  that  the  mental  context  does 
upon  the  selection  of  the  object  to  be  appreci- 
ated and  the  way  it  shall  be  appreciated  or 
interpreted.     The  social  factor  plays  an  im- 
portant part  in  the  determination  of  the  form 
of  expression  and  consequently  we  shall  find  it 
necessary  to  consider  it  throughout  in  connec- 
tion with  the  spoken  judgments. 

The  next  stage  in  the  complexity  of  the  judg- 
ment as  a  linguistic  unit  is  the  so-called  demon- 
strative judgment.  In  the  demonstrative  judg- 
ment an  indication  of  the  place  of  an  object  is? 
added  to  mere  appreciation.  In  the  instance 
above  if  the  position  of  the  wolf  were  a  matter 
of  importance  and  were  not  sufficiently  well 

154 


JUDGMENT  AND  LANGUAGE 

known  from  the  context,  the  probability  is  that 
some  demonstrative  might  be  used,  *^That  is  a 
wolf,"  or  "There  is  a  wolf,''  or  some  similar 
form.  This  part  of  the  communication  might 
easily  be  supplied  by  a  gesture  or  by  the  direc- 
tion of  the  glance.  In  fact  were  there  not  some 
such  gesture,  or  if  common  direction  of  gaze 
could  not  be  assumed  on  the  basis  of  earlier  con- 
versation, the  "that"  or  "this"  or  "there" 
would  have  no  meaning  in  itself  sufficiently  defi- 
nite to  be  helpful.  In  considering  this  type  of 
judgment  we  must  be  on  our  guard  on  the  one 
hand  against  taking  the  demonstrative  too 
seriously,  and  on  the  other  of  neglecting  the 
essentially  spatial  appreciation  that  may  be  in- 
volved in  the  simpler  forms  of  judgment  already 
discussed.  In  many  cases  the  demonstrative 
is  prefixed  as  the  result  of  linguistic  convention, 
as  was  the  "it"  of  the  impersonal.  "There" 
has  become  a  conventional  word  to  introduce  a 
sentence  when  no  reference  to  space  is  intended, 
but  one  desires  to  avoid  repetition  of  the  usual 
subject-predicate  order.  "That"  and  "this" 
are  often  employed  in  conversation  in  very 
much  the  same  way.  In  such  a  case  nothing  be- 
yond simple  apprehension  would  be  involved 
in  the  judging  process  as  a  mental  operation. 

155 


THE  PSYCHOLOGY  OF  SEASONING 

But  on  the  other  hand,  neither  of  the  earlier 
discussed  forms  of  judgment  would  be  of  great 
practical  importance  unless  this  spatial  appre- 
ciation were  involved  in  them  to  some  degree! 
even  if  only  implicitly.  Apprehension  as  pre- 
liminary to  action  would  be  valueless  without 
appreciation  of  spatial  position.  Similarly 
valueless  would  be  the  expression  that  we  have 
in  the  demonstrative  judgment,  unless  supple- 
mented by  gesture  or  direction  of  glance.  The! 
judgment  of  one  kind  is  on  the  same  level  as 
the  other  in  making  evident  the  space  relation. 
The  demonstrative  is  as  helpless  as  the  imper- 
sonal judgment  in  assigning  position  to  the 
object  appreciated.  Both  must  either  assume 
a  knowledge  of  position  on  the  part  of  th( 
listener,  or  must  trust  for  the  indication  of  the 
object  presented  to  the  attitude  of  the  speakei 
revealed  in  some  other  way  than  through  words; 
The  demonstrative  in  this  case  is  either  £ 
convention  of  language,  due  to  some  vagui 
consciousness  of  the  importance  of  the  positior 
as  apart  from  the  quality  or  the  general  char< 
acter  of  the  object,  or  a  suggestion  to  the  hearei 
that  he  look  to  see  where  the  speaker  is  point: 
ing  or  looking. 

Other  forms  of  the  demonstrative  judgment 
156 


JUDGMENT  AND  LANGUAGE 

carry  us  a  step  farther  toward  what  one  regards 
as  the  typical  judgment,  the  simple  perceptive 
judgment,  or  the  simple  categorical  judgment 
that  has  two  distinct  parts.  This  comes  when 
one  uses  the  ^Hhaf  to  indicate  a  direction  and 
the  direction  is  itself  the  essence  of  the  process. 
Such,  for  example,  are  the  expressions  **That  is 
east,''  ^^This  is  west,''  or  when  two  objects  are 
important  because  of  their  position  rather  than 
because  of  their  quality.  We  must  grant  that 
in  this  case  there  are  two  appreciations  of  the 
object,  one  with  reference  to  its  character,  the 
other  with  reference  to  its  position  and  that 
each  is  or  may  be  equally  important.  Discus- 
sion of  demonstratives  of  this  kind  can  be  post- 
poned to  advantage  to  a  later  connection. 
They  evidently  do  not  belong  among  those  that 
may  be  brought  under  the  definition  of  judg- 
ment that  has  been  given  as  the  appreciation  of 
a  single  object.  The  first  form  of  the  demon- 
strative belongs  with  the  interjectional  and  im- 
personal judgment.  All  three  can  be  considered 
as  the  linguistic  counterparts  of  the  psycholog- 
ical judgment  as  we  have  defined  it.  Each  has 
but  a  single  term  although  that  term  may  be 
expressed  in  more  than  one  word. 
As  we  approach  the  typical  judgment  of 
157 


THE  PSYCHOLOGY  OF  REASONING 

formal  logic,  in  which  subject  and  predicate  each 
represents  an  object,  quality  or  activity,  it  is  by 
no  means  so  easy  to  bring  the  operation  under 
our  definition.  When,  for  example,  one  asserts 
of  an  object  in  the  field  of  view  that  ^Hhat  tree 
is  green"  there  is  not  one  act  of  apprehension 
but  two.  Two  meanings  are  apparently  added, 
the  single  object  is  given  two  different  interpre- 
tations. This,  to  be  sure,  is  not  always  the  case. 
Often  the  subject  is  not  important  at  the  mo- 
ment of  speaking,  but  is  spoken  almost  unthink- 
ingly, or  is  supplied  on  the  basis  of  an  earlier 
interpretation.  But  in  many  cases  it  must  be 
admitted  that  the  subject  is  as  much  the  result 
of  a  distinct  act  of  judgment,  in  the  terms  of  the 
last  chapter,  as  is  the  predicate.  The  two  pos- 
sible definitions  of  the  judgment  process  that 
are  current  represent  actual  differences  in  the 
importance  of  the  subject.  On  the  one  side  it 
is  occasionally,  perhaps  often,  but  slightly  em- 
phasized. This  corresponds  to  the  definition  of 
Bradley  and  the  Dewey  school  that  the  subject 
is  the  mere  given  to  which  the  predicate  is 
attached  to  give  it  meaning.  Existence  as  a 
tree  with  its  qualities  is  taken  for  granted,  or 
even  is  introduced  to  satisfy  the  language  con- 
vention.   But  on  the  other  hand  there  can  be 

158 


JUDGMENT  AND  LANGUAGE 

\    little  doubt  that  the  subject  in  many  cases  rep- 
i|    resents  just  as  complete  an  interpretation  of  the 
^    entering    impression    as    does    the    predicate. 
^    These  cases  justify  the  traditional  usage   of 
Tl    making  subject  and  predicate  on  the  same  level 
)    of  importance,  whatever  we  may  think  of  the 
^    traditional  method  of  disposing  of  the  connec- 
tion itself.    All  degrees  of  importance  between 
these  two  extremes  attach  to  the  subject.    In 
t    deciding  this  question  we  can  not  come  to  any 
\    safe  conclusion  if  we  take  the  judgment  apart 
!    from  its  setting,  and  we  can  best  illustrate  and 
I    prepare  for  our  conclusions  on  the  basis  of 
hypothetical  situations  in  which  the  judgments 
might  be  passed. 

It  is  inconceivable  that  the  judgment  *^The 

tree  is  green''  should  be  spoken  unless  there 

were  some  definite  occasion  for  it.     This  occa- 

=    sion  might  be  supplied  by  the  presence  of  a 

companion,  having  in  common  with  the  speaker 

a  purpose  that  might  be  satisfied  by  the  discov- 

.    ery  of  a  tree  still  in  leaf.     The  purpose  of  the 

;    expedition  may  be  to  discover  decorations  for 

(    some  festal  occasion  at  a  season  when  foliage 

\  is  scarce.    Under  these  conditions  when  a  tree, 

,    still  in  leaf,  presents  itself,  the  remark  is  the 

I  natural  one.    In  any  such  situation  the  exact 

159 


THE  PSYCHOLOGY  OF  REASONI^  G 


words  spoken  are  not  to  be  taken  too  literally. 
Numerous  other  remarks  might  satisfy  the  same 
end.  *'That  will  do,"  *^ There"  or  even  a  ges- 
ture suffice  to  attract  the  attention  of  the  hearer 
and  inform  him  of  the  end  of  the  quest,  provided 
only  he  completely  understands  the  situation 
and  shares  the  purpose.  If  he  does  not,  the 
words  of  the  sentence  are  entirely  inadequate. 
Under  such  circumstances  the  predicate  alone 
is  essential,  the  subject  ^Hhe  tree"  is  supplied 
by  the  earlier  conversation.  It  would  not  be  at 
all  important  at  the  moment  and  we  might  re- 
gard the  actual  judgment  as  nothing  more  than 
an  intimation  that  here  was  the  green  that  they 
had  been  looking  for.  The  subject  would  be  a 
remnant  of  a  judgment  process  that  had  been 
completed  before.  A  situation  of  this  kind  sat- 
isfies fairly  well  the  conditions  of  the  Bradley 
definition  that  judgment  is  merely  the  ascrip- 
tion of  meaning  to  the  given.  It  satisfies  it, 
that  is,  so  far  as  one  does  not  accept  what  they 
seem  to,  that  the  subject  is  present  as  a  mean- 
ingless somewhat,  held  in  abeyance  but  still  con- 
scious. On  the  contrary  it  has  been  already 
appreciated  as  something  else,  but  that  appre- 
ciation is  taken  for  granted  at  the  moment  the 
judgment  is  passed.     Consciousness  is  filled  by 

IGO 


JUDGMENT  AND  LANGUAGE 

the  fact  that  the  given  is  green — that  it  is  a  tree 
is  entirely  subordinate.  This  sort  of  implicit 
acceptance  of  the  subject  on  the  basis  of  earlier 
appreciation  is  very  common.  If  we  consider 
merely  the  operation,  not  the  word  form,  we 
have  but  a  single  ascription  of  meaning,  not  two. 
The  subject  however  represents  not  something 
that  is  meaningless  but  something  to  which  a 
meaning  of  another  kind  has  been  ascribed  a 
moment  before  and  which  is  not  prominently 
before  consciousness  at  the  instant. 

On  the  other  hand  there  are  many  eases  in 
which  subject  and  predicate  are  equally  impor- 
tant and  each  represents  a  distinct  appreciation 
of  the  object.  Such  is  the  case  when  several 
small  green  objects  have  been  examined  and  do 
not  furnish  a  sufficient  amount  of  foliage  to 
make  it  worth  while  to  carry  them  off.  One 
might  then  make  the  remark  ^Hhat  tree  is 
green,''  in  which  the  appreciation  of  the  object 
as  a  tree  is  equally  important  with  the  appre- 
ciation of  the  fact  that  it  still  retained  its  foli- 
age. It  would  be  the  equivalent  of  **That  is 
a  tree"  and  *^It  is  green."  Two  meanings 
would  be  ascribed  in  succession  and  each  would 
be  as  important  as  the  other.  It  would  be  a 
process  on  the  same  level  as  attachment  of 

161 


THE  PSYCHOLOGY  OF  REASONING 

successive  predicates,  as  if  one  should  say  that 
ice  is  soft  and  dirty.  In  these  cases  there  can 
be  no  doubt  that  the  proposition  involves  two 
judgments  in  terms  of  the  definition  that  we 
have  given  in  the  preceding  chapter.  One  is 
compelled  in  cases  such  as  these  to  give  up  all 
attempts  to  bring  the  definition  into  harmony 
with  the  traditional  significance  of  the  term. 

While  then  we  can  bring  under  the  definition 
that  is  common  in  popular  speech  and  modern 
logic  all  judgments  of  relation,  and  of  spatial 
attributes,  all  impersonal  and  inter jectional 
judgments,  most  demonstrative  judgments  and 
a  fair  proportion  of  the  simple  judgments  of 
perception,  a  small  residue  of  the  simple  per- 
ceptive judgments  remains  in  which  it  must  be 
admitted  that  the  thought  as  well  as  the  form* 
shows  evidence  of  the  presence  of  two  terms. 
If  we  are  compelled  to  assume  that  some  of  the 
relatively  simple  judgment  forms  of  the  logi- 
cians give  what  we  have  called  two  judgments 
rather  than  one,  two  questions  at  once  arise, — 
first,  what  shall  we  call  the  process,  and  second 
and  more  important,  what  is  the  connection  be- 
tween the  two  judgments  or  terms,  what  is  it 
that  holds  them  together?  The  first  question 
we  shall  leave  open  until  we  have  occasion  to 

16^ 


JUDGMENT  AND  LANGUAGE 

ompare  the  more  complex  propositions  with  the 
simpler  forms  of  inference.  Certainly  infer- 
ence and  this  form  of  the  logician's  judgment 
shade  into  one  another.  But  before  we  make 
the  assertion  that  all  connections  between  two 
judgments  as  processes  of  interpretation  are 
to  be  called  inference,  we  must  raise  the  second 
of  our  two  questions, — what  is  the  relation  be- 
tween the  two  interpretations,  what  holds  them 
together? 

If  we  confine  ourselves  for  the  moment  to  the 
judgment  of  perception,  we  see  first  of  all  that 
any  relation  depending  upon  the  irreversibility 
of  the  terms  must  be  rejected.  Under  this  head 
come  all  the  theories  that  assert  that  the  pred- 
icate is  essentially  different  in  form  or  in  its 
effect  from  the  subject.  This  can  be  very  easily 
shown  from  the  fact  that  in  most  instances  sub- 
ject and  predicate  can  be  interchanged  and  the 
judgment  still  remain  a  judgment.  In  our  sim- 
ple instance  one  can  quite  readily  conceive  that 
a  man  might  say  **That  green  is  a  tree*'  and 
have  it  mean  as  much  as  ^  ^  That  tree  is  green. ' ' 
It  depends  upon  what  his  purpose  in  the  search 
might  be  and  the  order  of  appreciation  of  the 
different  qualities.  If  he  wanted  a  tree  for  any 
purpose  and  one  green  object  met  his  eye,  he 

163 


THE  PSYCHOLOGY  OF  REASONING 

would  point  it  out  to  a  companion  with  tree  as 
the  predicate  just  as  certainly  as  where  trees 
were  plentiful  and  foliage  were  scarce  he  would 
make  green  the  predicate.  This  inversion  of 
subject  and  predicate  is  applicable  to  all  judg- 
ments of  perception  except  possibly  those  that 
have  their  end  in  the  process  of  naming.  Which 
is  subject,  which  predicate,  depends  altogether 
upon  the  purpose  of  the  man  at  the  moment  and 
upon  the  circumstances  under  which  he  is  speak- 
ing. This  fact  excludes  all  definitions  like  Sig- 
wart's  that  make  the  subject  always  a  new 
impression,  the  predicate,  the  old  idea  to  which 
it  was  referred.  It  also  excludes  all  of  the 
various  kinds  of  subsumption.  Even  the  judg- 
ment of  naming  is  not  altogether  excluded  from 
the  test  nor  from  the  more  general  statement 
that  the  subject  and  predicate  are  more  or  less 
independent  interpretations.  The  object  may 
be  named  either  in  the  more  general  or  in  the 
more  particular  way  first.  In  either  case  one 
is  subsuming  the  presented  quale  under  two 
heads,  that  may  be  regarded  as  independent  or 
that  may  stand  to  one  another  in  some  definite 
relation  of  generality.  There  is  no  reason  why 
the  predicate  should  be  universally  less  general 
or  more  general.    And  while  in  practice  it  is 

1G4 


JUBGMEXT  AND  LAKGTJAGE 

probable  that  the  more  general  term  is  most 
frequently  made  the  predicate,  that  is  by  no 
means  universal. 

If  the  subject-predicate  order  is  not  depend- 
ent upon  the  importance  of  the  appreciation  or 
upon  its  degree  of  generality,  it  would  seem  that 
even  in  the  cases  where  each  of  the  two  terms 
stands  for  an  independent  appreciation  the  sub- 
ject and  predicate  can  not  be  distinguished  in 
any  easy  way.  No  positive  and  universal  asser- 
tion can  be  made  as  to  the  particular  function 
of  one  or  the  other  nor  that  any  particular 
operation  is  performed  upon  them  by  the  juxta- 
position. So  far  as  can  be  made  out  they  are 
in  themselves  entirely  independent  operations. 
Why,  then,  are  they  juxtaposed?  Two  sugges- 
tions might  be  made.  One  is  essentially  real- 
istic,— that  they  are  held  together  by  the  unity 
of  the  object,  that  each  is  a  different  interpre- 
tation of  the  same  object  and  that  all  of  the 
interpretations  of  that  object  are  likely  to  be 
joined  in  a  single  proposition.  While  this  is 
not  the  place  for  a  discussion  of  realism  it  may 
be  urged  as  a  difficulty  that  there  is  doubt 
whether  the  object  has  these  qualities  before 
they  are  appreciated,  and  hence  whether  it  can 
be  said  to  exist  as  a  unity  in  advance  of  the 

165 


THE  PSYCHOLOGY  OF  KEASOXIXG 

interpretations  that  are  put  upon  it.  One  might 
insist  that  the  qualities  had  been  appreciated 
together  before  and  now  come  back  together 
because  of  that  fact.  This  would  reduce  the 
reason  for  their  successive  presence  to  habit  or 
to  association  rather  than  to  the  unitary  nature 
of  the  object. 

Even  more  important  probably  is  the  expla- 
nation in  terms  of  the  unity  of  the  purposes 
that  the  two  interpretations  further.  If  the 
problems  that  serve  to  develop  the  interpreta- 
tions are  connected,  the  interpretations  will  suc- 
ceed one  another.  All  the  other  possible  inter- 
pretations that  are  not  essential  at  the  moment 
will  be  in  abeyance,  will  not  make  their  appear- 
ance. In  other  words,  if  we  consider  the  judg- 
ment in  isolation  from  the  universe  of  discourse 
in  which  it  is  found,  we  can  not  understand  the 
relation  of  subject  and  predicate.  These  two 
appreciations  are  held  together  by  the  general 
purpose  that  dominates  consciousness  over  that 
whole  period.  It  is  also  what  controls  the  move- 
ment of  thought  for  the  same  time.  One  can 
not  understand  the  reason  for  the  succession 
from  an  examination  of  the  single  pair  because 
there  is  nothing  in  the  single  pair  that  decides 
that  they  shall  be  connected.     What  decides  the 

166 


JUDGMENT  AND  LANGUAGE 

order  that  the  two  appreciations  shall  take 
is  the  general  situation  of  the  moment.  That 
also  decides  that  they  shall  be  connected  and 
the  nature  of  the  connection.  The  single  propo- 
sition is  but  a  part  of  a  total  larger  movement 
of  thought,  and  it  is  this  larger  movement 
of  thought  that  gives  it  order,  that  gives  it  what 
connection  it  has.  Without  it  the  judgment  is 
a  pair  of  disconnected  appreciations.  Again  we 
may  assert  that  the  nature  of  the  relation  varies 
according  to  the  whole  of  which  it  is  a  part, 
according  to  the  purpose  that  is  to  be  fulfilled 
at  the  moment.  So  at  one  moment  the  judgment 
is  merely  the  process  of  connecting  an  object 
appreciated  in  one  way  with  a  wider  class  of 
appreciations,  a  process  of  classification  or 
naming.  At  another  moment  it  is  a  process  of 
expressing  an  appreciated  equality  or  identity; 
at  still  another  it  is  the  expression  of  a  series 
of  disconnected  appreciations,  or  of  apprecia- 
tions that  are  connected  only  because  they  all 
serve  to  advance  the  purpose  of  the  moment 
whatever  that  may  be. 

In  short,  the  judgment  is  but  a  link  in  a  con- 
nected chain  of  thought  and  it  is  impossible  to 
understand  it  apart  from  the  chain.     We  are 
within  the  truth  if  we  assert  that  no  judgment 
12  1G7 


THE  PSYCHOLOGY  OF  REASONING 

of  perception  can  be  understood  in  its  real  mean- 
ing unless  taken  in  its  context.  The  reason  for 
the  expression  both  in  form  and  in  content  can 
be  understood  only  from  the  context.  We  have 
seen  throughout  that  the  same  mental  operation 
may  lead  to  one  of  several  expressions  accord- 
ing to  the  social  situation,  the  distance  of  audi- 
tors, their  preparedness,  etc.  Similarly  we  can 
understand  the  connection  of  the  elements  in  the 
mind  of  the  speaker,  only  if  we  consider  the 
entire  situation  from  which  it  arises,  the  entire 
movement  of  thought  in  which  it  developed. 
Each  of  the  theories  that  were  examined  is  inad- 
equate in  part  because  it  has  not  asked  what 
the  connection  between  the  parts  of  the  judg- 
ment is  in  the  actual  setting  in  which  it  arises. 
Instead,  they  all  ask  what  the  connection  might 
have  been  in  any  situation.  To  this  no  single 
answer  can  be  returned.  It  might  be  any  one 
of  the  forms  of  connection  suggested,  it  may  be 
none  of  them,  but  depend  upon  some  chance 
succession  of  words.  All  of  this  leads  to  the 
one  result  that  the  nature  of  predication  can 
not  be  defined  in  a  single  statement.  Predica- 
tion may  assert  any  one  of  several  connections. 
One  can  say  which  one  is  intended  in  any  par- 
ticular case  only  by  a  study  of  the  actual  pur- 

168 


JUDGMENT  AXD  LANGUAGE 

pose  at  the  moment  of  judging.    This  may  be 
known  at  first  hand  or  from  the  context. 

An  attempt  to  summarize  our  results  so  far 
as  concerns  the  subsuming  of  the  judgment  of 
perception  under  the  definition  that  we  found 
to  correlate  the  judgments  as  described  by  the 
psychologist,  results  in  the  statement  that  the 
mental  operation  behind  the  interjectional  and 
impersonal  judgments,  and  behind  many  of  the 
demonstrative  and  simple  two-term  categorical 
judgments,  is  evidently  the  correlate  of  the 
ascription  of  a  single  meaning  to  the  presented 
somewhat.  Of  the  other  two-term  judgments 
we  can  be  sure  that  there  are  two  interpreta- 
tions, that  two  judgments  are  involved.  How 
these  two  interpretations  are  connected  can  not 
be  determined  from  the  proposition  itself.  The 
connection  is  controlled  by  the  wider  context 
of  thought  and  varies  between  mere  succession 
of  appreciations,  through  the  classification  of 
bare  naming,  to  the  real  classification  of  sub- 
sumption.  A  very  large  proportion  of  the 
processes  that  the  formal  logician  calls  judg- 
ment fall  under  our  definition  of  the  last  chap- 
ter, and  are  really  one-term  processes  that  are 
either  expressed  in  one  word  only,  or  in  two 
words.     Where  two  words  are  employed,  as  in 

169 


THE  PSYCHOLOGY  OF  REASONING 

the  judgments  of  relation  and  many  of  the 
categorical  judgments,  the  subject  does  not  cor- 
respond to  a  vital  mental  operation  at  the  mo- 
ment, but  is  added  to  comply  with  linguistic 
convention.  Since  the  judgment  process  of 
formal  logic  is  psychologically  not  a  single  proc- 
ess, but  represents  a  large  number  of  diverse 
operations  which  can  not  be  brought  under  a 
single  statement,  and  since  the  connection  can 
not  be  stated  in  terms  of  the  single  proposition 
alone  but  must  be  regarded  in  terms  of  the 
whole  movement  of  thought,  there  seems  to  be 
no  reason  why  we  should  not  define  judgment  in 
the  popular  way,  and  in  harmony  with  the  defi- 
nition of  Bradley  and  Bosanquet.  Those  forms 
of  the  judgment  of  the  formal  logician  that  will 
not  come  under  this  head,  we  may  either  call 
propositions,  or  we  may  push  them  on  to  the 
next  more  complicated  operation,  inference. 

This  somewhat  radical  change  in  nomencla- 
ture may  seem  the  more  justifiable  if  one  con- 
siders the  undue  proportion  of  reasoning  that 
recent  logical  theory  has  brought  under  the  head 
of  judgment,  and  the  little  that  is  left  to  the 
more  practical  operation  of  inference.  Super- 
ficially regarded  this  seems  to  indicate  that  the 
recent  writers  have  failed  to  find  any  sharp  line 

170 


JUDGMENT  AND  LANGUAGE 

of  distinction  between  what  they  call  judgment 
and  what  they  call  inference  and  have  been 
crowding  more  and  more  into  the  judgment  until 
at  present  there  is  on  their  designation  nothing, 
or  very  little,  left  over  for  the  inference.  The 
present  scheme  leaves  three  forms  over  to  infer- 
ence: the  judgment  of  perception  in  which  two 
interpretations  are  given  of  the  presentation; 
those  cases  in  which  the  first  interpretation  sug- 
gests an  older  impression,  a  memory;  and  the 
whole  series  of  propositions  in  which  both  terms 
are  supplied  by  memory.  How  far  it  may  be 
possible  to  bring  these  all  under  one  head  is  one 
of  the  problems  for  the  remaining  discussion. 


J 


CHAPTER   VI 

INFERENCE 

We  approach  the  problem  of  inference  with 
a  considerable  portion  of  what  is  ordinarily- 
designated  judgment  still  to  dispose  of.  It  has 
become  evident  from  the  two  preceding  chapters 
that  a  large  proportion  of  the  propositions  that 
the  logician  calls  judgment  are  judgments  in 
our  sense, — are  simple  interpretations  of  the 
presented.  But  we  have  left  over  three  sorts 
of  judgment  with  distinct  subject  and  predi- 
cate, those  in  which  there  are  two  interpreta- 
tions of  the  given.  These  include  (1)  those  in 
which  there  are  two  interpretations  of  the  given, 
(2)  those  that  add  to  the  presented  some  quality 
that  it  is  remembered  to  have  had  at  an  earlier 
presentation,  (3)  instances  in  which  we  im- 
agine that  the  object  has  been  changed  in  some 
way  or  see  how  it  could  be  changed  to  advan- 
tage. The  first  of  these  processes  is  called  the 
analytic  judgment  in  the  spirit  of  the  current 
logical  usage;  the  second,  the  synthetic  judg- 

172 


INFERENCE 

ment;  tlie  third  is  universally  accepted  as  a 
process  of  inference.  Our  first  problem  in  this 
chapter  is  to  trace  the  distinctions  and  simi- 
larities between  these  three  processes  to  deter- 
mine whether  they  can  be  brought  under  a  single 
head. 

In  beginning  the  investigation  we  may  at  once 
take  advantage  of  the  lesson  learned  in  the  dis- 
cussion of  the  judgment,  and  recognize  the  fact 
that  there  is  no  necessary  relation  between  the 
form  of  expression  in  language,  and  the  actual 
mental  operation.  We  shall,  in  consequence,  be- 
gin at  once  with  specific  thought  processes  to 
determine  how  far  they  are  similar,  how  far 
dissimilar  in  the  three  cases.  Perhaps  one  in- 
stance will  do  as  well  as  another.  *^That  tree 
is  green,''  which  has  already  been  discussed  in 
another  connection,  may  sufiice  in  spite  of  its 
triviality.  Here  certainly  is  an  analytic  judg- 
ment of  perception.  Both  the  greenness  and 
the  tree  may  be  said  to  be  analyzed  from  the 
immediately  perceived.  Probably  too  there  is 
little  or  no  subordination  of  one  to  the  other. 
At  least,  as  was  demonstrated  in  an  earlier  dis- 
cussion, either  may  be  regarded  as  subordinate 
to  the  other  according  to  the  circumstances  un- 
der which  the  assertion  is  made.    And,  were 

173 


THE  PSYCHOLOGY  OF  REASONING 

there  any  occasion  for  the  addition,  we  might 
continue  to  add  similar  attributes  as  evergreen, 
tall,  and  the  like,  that  would  still  further  define 
the  object.  The  simplest  of  the  synthetic  judg- 
ments differs  from  this  only  slightly.  Such, 
for  example,  *^The  tree  would  supply  tough 
wood.''  Here  the  quality  is  not  regarded  as 
necessarily  contained  in  the  object,  but  is  added 
to  the  object  of  presentation  on  the  basis  of 
earlier  knowledge.  Toughness  is  no  immediate 
quality  of  sensation  and  cannot  be  seen  directly, 
but  similar  bits  of  wood  or  parts  of  similarly 
green  trees  have,  when  tested  in  the  past,  been 
found  to  be  tough.  What  is  seen  is  some  rough- 
ness of  bark,  or  color  or  shape  of  leaf  and  these 
serve  to  reinstate  the  toughness  as  a  general 
idea,  to  recall  a  definite  earlier  experience. 

Again  the  process  of  addition  may  go  farther. 
The  actual  connection  may  never  have  been  in 
experience  before,  and  the  added  element  may 
be  some  improvement  or  change  in  the  object. 
Instead  of  actually  recalling  the  use  of  the  twig 
that  proved  it  to  be  tough,  there  may  be  sug- 
gested the  idea  of  grafting  on  the  tree  a  twig  of 
hickory  that  shall  grow  numerous  tough  twigs, 
or  some  way  of  preparing  the  wood  may  suggest 
itself  that  shall  give  to  what  was  naturally  brit- 

174 


INFERENCE 

tie  wood  some  degree  of  resiliency.  In  this 
case,  too,  there  is  nothing  more  than  the  addi- 
tion of  old  experiences  to  the  new  that  will 
modify  it  in  some  degree  or  other.  The  earlier 
experience  has  not  been  definitely  connected 
with  this  particular  object  or  perhaps  with  any 
object  of  a  similar  kind.  Certainly  to  the  first 
man  who  grafted  a  tree,  if  it  were  done  inten- 
tionally, there  had  never  been  any  close  connec- 
tion between  the  thought  from  which  the  action 
grew  and  any  similar  act.  And  each  time  the 
process  is  repeated  on  a  new  plant  or  animal, 
processes  are  connected  that  have  not  previously 
been  connected  in  any  way  closer  than  to  recog- 
nize the  likeness  of  the  two  species  and  the 
probable  similar  response  of  objects,  alike  in 
some  characteristic  essential  for  the  experiment 
in  question.  An  instance  of  this  kind  is  uni- 
versally called  inference. 

The  specific  instances  show  a  number  of  close 
similarities.  Each  consists  in  the  primary  rec- 
ognition of  some  phase  either  directly  seen  or 
supplied  from  memory.  In  fact  if  we  look  more 
closely  into  the  psychological  mechanism,  it 
becomes  a  question  whether  it  is  not  more  diffi- 
cult to  distinguish  one  from  the  other  than  it 
is  to  find  points  of  resemblance.     True,  in  the 

175 


THE  PSYCHOLOGY  OF  EEASONING 

first  instance,  it  seems  that  there  could  be  no 
difficulty  in  deciding  whether  the  second  quality 
were  actually  given  in  sensation  or  were  added 
from  memory.  In  the  assertion  ^Hhe  tree  is 
green '^  there  might  be  little  or  no  doubt  that 
the  color  appreciated  is  an  immediate  sense 
quality,  but  when  we  go  a  step  farther  to  the 
form,  or  to  the  size,  or  even  to  the  simple  proc- 
ess of  naming,  it  becomes  a  question  whether 
one  could  say  that  the  judgment  were  analytic 
or  synthetic.  The  more  apparently  simple  per- 
ceptual qualities  are  analyzed,  the  more  complex 
they  are  found  to  be,  the  more  they  are  seen 
to  depend  upon  the  addition  of  elements  from 
memory  rather  than  upon  the  mere  entrance 
of  a  quality  actually  present  in  the  object  or 
given.  It  would  be  very  difficult  to  say  in  the 
light  of  recent  investigations  in  space  percep- 
tion, whether  the  recognition  of  toughness  in 
the  twigs  of  a  tree  were  more  the  result  of  mem- 
ory processes  than  the  recognition  of  the  size 
of  the  twig,  or  of  its  direction,  or  than  the  dis- 
crimination between  the  actual  color  of  the 
object  and  the  apparent  color  due  to  the  contrast 
and  shadow  effects.  Each  of  these  character- 
istics comes  to  consciousness  immediately ;  there 
is  no  more  awareness  of  the  mental  operation 

176 


INFERENCE 

that  results  in  the  interpretation  than  there  is 
of  what  takes  place  before  the  entrance  of  the 
green  in  the  simplest  instance  of  sensation  or 
perception.  It  is  only  elaborate  and  long  con- 
tinued psychological  analysis  that  has  led  to 
the  recognition  of  the  fact  that  in  these  space 
perceptions  we  are  dealing  with  interpretation 
and  not  with  immediate  sensation.  Without 
raising  the  question  whether  there  is  not  a  pos- 
sibility that  one  day  the  simplest  processes  may 
be  analyzed  into  still  simpler  parts,  it  is  impos- 
sible to  decide  exactly  where  to  draw  the  line 
between  the  cases  where  subject  and  predicate 
are  both  given  in  immediate  sensation  and 
where  one  is  added  from  memory.  All  would 
agree  that  recognition  of  the  size  of  an  object 
is  due  to  factors  immediately  given  in  percep- 
tion and  sensation,  but  it  would  be  very  difficult 
to  decide  on  any  psychological  grounds  between 
that  and  let  us  say  determination  of  the  prob- 
able size  of  an  animal  from  its  footprints  in  the 
snow. 

The  two  forms  of  judgment  are  alike  not 
merely  in  the  materials  of  which  they  are  com- 
posed but  in  the  way  the  second  is  selected 
from  the  number  of  qualities,  phases  or  mem- 
ories that  might  come  to  consciousness  at  that 

177 


THE  PSYCHOLOGY  OF  REASONING 

particular  time.  Whether  one  phase  or  another 
shall  appear  depends  upon  the  interest,  upon 
the  dominant  problem,  upon  the  controlling  pur- 
pose at  the  moment.  As  we  said  before,  you 
will  notice  the  greenness  of  the  tree  only  when 
you  are  looking  for  foliage  with  which  to  deco- 
rate a  room,  or  for  shade,  or  as  forage  for 
cattle,  or  what  not.  Were  the  mental  situation 
or  context  to  change,  there  would  be  similar 
change  in  the  quality  or  phase  that  is  seen.  In 
exactly  the  same  way  in  the  more  synthetic 
judgment,  what  shall  be  added  from  memory  to 
the  first  impression  depends  altogether  upon 
the  setting,  mental  and  physical.  The  tree  will 
suggest  touglmess  of  wood  only  if  it  is  desired 
to  obtain  wood  for  some  definite  purpose.  And 
so  for  the  intermediate  forms  of  judgment. 
One  sees  the  size  of  the  object,  or  its  distance 
only  if  one  or  the  other  is  important.  In  short, 
the  succession  of  phases  that  shall  present  them- 
selves in  the  bare  sensing,  the  characteristics 
that  shall  be  added  in  perception  or  in  the  syn- 
thetic judgment,  depend  upon  the  same  general 
set  of  conditions,  upon  the  mental  context  at 
the  moment. 

The  difference  between  inference  in  its  sim- 
pler forms  and  the  synthetic  judgment  is  fully 

178 


INFEREXCE 

as  fleeting  as  is  the  difference  between  the 
analytic  and  synthetic  judgment.  There  is  no 
question  here  that  the  materials  are  iden- 
tical. In  both,  what  is  added  is  a  memory  proc- 
ess. The  only  possible  distinction  that  can  be 
made  is  in  terms  of  the  relative  newness  of  the 
addition,  in  the  frequency  with  which  the  same 
two  elements  have  been  found  together,  and 
where  one  was  new,  the  degree  of  divergence 
between  what  is  added  now  and  what  had  been 
seen  before.  There  would,  for  example,  be  no 
question  that  we  were  dealing  with  judgment 
alone,  or  at  least  had  nothing  to  do  with  infer- 
ence in  the  ordinary  sense  of  the  term  in  case 
we  were  merely  passing  some  remark  upon  the 
size  of  an  object,  or  more  simply  upon  the  rela- 
tive size  of  two  objects.  If  it  were  a  question 
of  deciding  whether  a  track  in  the  snow  were 
of  a  rabbit  or  a  squirrel  there  would  be  more 
difference  of  opinion.  Whether  it  were  made 
a  problem  of  perception  or  of  inference  would 
probably  depend  in  last  analysis  upon  the 
method  by  which  the  conclusion  was  reached. 
If  the  man  who  decided  were  perfectly  familiar 
with  the  two  animals  and  the  footprints  so  that 
but  a  glance  were  necessary  to  decide,  it  would 
be  called  judgment,  or  mere  perception  if  we 

179 


THE  PSYCHOLOGY  OF  REASONING 

keep  to  the  psychological  ground.  If  the  on- 
looker were  more  skilled  in  theoretical  or  book 
science  than  in  woodcraft,  the  conclusion  might 
be  reached  slowly  and  more  self-consciously. 
There  might  be  successive  trials  of  the  fact  un- 
der different  heads,  and  a  gradual  elimination 
of  the  impossible  or  unlikely  conclusions.  This 
would  be  inference.  Between  these  two  ex- 
tremes would  lie  a  host  of  cases  gradually  shad- 
ing from  one  to  the  other.  For  some  the  inter- 
pretative addition  would  be  immediate,  for 
others  long  deliberation  would  be  required. 
Certainly  no  one  point  in  the  scale  of  immedi- 
ateness  or  explicit  consciousness  of  the  proc- 
esses would  be  accepted  by  all  as  marking 
the  line  between  inference  and  what  is  not  infer- 
ence. 

One  might  be  tempted  to  make  the  line  of  divi- 
sion again  on  the  basis  of  the  newness  of  the 
addition.  If  the  interpretation  consisted  in  the 
addition  of  an  element  that  had  been  frequently 
noticed  in  connection  with  the  thing  perceived, 
we  would  certainly  have  to  do  with  synthetic 
judgment.  If  on  the  other  hand  the  two  had 
been  but  infrequently  connected,  the  process 
would  be  called  inference.  This  is  an  uncertain 
criterion,  partly  because  there  are  all  degrees 

180 


INFEREXCE 

of  frequency  as  there  are  of  complexity,  partly 
because  there  are  cases  that  would  certainly 
come  under  the  head  of  judgment  that  had  been 
connected  but  once  before,  such  as  learning  the 
name  of  an  object  by  one  repetition.  On  the 
other  hand  some  would  still  rank  as  inference 
in  spite  of  the  fact  that  they  had  been  repeated 
several  times,  and  the  process  of  inference 
might  be  run  through  with  little  or  no  difficulty. 
Again  the  degree  of  similarity  between  the  pres- 
ent set  of  circumstances  and  the  earlier  that 
served  to  suggest  the  change  might  be  used  as  a 
criterion.  This  is  open  to  the  same  objections. 
The  presented  can  never  be  identical  with  any 
previous  experience.  It  must  be  interpreted, 
and  whether  the  interpretation  that  one  makes 
is  fairly  new  or  is  the  result  of  mere  habit 
depends  upon  the  man  and  upon  the  circum- 
stances under  which  he  is  working.  There  is 
no  objective  measure  of  the  difference  at  the 
extremes  and  no  satisfactory  line  of  division 
at  all.  To  the  first  man  who  succeeded  in  think- 
ing of  the  possibility  of  grafting  parts  of  the 
body  of  one  animal  upon  another,  there  was 
presented  the  idea  of  the  similarity  between 
plant  and  animal  tissues.  "Whether  plant  and 
animal  were  for  this  man  more  similar  than 

181 


THE  PSYCHOLOGY  OF  REASONING 

were  the  rose  and  apple  to  the  first  gardener 
who  grafted  the  rose,  would  be  a  question  that 
could  be  answered  only  by  a  definite  knowledge 
of  the  mental  make-up  of  the  two  men  and  the 
conditions  under  which  each  worked.  It  is, 
however,  not  at  all  impossible  that  the  garden- 
er's processes  at  the  time  were  defined  as  a  mere 
sjTithetic  judgment,  as  bare  association  induced 
by  failure  to  recognize  the  difference  be- 
tween the  two  kinds  of  vegetation,  while  the 
scientist's  grafting  would  undoubtedly  be 
classed  under  inference.  Between  would  run 
all  sorts  of  gradations.  What  would  be  infer- 
ence for  one  man  in  the  popular  sense  certainly 
would  not  be  for  another  if  we  use  exactly  the 
same  definition  of  inference  in  the  two  cases. 
Again,  to  connect  this  illustration  with  one  that 
was  used  earlier,  whether  the  suggestion  of 
grafting  is  more  of  an  addition  to  that  immedi- 
ately given  than  the  recognition  of  the  quality 
of  bending  or  of  burning  readily,  would  be  a 
question  that  reduces  ultimately  to  the  fre- 
quency of  earlier  connection. 

There  is  finally  no  difference  in  the  nature  of 
the  control  processes  that  determine  the  course 
of  the  stream  of  thought,  that  decide  what  the 
jDarticular  addition  shall  be  in  each  case.     What 

182 


INFEPxEXCE 

the  addition  is  to  be  depends  in  inference  as  in 
perception  upon  the  problem  one  is  trying  to 
solve,  upon  the  end  that  one  has  set  one's  self 
to  attain.  When  the  tree  is  in  consciousness 
one  thinks  of  grafting  if  dissatisfied  with  the 
product  of  the  tree;  one  thinks  of  propping  up 
the  limbs  and  looks  for  means  of  supporting 
them  if  it  is  appreciated  that  the  yield  is  too 
great  for  the  strength  of  the  limbs.  In  this 
regard,  too,  inference  is  not  to  be  distinguished 
from  the  processes  that  are  ordinarily  called 
judgment.  The  nature  of  the  control  is  on  ex- 
actly the  same  level. 

Apparently  then  the  three  processes  of  ana- 
lytic judgment,  synthetic  judgment  and  infer- 
ence in  logic  are  not  to  be  easily  distinguished. 
They  are  alike  in  the  elements  of  which  each 
is  composed,  in  the  nature  of  the  consciousness 
that  accompanies,  in  the  nature  of  the  factors 
that  control  their  course,  and  it  is  even  difficult 
to  draw  a  distinction  in  terms  of  the  simplicity 
or  complexity  of  the  processes.  We  seem  to 
have  too  few  distinctions  or  too  many  words. 
At  this  juncture  some  change  from  the  usual 
nomenclature  seems  necessary.  For  my  own 
use  I  propose  to  adopt  explicitly  at  this  point 
the  usage  that  I  have  been  following  without 
13  183 


THE  PSYCHOLOGY  OF  REASONING 

any  preliminary  justification.  It  is  certainly 
possible  to  distinguish  between  the  first  appre- 
ciation and  the  interpretation  that  is  added  to 
it,  or  between  the  first  appreciation  and  the 
second  appreciation  that  succeeds  it.  My  sug- 
gestion is  that  we  call  the  first  of  these  proc- 
esses judgment,  and  the  second  either  inference 
or  a  succession  of  judgments.  In  this  usage 
we  must  have  reference  to  the  psychological 
process  and  not  to  the  expression  in  words. 
The  necessity  for  this  distinction  has,  I  trust, 
been  made  clear.  This  departure  from  current 
usage  is  not  so  radical  as  it  may  seem  at  first 
sight.  Many  of  the  more  recent  writers  either 
by  their  own  avowal  or  by  the  logical  conse- 
quences of  their  definition  have  made  the  judg- 
ment a  single  process.  Brentano  in  his  defini- 
tion of  judgment  as  an  expression  of  belief  or 
disbelief,  Kiilpe  and  Marbe  who  define  it  as  com- 
parison, Bradley  and  Bosanquet,  Dewey  and 
others  who  define  it  as  the  addition  of  meaning 
to  the  given,  all  explicitly  or  by  a  necessary  re- 
sult of  their  conclusions  make  judgment  a  uni- 
tary process.  Here,  too,  we  may  mention  the 
fact  that  Binet  finds  reasoning  in  perception  and 
Helmholtz  calls  perception  unconscious  infer- 
ence. 

184 


INFEREXCE 

The  discussion  of  tlie  relation  of  judgment  [ 
to  inference  has  followed  the  psychological  and  j 
popular  usage  somewhat  more  than  the  logical.  / 
The  logician  always  defines  inference  as  made! 
up  of  judgments,  as  a  process  by  which  two 
propositions  are  united  in  a  way  to  give  rise 
to  a  third  that  states  a  new  truth  derived  from 
them.  The  first  proposition  is  the  major  prem- 
ise and  asserts  a  general  principle,  the  second 
or  minor  premise  contains  an  application  of 
the  general  truth  to  the  particular  set  of  cir-/ 
cumstances,  while  the  third  states  the  conclu- 
sion, the  new  truth.  If  all  of  these  operations 
and  processes  are  in  consciousness  during  the 
inference  and  determine  the  character  and 
course  of  the  inference,  obviously  one  cannot 
describe  the  process  as  the  mere  combination 
of  two  mental  processes  or  the  succession  of 
two  appreciations.  But  the  logician's  insist- 
ence on  the  presence  of  the  premises  during  the 
actual  reasoning  has  long  been  questioned. 
Thomas  Brown  early  in  the  last  century  denied 
that  the  major  premise  has  any  real  part  in 
reasoning.  Many  skeptical  individuals  have 
argued  that  if  reasoning  did  nothing  more  than 
recombine  propositions  it  would  make  no  real 
contributions  to  knowledge.     Careful  examina- 

185 


THE  PSYCHOLOGY  OF  EEASONING 

tion  of  the  procedure  in  a  case  of  concrete  rea- 
soning, will,  I  believe,  convince  anyone  that  he 
is  actually  aware  of  nothing  but  the  conclusion. 
If  it  be  accepted  that  inference  consists  of  the 
conclusion  alone,  the  question  why  the  formal 
logician  gives  the  premises  so  large  a  place  in 
his  discussion  naturally  presents  itself.  The 
answer  is  to  be  found  in  the  fact  that  the  logi- 
cian has  been  for  the  most  part  indifferent  to 
the  origin  of  the  conclusion,  he  has  been  con- 
cerned with  its  truth  alone.  All  of  his  efforts 
have  been  devoted  to  proving  that  the  conclusion 
is  true,  he  has  given  no  thought  to  the  mental 
processes  that  originated  it,  he  has  even  denied 
that  it  is  the  product  of  mental  laws.  He  has 
never  gone  behind  the  words  that  express  the 
conclusion  and  he  has  considered  them  as  they 
stood  in  a  book  not  with  reference  to  the  mental 
processes  that  give  rise  to  them.  As  a  matter 
of  fact,  the  essential  part  of  thinking  is  to  know 
that  the  results  attained  are  correct;  how  they 
originate  is  a  question  that  interests  one  only 
as  it  points  out  methods  that  should  be  avoided. 
Furthermore,  inference  and  proof  are  entirely 
independent  of  each  other.  One  may  prove  con- 
clusions attained  in  any  way,  even  if  they  origi- 
nate by  chance  or  are  taken  from  someone  else. 

186 


INFEEENCE 

Bad  metliods  may  give  true  results  and  if  one 
only  recognizes  the  results  as  true  or  false  when 
they  come,  it  matters  not  in  practice  whether 
the  method  be  good  or  bad. 

The  fallacy  of  the  formal  logician  was  that 
he  devised  methods  adequate  to  prove  his  re- 
sults and  then  assumed  that  the  methods  of 
proof  were  the  methods  of  deriving  the  results. 
When  the  conclusion  was  once  given  he  found 
that  he  might  give  it  added  probability  by  refer- 
ring it  to  a  general  principle  already  estab- 
lished. This  was  the  major  premise.  The 
reference  of  the  conclusion  to  the  general  prin- 
ciple was  made  in  the  minor  premise.  If  the 
premises  existed  as  means  of  establishing  the 
conclusion  it  was  unconsciously  assumed  that 
they  might  also  be  the  facts  from  which  the 
conclusion  developed  as  well.  As  the  logician 
was  never  given  to  observing  mental  states, 
and  needed  an  explanation  of  the  origin  of  his 
conclusion  he  jumped  at  the  chance  to  solve  his 
problem  in  the  quickest  possible  way.  As  was 
said  in  the  first  chapter,  the  logician  was  always 
satisfied  to  know  how  results  might  be  obtained, 
he  cared  nothing  for  knowing  how  they  were 
actually  obtained.  Our  thesis  then  is  that  the 
syllogism   arose   through   confusing   inference 

187 


\1 


THE  PSYCHOLOGY  OF  EEASONING 

and  proof,  that  it  is  adequate  to  proof  of  one 
kind  but  has  only  remote  relation  to  the  deriv- 
ation of  the  conclusion.  The  thesis  can  be 
established  by  a  consideration  of  the  different 
forms  of  reasoning  in  the  concrete.  It  will  be 
seen  that  in  actual  reasoning  the  conclusion 
always  precedes  the  premises  where  they  are 
present  at  all,  and  also  that  the  same  influences 
give  rise  to  the  conclusion  no  matter  how  it  may 
be  proved. 

To  avoid  the  many  pitfalls  that  beset  one  in 
the  discussion  it  is  necessary  to  distinguish  be- 
tween inference  and  proof.  Conclusions  all 
come  through  suggestion,  and  the  laws  of  sug- 
gestion here  are  the  laws  of  association  as  they 
are  found  in  memory  or  imagination  or  in 
action.  We  may  distinguish  several  different 
sorts  of  inference  or  ways  of  reaching  conclu- 
sions. First,  one  has  actions  that  give  con- 
elusions  of  value  with  little  or  no  antecedent 
thought.  In  animals  we  have  little  or  no  evi- 
dence of  mental  processes,  but  the  acts  very 
frequently  give  results  that  are  similar  to  the 
reasoned  conclusions  of  men.  Frequently 
men's  acts  have  a  rational  outcome  when  there 
is  no  antecedent  thought  to  speak  of.  The  sud- 
den demands  of  a  game  are  met  by  movements 

188 


I 


INFERENCE 

in  which  thinking  and  action  are  practically 
indistinguishable.  Then  one  may  distinguish 
the  cases  in  which  the  thinking  processes  pre- 
cede the  action  by  a  noticeable  period  or  in 
which  the  reference  to  action  is  remote.  These 
two  sorts  of  inference  follow  the  same  general 
laws  and  may  be  treated  together.  In  each  may 
be  distinguished  inferences  in  which  the  correct 
result  is  reached  at  the  first  trial  and  others  in 
which  many  unsuccessful  trials  precede  the 
attainment  of  the  desired  end.  This  distinc- 
tion is  more  evident  in  action  or  at  least  has 
been  given  more  importance  in  action.  Occa- 
sionally to  be  sure  one  makes  the  correct  re- 
sponse at  once,  but  more  frequently,  particu- 
larly when  the  movement  is  new  or  is  a  new 
combination  of  movements,  one  tries  several 
times  before  the  desired  end  is  attained.  Sim- 
ilarly in  thought  one  sometimes  hits  upon  the 
right  idea  at  once,  but  more  frequently  numer- 
ous suggestions  present  themselves  before  one 
is  satisfied  with  the  result.  If  one  is  writing, 
several  expressions  come  up  before  just  the 
right  turn  is  hit  upon  and  the  same  is  true 
in  the  designing  of  an  instrument  or  the  solu- 
tion of  any  puzzle.  One  tries  plan  after  plan  in 
thought  before  one  is  satisfied.    It  is  not  until 

189 


THE  PSYCHOLOGY  OF  SEASONING 

some  suggestion  has  passed  the  test  that  in- 
ference is  complete. 

It  might  appear  from  all  this  that  human 
thinking  is  altogether  like  the  method  of 
learning  that  Thorndike  and  numerous  other 
more  recent  workers  have  demonstrated  to  be 
fundamental  for  animal  acquirement.  That 
just  as  the  animal  keeps  struggling  in  one  way 
or  another  and  needs  only  a  sufficient  diversity 
of  movement  and  sense  enough  to  know  when 
the  end  is  attained,  so  man  needs  no  more 
than  a  large  number  of  suggestions  and  an  ade- 
quate test  of  the  results,  to  accomplish  any  end 
whatsoever.  On  this  assumption,  if  a  mathe- 
matician were  dictating  an  original  treatise  to 
a  stenographer  ignorant  of  mathematics,  the 
mistakes  of  the  stenographer  would  be  as  fruit- 
ful as  the  thinking  of  the  scholar,  provided  only 
they  were  sufficiently  numerous  and  the  mathe- 
matician was  qualified  to  select  the  conclusions 
that  were  true.  The  grain  of  truth  in  the  idea 
is  the  absolute  independence  of  obtaining  and 
testing  a  conclusion.  But  it  does  not  follow  that 
the  suggestions  come  without  law.  They  cer- 
tainly are  more  likely  to  come  to  certain  minds 
than  to  others.  A  man  trained  in  mathematics 
is  more  likely  to  have  the  solution  of  a  problem 

190 


INFERENCE 

present  itself  to  him  as  well  as  more  certain 
to  be  right  in  accepting  the  suggestion  when 
it  comes.  While,  then,  the  suggestions  leave 
more  to  chance  than  does  the  test,  it  does  not  fol- 
low that  suggestions  arise  without  reference  to 
law.  But  the  laws  of  suggestion  take  us  once 
more  into  psychology. 

The  laws  that  govern  the  appearance  of  the 
solution  or  that  give  rise  to  the  suggestions 
or  to  the  movements  are  the  laws  of  association. 
In  the  simple  case  of  movement,  the  stimulus 
or  the  appreciation  of  the  stimulus  calls  out  the 
response  that  has  been  earlier  connected  with 
that  stimulus.  It  is  a  question  of  habit,  nothing 
more.  Where  several  responses  have  been 
made  upon  the  same  stimulus  as  would  be  nec- 
essary if  the  process  is  to  be  classed  as  reason- 
ing, one  response  is  selected  from  the  others  in 
the  light  of  the  connected  circumstances,  or  in 
terms  of  the  particular  mental  context.  Where 
all  of  the  important  circumstances  are  consid- 
ered or  are  reflected  in  the  response  the  reason- 
ing is  adequate,  where  some  are  omitted  the 
trial  is  unsuccessful  and  the  result  is  not  called 
reasoning  unless  it  can  be  said  that  the  trial 
contributed  something  to  the  final  result  or  one 
speaks  of  the  process  as  a  whole.    The  success- 

191 


THE  PSYCHOLOGY  OF  REASONING 

ful  trials  then  are  guided  not  merely  by  the 
immediate  cue  but  by  the  purpose  of  the  indi- 
vidual and  by  many  other  elements  of  the  en- 
vironment, present  and  immediately  past.  The 
larger  the  number  of  relevant  circumstances 
that  are  effective  in  the  control,  the  greater  the 
probability  that  the  act  will  be  adequate. 

One  may  distinguish  the  same  laws  in  the 
operation  of  thinking  with  reference  to  a  later 
act.  Here  again  some  cue  must  be  present  such 
as  the  appreciation  of  the  situation  actually 
present  or  imagined.  This  suggests  some  ope- 
ration that  has  been  earlier  in  connection  with 
the  situation.  Since  ordinarily  many  sugges- 
tions might  come  up  and  only  one  actually  does 
appear  some  criterion  of  selection  must  be 
found,  and  is  furnished  by  the  wider  context 
of  the  moment  and  the  situation  in  which  the 
whole  problem  is  appreciated.  The  selecting 
force  is  to  be  found  in  the  purpose  and  the 
related  circumstances  of  the  situation,  together 
with  more  remote  experiences  of  the  individual 
so  far  as  these  are  not  included  in  the  purpose. 
And  as  with  movements  the  suggestions  that 
prove  on  the  whole  more  satisfactory  are  those 
that  are  guided  by  the  wider  experience,  and 
by  the  more  adequate  appreciation  of  all  the 

192 


INFERENCE 

circumstances.  The  cue  or  the  appreciated  sit- 
uation plus  the  purpose  of  the  individual  and 
his  relevant  experiences  constitute  the  condi- 
tions that  suggest  the  conclusion.  The  char- 
acter of  the  conclusion  depends  upon  these  influ- 
ences. When  several  tentative  solutions 
present  themselves  one  after  another  the  atti- 
tude of  the  thinker  varies  for  each. 

The  laws  that  control  the  suggestion  of  a 
movement  are  the  same  as  the  laws  that  sug- 
gest the  thought.  We  may  distinguish  in  each 
the  suggestions  that  are  immediately  adequate 
from  the  solutions  that  are  attained  only  after 
numerous  trials,  and  when  the  correct  solution 
appears  at  once  it  is  due  in  each  case  to  the 
proper  interaction  of  cue  and  control.  One  may 
go  farther  in  pointing  out  similarities  since 
there  is  a  constant  interaction  between  the  two 
sorts  of  reasoning.  Purely  ideal  solutions  ordi- 
narily lead  sooner  or  later  to  action  and  solu- 
tions in  idea  need  frequently  to  be  checked  and 
corrected  by  solutions  of  a  material  sort.  One 
can  seldom  picture  the  conditions  so  clearly  that 
the  construction  in  thought  will  be  entirely  ade- 
quate. One  nearly  always  overlooks  some  es- 
sential part  of  the  problem  until  the  solution 
is  transferred  to  material  construction.    I  have 

193 


THE  PSYCHOLOGY  OF  REASONING 

been  told  by  a  scientist  of  great  ingenuity  in 
the  construction  of  physical  instruments  that 
he  has  frequently  tried  to  think  out  a  device 
that  should  need  no  modification  when  it  was 
actually  built,  but  always  without  success.  He 
finds  that  some  essential  factor  is  always  for- 
gotten until  the  parts  are  really  seen.  His 
memory  for  details  is  not  sufficient  to  recall 
or  construct  all  the  factors  of  the  problem.  It 
is  necessary  to  receive  suggestions  from  the 
eye  to  attain  an  adequate  solution.  Reason- 
ing as  response  and  as  mental  construction  then 
are  mutually  helpful  and  are  frequently  parts 
of  the  same  process.  They  show  the  same  vari- 
eties and  are  governed  by  the  same  laws.  For 
practical  purposes  they  may  be  regarded  as  of 
the  same  class. 

Differences  in  reasoning  then  must  be  sought 
primarily  not  in  the  different  ways  in  which 
conclusions  are  reached  but  in  the  different 
ways  of  testing  the  conclusions.  Whether  the 
testing  or  proving  is  by  induction,  deduction, 
analogy  or  experiment  the  conclusion  is  reached 
by  the  simple  process  of  suggestion  that  we  have 
described.  The  so-called  forms  of  reasoning 
differ  only  in  the  way  the  results  are  proved, 
not  in  the  way  they  are  attained.     This  can  be 

194 


INFERENCE 

seen  in  many  of  the  famous  scientific  conclu- 
sions that  are  on  record.  The  most  striking 
perhaps  from  the  accuracy  of  the  contemporary 
account  is  Darwin's  doctrine  of  natural  selec- 
tion. We  can  trace  in  Wallace's  account  of 
the  way  the  conclusion  was  reached  both  by 
Darwin  and  himself  all  the  various  elements  of 
the  reasoning  process  as  we  have  analyzed  them 
from  the  complex.  Darwin's  problem  was  set 
by  observing  the  wide  divergence  in  species 
among  beetles  with  which  he  had  been  working 
all  his  life.  The  suggestion  of  the  solution  came 
suddenly  from  reading  Malthus'  **  Essay  on 
Population"  and  particularly  from  the  sugges- 
tion that  in  the  final  struggle  only  the  fit  could 
win.  The  similarity  of  the  conditions  to  those 
of  his  own  problem  struck  him  at  once.  The 
proof  was  for  Darwin  an  inductive  process  and 
occupied  him  for  twenty  years.  Still  more 
striking  is  the  fact  that  Wallace,  with  the  same 
problem  derived  from  a  study  of  the  same  mate- 
rial, should  get  identically  the  same  suggestion 
from  reading  the  same  work  and  should  apply  it 
in  the  same  way  and  in  almost  the  same  words. 
The  difference  between  the  two  men  was  found 
in  the  time  devoted  to  proof.  Wallace  was  con- 
tent to  publish  the  conclusion  to  the  world  on  the 

195 


THE  PSYCHOLOGY  OF  EEASONING 

proof  of  his  own  earlier  observations  and  from 
more  general  considerations  and  analogies, 
while  Darwin  sought  confirmation  inductively 
by  the  study  of  a  large  number  of  separate  in- 
stances. 

The  story  of  Newton  and  the  fall  of  the  apple, 
although  probably  apocryphal,  illustrates  the 
same  point.  Here  the  problem  had  long  been 
present  and  the  solution  was  suggested  by  a 
perception.  To  that  extent  the  ordinary  rela- 
tion was  reversed.  The  problem  is  usually  in 
perception,  the  solution  in  idea,  but  still  the 
solution  can  be  traced  to  an  association  between 
the  situation  or  the  problem  and  the  suggestion 
of  the  solution.  Here  too  the  final  suggestion 
of  the  worlds  mutually  falling  toward  one  an- 
other was  in  imagination,  the  perception  is  but 
an  intermediate  link  in  the  chain.  For  Newton 
the  proof  was  found  in  a  reference  to  estab- 
lished principles  as  well  as  to  observed  facts,  so 
that  the  reasoning  would  more  nearly  approach 
the  process  designated  as  deduction.  In  the 
more  truly  deductive  reasoning  of  mathematics 
the  conclusions  seem  to  present  themselves  in 
the  same  way.  The  proof  alone  is  deductive. 
If  one  is  solving  a  problem  in  geometry  one 
tries  one  construction  after  another  until  some 

19G 


INFERENCE 

one  is  found  that  fulfills  the  conditions.  The 
deductive  phase  of  the  process  is  the  reference 
to  general  laws  that  constitutes  the  proof. 
Even  in  the  experiment  at  the  other  extreme 
one  does  not  try  all  possible  combinations,  but 
one  first  gets  a  suggestion  as  one  gets  it  in 
induction  and  then  tries  the  idea  in  practice. 
Of  course  there  are  experiments  that  consist  of 
making  measurements  where  the  outcome  is  en- 
tirely unforeseen,  but  they  would  not  give  re- 
sults at  all  comparable  with  deduction.  They 
are  not  at  all  constructive  in  character.  The 
ordinary  experiment  that  contributes  to  an  un- 
derstanding of  anything  is  a  process  of  testing 
some  conjecture.  In  the  process  new  con- 
jectures are  constantly  arising  to  be  tested  in 
turn,  but  that  is  incidental  to  the  experiment  in 
hand.  All  of  the  so-called  different  forms  of 
reasoning  or  of  inference  are  really  different 
ways  of  testing  conclusions  rather  than  of  prov- 
ing conclusions.  The  conclusion  always  comes 
through  association  and  then  may  be  tested  in 
any  one  of  these  four  ways. 

The  qualities  demanded  of  the  thinker  for 
the  development  of  the  conclusion  are  alto- 
gether different  from  those  desirable  for  testing 
the  conclusion.     The  one  demands  fertility  and 

197 


THE  PSYCHOLOGY  OF  EEASONING 

quickness  of  suggestion,  the  other  conservatism 
in  accepting  the  result  when  reached.  The  for- 
mer is  the  perquisite  of  youth,  the  latter  of  age. 
A  mind  conservative  enough  for  testing  is  often 
too  staid  and  set  for  new  suggestions.  What 
truth  there  may  be  in  the  theory  that  genius  is 
allied  to  insanity  is  probably  contained  in  the 
fact  that  genius  and  mental  alienation  are  alike 
characterized  by  great  fluidity  in  ideas  and  a 
wealth  of  associations.  Genius,  however,  is  rea- 
sonably conservative  and  rejects  many  of  the 
suggestions,  while  in  the  insane  there  is  no  re- 
straint in  accepting  or  uttering  them.  Many 
a  slow  and  commonplace  mind  might  be  skilful 
in  testing  conclusions  but  never  have  sugges- 
tions worth  testing,  while  many  persons  of 
fecund  imagination  are  over-hasty  in  accepting 
conclusions.  Adequate  thinking  obviously  de- 
mands both  qualities. 

The  net  result  of  the  present  chapter  is  to  see 
that  judgment  shades  over  gradually  so  far  as 
expression  is  concerned  from  propositions  that 
express  a  single  appreciation  and  so  a  single 
judgment  to  propositions  that  combine  two  ap- 
preciations or  some  mental  addition  to  the  situ- 
ation and  so  constitute  an  inference  in  the  true 
sense.    In  the  latter  process  one  must  distin- 

198 


INFERENCE 

guish  sharply  between  inference  or  deriving  the 
conclusion,  and  proof  or  testing  the  conclusion. 
The  former  always  depends  upon  the  laws  of 
association,  the  latter  begins  to  act  only  after 
the  conclusion  has  been  reached.  Proof  is  the 
more  important  operation  and  is  the  one  that 
has  always  attracted  the  attention  of  the  logi- 
cian. All  of  the  classical  distinctions  in  rea- 
soning have  considered  differences  in  proof  not 
in  the  derivation  of  the  conclusion.  If  judg- 
ment is  the  equivalent  in  logic  of  perception,  in- 
ference is  the  equivalent  of  association.  The 
only  difference  is  to  be  found  in  the  fact  that 
inference  is  the  association  considered  with  ref- 
erence to  its  truth.  The  prime  function  of  logic 
is  not  to  explain  the  origin  of  reasoning  but  to 
prove  the  truth  of  the  conclusion  when  it  has 
been  reached.  This  problem  must  be  attacked 
in  the  succeeding  chapters. 


14 


CHAPTER   VII 

PROOF THE   SYLLOGISM 

Before  the  nature  of  proof  may  be  discussed 
intelligently  it  is  necessary  to  consider  the  na- 
ture and  effect  in  consciousness  of  general 
propositions.  All  forms  of  proof  make  explicit 
reference  to  general  truths.  In  the  deductive 
forms  of  proof  the  general  statement  is  used  to 
establish  the  truth  of  the  particular  conclusion, 
while  in  inductive  reasoning  general  truths  are 
supposed  to  be  established  on  the  basis  of  par- 
ticular observations,  or  of  particular  instances. 
We  must  then  face  the  problem  of  how  these 
general  statements  differ  in  composition,  origin 
and  warrant  from  the  particular  conclusions 
considered  up  to  this  time. 

By  way  of  introduction  it  is  well  to  recall 
what  was  said  of  meaning  and  the  concept  in 
an  earlier  chapter.     There  it  was  seen  that  men-     ^ 
tal  processes  usually,  if  not  always,  have  a  ref- !  I  ^ 
erence  beyond  themselves,  that  they  mean  not 
one  thing  but  many,  and  that  it  is  difficult  to .  j . 

200 


K 


PROOF— THE  SYLLOGISM 

distingiaisli  the  ideas  that  stand  for  one  thing 
only  from  those  that  represent  classes.  An 
idea,  if  it  is  a  real  idea,  is  always  a  type. 
It  is  made  a  type  by  the  context  in  which  it 
stands  and  by  the  fact  that  it  has  developed 
out  of  a  mass  of  experiences,  not  from  one 
alone.  The  general  statement  or  conclusion  has 
the  same  origin  and  the  same  character.  It  is 
not  necessarily  different  in  kind  or  composition 
from  the  particular  statement,  but  it  stands  not 
for  a  particular  experience  but  for  a  class,  for 
several  not  one.  It  is  accepted  as  universal. 
The  basis  of  this  acceptance  is  quite  as  likely 
to  be  found  in  the  absence  of  some  quality  as 
in  anything  that  is  added.  The  essential  ele- 
ment in  the  general  or  universal  is  the  ac- 
ceptance of  the  particular  mental  somewhat  as 
convertible  into  or  replaceable  by  any  other  of 
the  same  or  a  similar  kind.  What  the  basis  of 
the  feeling  of  acceptance  is,  Wundt  and  the  oth- 
ers who  accept  it  do  not  pretend  to  say.  It  is 
undoubtedly  on  the  same  level  as  the  represent- 
ative basis  of  the  concept,  and  is  connected  with 
the  fact  that  mental  states  are  all  interwoven, 
with  the  fact  that  there  are  paths  and  lines  of 
association  that  interrelate  all  the  various  men- 
tal states. 

201 


THE  PSYCHOLOGY  OF  EEASONING 

That  the  general  conclusion  in  this  sense  may 
be  of  identically  the  same  kind  as  the  particular, 
is  evident  if  one  will  but  study  the  mental  proc- 
esses in  the  simpler  forms  of  general  conclu- 
sions. The  conclusions  of  the  geometer  are 
accepted  as  general  in  spite  of  the  fact  that  he 
is  looking  at  or  thinking  of  but  a  single 
triangle  or  other  figure.  He  uses  a  tri- 
angle of  one  size,  of  one  particular  shape, 
but  expects  his  conclusions  to  hold  true  of  all 
triangles  without  reference  to  size  or  shape. 
That  the  thinking  is  ordinarily  with  reference  to 
the  particular  alone  and  that  the  other  more 
general  forms  are  only  at  the  back  of  the  mind 
if  present  at  all  is  to  be  seen  in  the  fact  that 
one  of  the  most  difficult  things  to  teach  the 
beginner,  and  what  now  and  again  misleads  the 
man  who  would  probably  spurn  the  designation 
of  beginner,  is  to  avoid  making  general,  conclu- 
sions that  will  hold  only  for  the  figure  that  is 
before  him.  He  insists  in  drawing  universal 
conclusions  as  to  triangles  from  an  isosceles 
or  equilateral  triangle.  In  this  case  the  inhib- 
iting effect  of  earlier  knowledge,  or  of  the  other ||  o 
sets  of  premises  as  given  in  the  other  possible |J  si 
figures  is  not  sufficient,  and  associations  are  notll  ta 
properly  checked  in  the  formation,  or  not  re-' 

202 


PEOOF— THE  SYLLOGISM 

jected  when  formed.  Here  the  statement  of 
the  conditions  of  the  problem  acts  very  much 
as  the  attitude  or  problem  that  controls  associa- 
tions. Any  conclusion  is  guided  and  controlled 
by  the  conditions  explicitly  stated,  or  generally 
accepted  as  holding  for  the  given  problem. 
When  the  presuppositions  are  changed  to  be- 
come more  or  less  general,  the  conclusions  that 
may  be  accepted  will  be  correspondingly 
changed.  Thus  the  non-Euclidean  geometry 
may  be  regarded  as  related  to  the  Euclidean 
merely  in  the  removal  of  certain  restrictions 
that  had  previously  narrowed  the  constructions 
to  harmonize  with  a  single  set  of  assumptions. 
Its  conclusions  may  be  regarded  as  related  to 
the  older  form  of  the  discipline  in  much  the 
same  way  as  the  conclusions  for  the  scalene 
triangle  are  related  to  the  conclusions  in  ref- 
erence to  the  isosceles  triangle. 

Very  much  the  same  relation  holds  between 
general  and  particular  in  the  case  of  the  in- 
ventor. When  he  constructs  his  model,  he  as- 
sumes constantly  that  what  holds  of  his  model 
or  of  his  drawings  will  hold  of  all  machines 
similarly  constructed.  As  he  develops  his  men- 
tal picture  or  his  model  he  thinks  always  in 
terms  of  the  one  substance,  the  one  arrange- 

203 


THE  PSYCHOLOGY  OF  REASONING 

ment,  but  there  is  the  added  belief  that  what 
holds  for  the  one  will  hold  equally  for  all  cases 
that  are  essentially  the  same.  We  get  back  here 
again  to  the  problem  of  belief.  What  we  be- 
lieve to  be  general  is  general  for  us  whether  it 
be  pictured  in  one  way  or  another.  As  in  the 
concept  there  is  no  essential  relation  between 
the  mental  content  and  the  use  that  we  make 
of  it.  It  is  the  use  that  is  made  of  the  con- 
clusion, not  the  way  it  is  represented,  that  de- 
termines whether  we  are  dealing  with  that  con- 
clusion as  an  individual  or  as  typical,  and  so 
general  or  even  universal.  Anything  from  the 
clearest  picture  of  the  individual,  through  im- 
ages of  all  degrees  of  vagueness  to  the  mere  word 
and  in  some  individuals  to  so  much  less  that 
there  seem  to  be  no  pictures  whatsoever,  may 
constitute  the  mental  imagery.  Whether  there 
be  much  or  little  depends  upon  the  individual 
type  and  is  in  no  way  essential  to  the  generality 
of  the  conclusion.  The  most  clearly  imaged 
may  be  the  most  general,  while  the  individual 
in  whom  the  representation  is  practically  lack- 
ing, if  we  can  call  his  mental  state  representa- 
tion at  all,  may  have  ideas  that  are  altogether 
individual.  This  statement  holds  both  for  the 
conclusion  that  is  intended  to  be  general  and 

204 


PEOOF— THE  SYLLOGISM 

for  the  major  premise  of  the  ordinary  syllo- 
gism. The  statement  **all  men  are  mortaP' 
may  be  represented  in  exactly  the  same  way, 
may  be  accompanied  by  exactly  the  same  kind 
of  imagery,  as  the  conclusion  that  the  angles 
of  a  right  triangle  are  equal  to  two  right  angles, 
with  the  obvious  changes  required  by  the  dif- 
ference in  subject  matter.  Very  probably  since 
reasoning  of  this  character  is  almost  always 
merely  for  the  sake  of  expression,  the  only  con- 
sciousness will  be  of  the  words  in  which  the 
statement  is  formulated. 

When  we  return  to  the  question  of  how  con- 
clusions once  attained  are  to  be  justified,  we 
find  that  fundamentally  we  are  again  face  to 
face  with  our  old  problem  of  belief.  The  proc- 
ess of  justifying  a  conclusion  is  primarily  just 
by  raising  in  the  mind  of  the  hearer  or  of  the 
thinker  a  belief  that  the  statement  is  true.  The 
ultimate  test  of  truth  is  that  someone  believes, 
and  the  task  of  assuring  the  truth  of  a  statement 
is  the  task  of  making  the  individuals  concerned 
believe  the  proposition  that  one  is  endeavoring 
to  establish.  Historically,  two  sorts  of  proof 
have  been  distinguished,  the  deductive  and  the 
inductive.  The  one  derives  the  truth  of  the 
particular  from  some  general  principle  already 

205 


THE  PSYCHOLOGY  OF  REASONING 

accepted  by  speaker  and  listener,  the  other  sup- 
ports a  general  proposition  by  specific  instances. 
Each  of  these  general  classes  has  two  lesser 
varieties.  As  forms  of  deduction  one  may  dis- 
tinguish the  syllogism  and  the  less  rigid  form 
of  referring  new  to  old,  analogy.  Under  in- 
duction one  may  distinguish  induction  proper, 
which  draws  its  proof  from  instances  already 
known,  and  experiment  which  puts  the  sugges- 
tion to  the  test  in  some  new  way.  These  differ- 
ent forms  of  proof  may  be  used  in  support  of 
any  conclusion  and  in  fact  more  than  one  is 
ordinarily  used  to  support  any  conclusion  that 
is  drawn.  The  methods  are  rather  mutually 
helpful  than  mutually  exclusive. 

The  syllogism  as  the  oldest  and  best  known 
of  these  may  be  discussed  first.  It  assumes  that 
the  conclusion  may  be  established  by  referring 
it  to  some  one  general  truth.  The  general  truth 
is  expressed  in  the  major  premise,  the  minor 
premise  serves  to  relate  the  conclusion  to  it. 
An  instance  may  be  found  in  the  familiar 

**A11  men  are  mortal, 
Socrates  is  a  man, 
Therefore,  Socrates  is  mortal '  * 

of  the  texts  on  formal  logic.     It  is  unfortunate 

206 


PEOOF— THE  SYLLOGISM 

that  the  instances  of  logic  are  nearly  all  taken 
out  of  their  natural  context  in  this  way,  and 
are  treated  as  if  each  were  complete  in  itself. 
As  a  matter  of  fact  real  reasoning  always  grows 
out  of  a  particular  purpose  and  always  serves 
some  practical  end.  The  purpose,  the  ultimate 
end  and  even  the  particular  setting  are  as  much 
part  of  the  reasoning  as  the  conclusion  and  the 
premises.  To  understand  the  reasoning  one 
must  supply  a  context  and  this  is  not  easy  for 
the  syllogism  cited  above  or  for  many  of  the 
instances  chosen  by  the  familiar  treatises  of 
formal  logic.  One  can  think  of  trying  to  prove 
the  mortality  of  Socrates  only  if  one  were  a 
member  of  a  band  of  assassins  plotting  his 
death  or  were  arguing  against  him  before  the 
Areopagus  and  even  in  that  case  the  term  mortal 
would  be  used  figuratively  as  synonymous  with 
fallibility.  Taken  literally  the  major  premise 
would  add  little,  if  anything,  in  this  case  to  the 
force  of  the  conclusion. 

It  will  be  well  then  to  turn  to  some  instance 
in  which  the  context  may  be  assumed  to  be 
known  and  study  the  relation  of  the  syllogism 
to  the  conclusion  and  to  the  action  that  might 
result  from  it.  Professor  James*  example  of 
the  smoky  lamp  will  do  as  well  as  another.    A 

207 


THE  PSYCHOLOGY  OF  EEASONING 

servant,  presumably  ignorant,  stops  the  smok- 
ing of  a  lamp  by  inserting  a  bit  of  wood  under 
one  edge  of  the  chimney  to  admit  more  air. 
The  actual  process  of  reasoning  or  inferring  will 
be  completed  when  the  movement  is  made  or  the 
idea  presents  itself.  The  suggestion  may  come 
as  a  memory  from  some  similar  instance,  by 
mere  chance  trial,  or  it  matters  not  in  what  way. 
The  syllogism  begins  only  after  the  suggestion 
has  been  made.  Even  then  it  does  not  always 
appear  but  will  be  supplied  only  when  someone 
asks  why  it  was  done  or  the  thinker  becomes 
curious  to  understand  the  improvement  that  has 
been  made.  In  each  case  the  proof  grows  out  of 
some  preliminary  doubt.  The  explanation  is 
here  in  terms  of  some  earlier  accepted  general 
truth  that  is  implied  in  the  act  or  thought. 

That  any  process  of  justification  can  be  given 
the  syllogistic  form  may  be  illustrated  by  the 
smoky  lamp  and  its  remedy.  In  this  instance 
the  syllogism  would  be  made  up  of  a  major 
premise:  **The  admission  of  an  increased 
amount  of  oxygen  will  tend  to  make  a  lamp  stop 
smoking. '^  Then:  ** Inserting  a  bit  of  wood 
under  the  edge  of  the  chimney  will  admit  more 
oxygen.''  ^^  Therefore  insertion  of  a  bit  of 
wood  under  the  edge  of  the  chimney  will  tend 

208 


PEOOF— THE  SYLLOGISM 

to  prevent  the  lamp  from  smoking. ' '  A  further 
fact  to  be  considered  here  is  that  it  is  never 
possible  to  formulate  any  set  of  premises  that 
will  exhaust  all  the  proofs  that  might  be  given. 
We  might  make  our  syllogism  upon  a  principal 
that  is  even  more  fundamental.  Smokiness 
may  be  prevented  by  any  means  that  will 
prevent  an  excess  of  hydrocarbons  over  oxygen 
in  the  process  of  combustion.  Admission  of  an 
adequate  amount  of  air  will  prevent  this  excess. 
Therefore  the  admission  of  an  adequate  amount 
of  air  will  prevent  smokiness.  The  major 
premise  here  requires  other  syllogisms  to  jus- 
tify it  and  each  can  be  made  to  depend  upon 
some  other  in  ever  extending  regressus.  The 
regressus  will  extend  not  merely  in  a  straight 
line  but  at  many  points  there  will  be  a  bifurca- 
tion so  that  we  shall  have  diverging  lines  of 
syllogisms  that  between  them  will  include  most 
of  our  knowledge  of  chemistry  and  then  will 
probably  depend  upon  much  experience  that  has 
not  been  formulated.  For  instance  we  would  in 
strict  logic  have  to  justify  not  alone  the  entrance 
of  more  air  but  the  use  of  a  bit  of  wood  to 
support  the  chimney  and  this  would  require  a 
syllogism  for  the  strength  of  the  wood.  These 
again  would  divide  into  pairs  that  would  con- 

209 


THE  PSYCHOLOGY  OF  EEASONING 

sider  the  strength  of  the  wood  and  the  weight 
of  the  chimney  each  in  a  separate  syllogism. 
Other  syllogisms  still  would  be  required  to 
guarantee  us  against  the  danger  of  using  a 
combustible  material,  and  that  would  consider 
the  size  of  the  particle  and  its  relation  to  the 
size  of  chimney,  rate  of  passage  of  air,  etc., 
etc. 

It  would  be  very  difficult  to  say  that  any  one 
set  of  these  premises  would  be  more  necessary 
or  satisfactory  than  any  other,  and  if  any  were 
used  it  would  be  difficult  to  prophesy  in  advance 
which  of  the  many  sets  would  be  chosen  as  the 
more  important.  It  is  altogether  probable  that 
one  set  would  be  chosen  at  one  time,  another  at 
another,  all  depending  upon  the  difficulty  that 
chanced  to  be  prominent  in  the  mind  of  the  ob- 
server at  the  moment.  Certainly,  not  all  of 
the  possible  syllogisms  would  be  formulated  in 
any  case  and  if  they  were  they  would  run 
through  a  large  part  of  our  knowledge  of  the 
chemistry  and  physics  of  combustion,  and  would 
probably  raise  questions  many  of  which  are  not 
yet  definitely  answered  by  science. 

In  any  case  one  would  have  in  the  major 
premise  merely  a  statement  of  some  general 
truth  already  known  to  both  speaker  and  lis- 

210 


PROOF— THE  SYLLOGISM 

tener.  For  some  reason  this  general  truth 
serves  to  give  additional  warrant  to  the  conclu- 
sion; one  is  undoubtedly  more  ready  to  grant 
the  assertion  after  the  major  premise  has  been 
suggested  than  before.  The  syllogism  increases 
the  belief  of  the  hearer  and  of  the  thinker  him- 
self in  the  conclusion  that  has  been  already  at- 
tained. To  understand  how  this  is  possible  one 
must  turn  back  to  the  result  of  the  examina- 
tion of  the  nature  and  origin  of  the  general 
statement. 

The  effect  of  the  general  statement  is  not 
direct.  Certainly  no  new  knowledge  springs 
into  being  with  the  formulation  of  the  major 
premise  either  in  the  mind  of  the  thinker  or  of 
the  doubter  who  questions  how  or  why  he  con- 
cludes as  he  does.  One  is  no  more  certain  that 
Socrates  or  any  other  man  will  die,  after  he 
has  been  assured  that  all  men  are  mortal,  than 
he  was  before  the  statement  was  made.  If  the 
knowledge  that  finds  formulation  in  the  state- 
ment was  not  already  in  mind  there  would  be  no 
acceptance  of  the  statement  when  it  had  been 
made.  If  one  knew  nothing  of  higher  mathe- 
matics the  citation  of  a  differential  equation  of 
the  third  or  fourth  order  would  not  add  as- 
surance to  a  doubtful  physical  proposition.    I 

211 


THE  PSYCHOLOGY  OF  REASONING 

mean,  of  course,  real  assurance.  It  is  true  that 
one  ignorant  of  mathematics  or  trained  only  in 
the  lower  stages  has  a  respect  for  an  equation 
that  will  lead  him  to  pretend  assent  whenever 
an  equation  is  cited  against  him;  the  equation 
will  silence,  even  if  it  does  not  win  him  to  com- 
plete acquiescence  in  the  proposition.  This 
however  is  not  the  effect  of  the  major  premise 
that  is  valuable.  One  would  certainly  not  be 
said  to  grasp  the  force  of  the  argument  in  a  case 
of  that  kind,  and  an  argument  has  no  real  effect 
unless  its  force  is  actually  grasped.  One  might 
even  give  formal  demonstration  that  one  could 
not  know  the  general  statement  unless  all  the 
particular  instances  under  it,  and  hence  the  con- 
clusion were  also  already  known.  It  is  evident 
then  that  the  major  premise  does  not  confirm 
the  knowledge  in  the  sense  that  it  adds  some- 
thing that  was  not  present  before,  or  that  it 
adds  new  knowledge.  The  major  premise  is  no 
more  accepted  on  authority  than  is  the  conclu- 
sion. If  it  were  accepted  in  that  way  we  should 
not  be  dealing  with  reasoning  in  the  true  sense, 
at  least  in  the  sense  in  which  it  is  used  in  every 
day  life.  For  in  every  day  life  we  question  the 
truth  of  the  premises  just  as  strictly  as  we  ques- 
tion the  conclusion  and  in  much  the  same  way. 

212 


PROOF— THE  SYLLOGISM 

Only  in  classes  in  formal  logic  does  one  say  let 
us  assume  that  such  and  such  statements  are 
true  and  see  what  follows  from  them.  In  prac- 
tical life  an  argument  of  this  kind  is  likely  to  be 
met  with  a  howl  of  protest  that  the  assumptions 
themselves  are  wrong.  Even  in  formal  logic 
more  care  is  taken  than  the  extreme  formalist 
would  give  us  to  believe,  to  be  sure  that  the 
premises  square  with  experience,  not  of  course 
that  it  is  assumed  to  make  any  difference  to  the 
method,  but  to  avoid  confusing  the  youthful 
mind.  All  this  evidence  that  the  major  premise 
adds  nothing  new  to  the  conclusion  would  tend 
to  deprive  it  of  any  useful  function,  while  as 
a  matter  of  fact  it  has  a  place,  is  used,  if  not 
in  the  way  that  it  is  usually  said  to  be.  It  is 
certainly  true  that  you  can  make  plausible  to 
your  objector  a  conclusion  that  he  at  first  de- 
clines to  accept  if  you  will  formulate  for  him 
the  general  principle  under  which  it  is  sub- 
sumed. And  your  own  assurance  grows  with 
clear  and  definite  reference  of  your  conclusion 
to  already  established  principles. 

What  gives  this  feeling  of  satisfaction  exist- 
ence of  which  cannot  be  disputed  or  denied  is  not 
at  all  easy  to  say  and  so  far  as  I  know  no  alto- 
gether satisfactory  explanation  has  ever  been 

213 


THE  PSYCHOLOGY  OF  REASONING 

given.  Were  we  Platonists  or  even  did  we  hold 
to  the  metaphysical  theory  of  the  English 
Hegelians  in  a  world  of  universals  or  a  uni- 
versal world  that  existed  apart  from  the  more 
mundane  consciousness  of  every  day  life,  we 
should  have  no  trouble.  The  process  would  be 
one  of  transition  from  the  concrete  and  indi- 
vidual world  to  the  world  of  absolute  verities. 
As  psychologists  however  we  are  bound  to 
attempt  an  empirical  explanation,  and  this  is 
the  more  enforced  upon  us  since  we  have  found 
that  the  character  of  the  general  statement  that 
will  be  believed  is  colored  by  the  earlier  expe- 
rience of  the  individual  who  accepts  it.  On 
this  empirical  level  it  seems  that  the  general 
statement  when  made  tends  to  suggest  older 
connections,  older  bits  of  experience  that  have 
already  been  concerned  in  the  development  of 
the  conclusion  but  which  seem  to  gain  veri- 
similitude when  formulated  in  words.  The 
associations,  that  were  previously  latent,  now 
seem  to  add  their  quota  to  the  vague  feeling, 
a^d  while  not  even  then  explicitly  conscious 
they  endow  the  new  fact  with  a  feeling  of  being 
ac^i^ted  into  the  system  of  knowledge.  Then 
there  is  something  like  the  world  of  universals 
of  the  Hegelians  when  framed  on  an  empirical 

21i 


PROOF— THE  SYLLOGISM 

basis.  Laws  and  principles  of  connection  like 
the  concept  develop  as  types  or  standards  about 
which  the  individual  experiences  cluster.  As 
experiences  accumulate  they  seem  to  crystallize 
into  general  statements  toward  which  all  other 
facts  tend  to  gravitate.  They  persist  while  the 
particular  elements  out  of  which  they  were 
compounded  disappear.  Their  persistence  is 
probably  due  to  the  large  number  of  connections 
that  are  made  between  them  and  other  expe- 
riences. The  general,  the  type,  has  been  seen 
a  vast  number  of  times  while  the  individuals 
have  been  in  consciousness  but  once.  They  are 
then  always  likely  to  be  recalled,  or  at  least  the 
likelihood  of  their  recall  is  very  much  greater 
than  the  likelihood  of  the  recall  of  any  one  of 
the  elements  that  have  gradually  given  rise  to 
it.  All  of  these  associates  too  probably  in  some 
degree  persist  and  tend  to  give  increased  prob- 
ability to  the  general. 

In  fact,  when  the  forms  have  once  developed 
there  is  always  a  tendency  to  have  them  take 
the  place  of  the  particular  even  in  perception. 
Whenever  one  hears  a  new  theory  propounded 
there  is  always  a  tendency  to  say  that  is  the 
theory  of  so  and  so  with  certain  elements  of 
the  theory  of  some  one  else.  The  deviations 
15  315. 


THE  PSYCHOLOGY  OF  REASONING 

from  the  well-known  formulaB  will  not  be  no- 
ticed at  all.  Much  the  same  tendency  is  seen  in 
the  case  even  of  single  objects.  New  colors  ^ 
are  referred  to  colors  for  which  we  have  well- 
developed  names,  and  the  differences  are  not 
appreciated.  In  case  one  is  presenting  a  new 
device  to  a  man  who  is  familiar  with  many  I 
similar  ones  there  is  the  greatest  difficulty  in 
making  him  see  that  this  is  really  new  and  not 
another  variation  of  an  already  familiar  pat- 
tern. The  same  holds  equally  of  scientific  the- 
ories. Nothing  is  more  usual  or  more  provok- 
ing to  the  man  who  believes  that  he  has  some 
new  explanation  or  solution  of  an  old  problem 
than  to  be  told  that  his  is  but  one  of  the  many 
deviations  of  an  old  familiar  theory.  We  are 
all  familiar  with  the  man  who  assures  us  that 
all  systems  of  philosophy  are  to  be  found  in 
Plato  or  Aristotle.  But,  however  completely  we  j 
may  assent  to  the  general  proposition,  it  is  none 
the  less  discouraging  when  your  own  particular 
fondly-nourished  deviation  finds  satisfactory 
resting  place  in  the  mind  of  your  critic  in  one 
of  the  classical  philosophers.  However  much 
the  persistence  of  the  type  and  the  overshadow- 
ing dominance  of  the  type  may  be  deprecated  in 
the  particular  instance,  it  is  a  fact  that  these 

216 


PEOOF— THE  SYLLOGISM 

types  develop  as  a  framework  for  all  knowledge 
and  that  any  new  bit  of  knowledge  can  be  given 
separate  existence  only  at  the  expense  of  con- 
siderable pain  and  repetition.  Deprecate  as  we 
may  the  resulting  conservatism  of  human 
thought,  the  tendency  for  the  type  to  persist  at 
the  expense  of  the  individual  is  undoubtedly  a 
labor-saving  device,  and  without  some  ten- 
dency of  the  kind  all  progress  in  knowledge 
would  be  impossible.  The  dominance  of  the 
type  with  room  for  variation  certainly  gives 
the  most  satisfactory  results  for  retention,  in- 
terpretation and  progress. 

If  we  get  back  then  to  our  present  problem 
of  why  the  general  statement,  the  formulation 
of  the  major  premise,  gives  rise  to  the  feeling 
of  confidence  in  the  truth  of  the  conclusion,  we 
find  our  answer  in  the  fact  that  the  general 
statement  represents  the  type,  and  that  the 
actually  remembered  framework  of  our  knowl- 
edge is  forged  out  of  typical  statements.  If  we 
ask  how  the  framework,  or  the  elements  of  the 
framework  give  rise  to  a  feeling  of  satisfaction 
that  is  denied  to  the  particulars  out  of  which  the 
typical  has  developed,  we  find  the  explanation 
in  the  fact  that  the  general  has  hundreds  or 
thousands  of  connections  where  the  individual 

217 


THE  PSYCHOLOGY  OF  REASONING 

has  but  one.  The  associates  too  are  probably 
not  altogether  mere  dead  potentialities  but  are 
in  some  way  reflected  in  the  consciousness  of  the 
moment,  in  vague  feelings  or  in  the  absence  of 
inhibitions  and  their  corresponding  conscious- 
ness, that  attach  to  the  particular.  At  present 
the  feeling  cannot  be  defined;  probably  it  can 
never  be  defined  except  as  a  vague  feeling  of 
satisfaction.  We  are  aware  of  the  resulting 
confidence  in  the  truth  of  the  statement  and 
the  accompanying  readiness  to  proceed  to  ac- 
tion. This  characteristic  of  the  general  is 
closely  related  on  the  one  hand  to  the  feeling 
that  accompanies  the  concept  or  the  meaning, 
and  to  the  feeling  of  belief  on  the  other.  All 
three  are  important  for  their  functions  and  are 
known  by  their  functions  rather  than  by  the 
structures,  the  feelings  that  accompany  them. 
All  three  too  undoubtedly  find  their  explanation 
in  very  much  the  same  cerebral  and  psycholog- 
ical conditions  and  antecedents.  In  short,  the 
major  premise  or  the  general  statement  that 
justifies  the  particular  conclusion,  gives  it  a 
warrant  not  because  it  adds  something  to  the 
particular  or  because  its  truth  rests  upon  any 
other  basis  than  the  truth  of  the  particular,  but 
because  it  gives  greater  definiteness  to  the  ex- 

218 


PEOOF— THE  SYLLOGISM 

periences  that  warranted  and  induced  the  con- 
clusion, and  furnishes  a  resting  point  for  the 
accumulated  experiences  to  focus  about  and 
start  from.  Its  value  is  psychological  not  log- 
ical, is  primarily  static  rather  than  dynamic.  It 
warrants,  it  does  not  induce;  but  the  warrant 
comes  from  a  rearrangement,  or  different  action 
of  forces  effective  whether  the  syllogism  be  for- 
mulated or  not,  and  whether  the  major  premise 
be  expressed  or  not. 

That  the  truth  of  the  major  premise  and  ulti- 
mately the  truth  of  the  conclusion  should  rest 
upon  the  belief  process,  should  reduce  finally  to 
harmony  with  experience  does  not  seem  so  rad- 
ical if  one  recalls  that  the  tests  of  the  logician 
so  far  as  they  have  been  formulated  are  not  so 
very  different.  Certainly  formulations  of  the 
principle  of  sufficient  reason  are  no  more  defi- 
nite, and  if  analyzed  would  be  found  to  be  very 
largely  made  up  of  the  fact  that  men  in  general 
were  ready  to  accept  them,  believed  them. 
There  is  sufficient  reason  when  we  are  con- 
vinced, and  we  are  convinced  when  we  believe. 
Certain  beliefs  are  more  widely  accepted  than 
others  and  so  are  said  to  be  fundamental.  That 
means,  probably,  that  they  are  connected  with 
a  larger  number  of  experiences,  and  that  the 

219 


THE  PSYCHOLOGY  OF  REASONING 

system  as  a  whole  would  be  more  disorganized 
if  they  were  rejected.  It  is  belief,  nevertheless, 
and  nothing  more.  The  belief  has  merely  been 
highly  developed  and  closely  connected  with 
many  important  facts  and  experiences. 

The  test  of  the  inconceivability  of  the  oppo- 
site is  still  more  evidently  but  a  phase  of  the 
belief  problem.  To  say  that  the  opposite  is  out 
of  harmony  with  experience  is  but  a  roundabout 
way  of  asserting  that  all  experience  reinforces 
the  proposition  in  question.  It  is  belief  as- 
serted by  two  negatives  and  put  in  very  strong 
terms.  The  more  familiar  tests  of  truth  then 
reduce  to  our  principle  of  belief  with  the  excep- 
tion of  PascaPs  clearness  of  ideas  and  Hume's 
closeness  of  association.  Even  clearness  might 
be  said  to  depend  upon  the  reinforcement  of 
other  experiences  and  so  to  reduce  to  the  same 
principle  as  belief.  Hume's  closeness  of  asso- 
ciation has  been  tested  heretofore  and  has  not 
been  found  to  agree  with  the  facts.  Many  of 
the  closest  and  strongest  associations  are  unfor- 
tunate and  must  be  rejected.  Closeness  of  asso- 
ciation ensures  a  hearing  for  the  resulting  sug- 
gestions, but  like  the  slips  of  speech  they  are 
very  likely  to  be  refused  acceptance  when  tested. 
Practically  all  tests  of  truth  that  have  played 

220 


PROOF— THE  SYLLOGISM 

a  part  in  history  would  reduce  in  one  form  or 
another  to  belief.  This  harmonizes  with  our 
own  conclusion  that  the  truth  of  an  inference 
or  of  a  major  premise  rests  upon  its  being  be- 
lieved. 

If  the  major  premise  warrants  the  truth  of 
the  conclusion  because  it  is  an  expression  of 
related  and  ordered  experiences  of  the  same 
class  but  of  earlier  acquirement,  and  the  course 
of  associations  that  give  rise  to  the  inference 
is  in  terms  of  large  masses  of  related  experi- 
ences, and  belief  is  a  result  of  the  interaction 
of  wide  ranges  of  earlier  experiences  with  the 
particular  experience,  it  would  seem  that  there 
might  be  some  close  relationship  between  all 
three  operations.  In  the  instance  of  the  smoky 
lamp,  only  those  associates  will  be  favored  by 
the  educated  mind  that  have  some  relation  to 
the  increased  air  supply.  For  an  ignorant  per- 
son the  difficulty  with  the  light  might  recall 
a  host  of  older  remedies,  such  for  example  as 
putting  a  screen  about  the  light  to  shield  it 
from  a  strong  draft.  In  the  intelligent  mind 
this  would  be  excluded  unconsciously  by  the 
circumstances  that  indicate  too  little  rather 
than  too  much  oxygen  and  by  numerous  related 
experiences  and  facts.     The  same  experiences 

221 


THE  PSYCHOLOGY  OF  REASONING 

then  that  conJ5rm  the  conclusion  when  reached, 
guide  it  during  the  course  of  its  development. 
To  that  extent  and  to  that  extent  alone  it  may 
be  said  that  the  conditions  and  facts  that  are 
expressed  in  the  premises  are  also  the  factors  or 
are  related  to  the  factors  that  generate  the 
conclusion.  In  so  far  one  might  say  that  the 
influences  that  implicitly  guide  the  conclusion 
find  explicit  expression  in  the  premises.  But 
even  granting  this  it  must  be  added  that  the 
guidance  is  in  terms  of  vague  and  ill-defined 
masses  of  experience  not  by  definitely  formu- 
lated propositions,  and  that  at  the  most  one 
can  say  only  that  the  experience  that  guides 
is  later  formulated  in  the  premises.  It  was  not 
thus  formulated  at  the  moment  it  was  exerting 
its  influence. 

It  must  be  insisted  too  that  the  premises 
contain  only  an  inconsiderable  part  of  the 
knowledge  that  was  guiding  the  suggestion.  In 
the  case  in  question  the  conclusion  would  be 
in  terms  of  the  effects  not  merely  of  the  com- 
position of  the  air  and  the  consequent  results  of 
the  increased  draft,  but  also  in  terms  of  the 
knowledge  of  the  combustibility  of  the  substance 
used  as  a  support  and  its  nearness  to  the  flame, 
of  the  strength  of  the  substance  and  its  prob- 

223 


PKOOF— THE  SYLLOGISM 

able  adequateness  to  support  the  weight  of  the 
chimney  and  of  innumerable  other  considera- 
tions. Each  of  these  might  be  made  the  major 
premise  of  a  syllogism  and  used  to  prove  the 
truth  of  the  conclusion,  but  only  one  would  be 
so  used.  This  is  the  limitation  of  the  syllogistic 
proof.  It  does  not  justify  the  conclusion  by  all 
of  the  means  that  have  led  to  its  production, 
nor  by  all  of  the  elements  that  might  serve  to  give 
it  warrant.  The  premise  that  is  chosen  in  prac- 
tice is  one  that  meets  the  objection  of  the  person 
actually  present  or  that  serves  to  remove  the 
immediate  doubt  of  the  thinker.  In  the  in- 
stances chosen  by  the  texts  the  major  premise 
is  assumed  to  meet  the  most  likely  objection, 
but  it  must  always  be  a  justification  on  one  only 
of  the  many  possible  grounds  that  might  be 
offered  and  that  are  needed  to  prove  it  com- 
pletely. It  can  state  but  one  of  the  many  gen- 
eral truths  that  were  implicitly  involved  in  de- 
veloping it. 

The  process  of  justification  is  also  closely 
allied  to  the  belief  process.  In  fact  the  ulti- 
mate end  of  proof  is  to  make  the  conchision 
believed.  The  factors  that  give  belief  are  the 
related  experiences  implicit  in  the  control  of 
the  development  of  the  conclusion  and  in  part 

223 


THE  PSYCHOLOGY  OF  REASONING 

become  explicit  in  the  proof.  Ordinarily  there 
is  no  overt  question  of  belief,  the  conclusion  is 
accepted  without  hesitation  and  one  proceeds  to 
act  upon  it  or  takes  the  next  step  in  the  opera- 
tion. One  proves  or  attempts  to  justify  only 
when  preliminary  doubt  arises.  This  proof  is 
in  terms  of  the  same  sort  of  experience  as  that 
which  is  the  basis  of  the  tacit  belief.  As  has 
been  said  these  factors  that  work  ordinarily 
without  giving  other  sign  of  their  presence  than 
belief,  work  more  effectively  to  give  belief  when 
they  are  stated  in  the  explicitly  formulated  uni- 
versal proposition.  The  forces  that  give  belief 
are  on  the  whole  the  forces  that  guide  infer- 
ence. The  premises  represent  one  of  the 
masses  of  experience  so  far  as  it  has  been  crys- 
tallized in  the  single  statement.  The  three 
forces  are  in  part  identical.  It  might  be  re- 
marked that  the  ordinary  consciousness  of  the 
truth  of  any  proposition  or  suggestion  is  more 
likely  to  lie  in  the  feeling  that  the  one  sugges- 
tion is  false  rather  than  in  the  explicit  approval 
of  the  correct  conclusion.  As  suggestion  after 
suggestion  appears  it  is  rejected  until  finally 
some  one  comes  to  which  no  objection  can  be 
raised.  Here  as  everywhere  the  process  that 
is  definitely  conscious  is  doubt  and  the  conclu- 

224 


PEOOF— THE  SYLLOGISM 

sion  that  is  accepted  is  practically  without  pecu- 
liar sign  or  mark. 

Eeasoning  and  the  justification  of  reasoning 
may  have  all  degrees  of  definiteness.  Ordina- 
rily the  accuracy  of  the  adjustment  of  means  to 
end  goes  hand  in  hand  with  the  clearness  of  the 
justification.  The  first  performance  of  any  act 
of  reasoning  is  very  much  like  Lamb's  fable  of 
burning  down  the  house  to  roast  a  pig.  Some 
solution  is  recalled  in  the  rough  that  will  solve 
the  present  problem,  but  the  essentials  of  the 
operation  are  not  recognized.  In  the  operation 
that  we  have  used  as  an  illustration  it  may  be 
recalled  merely  that  in  times  past  raising  one 
side  of  the  chimney  has  stopped  the  smoke,  and 
no  other  reason  can  be  given.  At  the  next  stage 
it  may  be  recalled  that  admitting  more  air  will 
make  a  stove  burn  as  well,  and  this  general  prin- 
ciple will  support  the  other  and  serve  to  make 
the  understanding  of  the  operation  more  defi- 
nite. From  this  point  onward  to  the  knowledge 
of  the  chemistry  of  combustion  and  of  the  com- 
position of  the  air,  all  stages  of  definiteness  of 
explanation  may  be  recognized.  Each  stage  is 
a  warrant  for  the  conclusion.  It  is  the  definite- 
ness of  the  warrant  and  the  degree  to  which 
the  essentials  are  picked  out  that  varies  in  each 

225 


THE  PSYCHOLOGY  OF  REASONING 

case.     The  more  scientific  the  thinker,  the  more 
explicit  must  be  the  proof. 

Analogy,  the  second  form  of  deductive  proof, 
has  several  points  of  similarity  to  the  syllogism. 
Analogy  deserves  the  more  attention  because, 
although  it  finds  no  place  in  the  traditional 
logic,  it  is  nevertheless  the  method  that  is  per- 
haps most  used  in  the  arguments  of  every  day 
life.  The  essence  of  the  proof  by  analogy  is 
the  reference  of  a  new  or  disputed  statement  to 
some  older  and  accepted  principle  to  which  it 
is  similar,  but  with  which  it  is  not  identical.  An 
instance  is  the  use  of  the  discovery  or  inven- 
tion of  wireless  telegraphy  to  support  a  belief 
in  telepathy.  In  the  new  form  of  transmission, 
messages  are  carried  through  the  ether  without 
special  connecting  wires  or  other  paths.  It  is 
argued  from  this  that  the  human  mind  might 
similarly  send  out  some  form  of  energy  through 
the  ether  that  would  affect  other  minds  rightly 
tuned  to  the  sending  individual.  Without  at- 
tempting to  comment  on  the  sufficiency  of  the 
proof,  there  can  be  no  doubt  that  for  most 
minds  an  analogy  of  this  kind  will  strengthen 
belief  in  the  fact  supported  by  the  analogy. 
The  degree  of  belief  that  is  aroused  will  depend 
upon  the  closeness  of  the  similarity  between 

226 


PROOF— THE  SYLLOGISM 

the  statement  to  be  proved  and  the  accepted  fact 
that  is  cited  to  prove  it.  Where  the  two  are 
closely  similar,  the  proof  will  be  regarded  as 
strong ;  where  the  difference  is  great  and  affects 
vital  parts  of  the  analogy,  the  proof  will  be 
weak  down  to  the  vanishing  point.  In  the  argu- 
ment for  telepathy  just  mentioned,  the  case 
would  be  much  stronger  if  one  could  point  to 
anything  in  the  human  brain  that  corresponded 
in  any  degree  to  the  transmitting  or  receiving 
apparatus  of  the  Marconi  system.  The  simi- 
larity would  thereby  be  considerably  increased. 
But  the  lack  of  an  essential  point  in  the  simi- 
larity is  by  no  means  fatal  to  the  belief  that  is 
engendered  by  the  argument.  One  inclined  to 
believe  would  insist  that  there  was  still  a  pos- 
sibility that  some  way  of  sending  out  the  influ- 
ence might  be  discovered  later,  or  that  it  might 
be  too  delicate  ever  to  be  discovered,  but  still 
exist,  and  be  proved  to  exist  by  its  action.  As 
the  negative  of  a  proposition  is  very  difficult 
to  establish,  the  force  of  the  analogy  could  never 
be  entirely  destroyed. 

At  the  same  time  it  is  not  possible  to  reduce 
the  analogy  to  syllogistic  form.  One  may  even 
say  that  there  is  no  possibility  of  giving  rigid 
proof  of  any  kind  by  analogy.    It  is  always 

227 


THE  PSYCHOLOGY  OF  REASONING 

possible  that  the  similarity  may  be  elusive  or 
in  a  non-essential.  It  is  always  at  least  possible 
that  the  discovery  necessary  to  reduce  the  simi- 
larity to  identity  may  never  be  made,  and  at 
the  best  until  the  discovery  is  made  there  is 
no  certainty  attaching  to  the  proof.  From  this 
point  of  view  it  is  remarkable  that  it  should 
find  so  large  a  place  in  reasoning,  both  popular 
and  scientific.  Why  does  it  give  so  definite  a 
warrant!  A\Tiy  does  it  arouse  belief?  If  we 
are  to  draw  a  distinction  between  logic  and  psy- 
chology, we  must  look  to  psychology  rather  than 
to  logic  for  our  answer.  But  on  the  other  side, 
the  nature  of  the  warrant  for  the  proof  by  anal- 
ogy is  not  so  very  different  from  the  warrant 
for  the  belief  in  the  syllogism  itself.  Both 
draw  their  justification  from  the  results  of 
earlier  experience  definitely  formulated  in  laws 
and  maxims.  We  have  seen  both  in  the  dis- 
cussion of  belief  and  in  the  discussion  of  the 
proof  given  by  the  syllogism  that  we  are  willing 
to  accept  anything  that  can  be  united  with  the 
general  mass  of  our  knowledge.  Analogy 
serves  to  give  this  union  by  assimilating  the 
new  or  doubted  proposition  to  some  law  or  prin- 
ciple that  has  already  been  established  and  is 
accepted  by  both  speaker  and  listener.     The 

228 


PROOF— THE  SYLLOGISM 

human  mind  is  so  anxious  to  get  all  experience 
arranged  in  some  sort  of  order  that  it  is  none 
too  close  in  its  scrutiny  of  any  scheme  that  will 
permit  a  systematic  ordering  of  its  knowledge. 
In  this  respect,  reasoning  from  analogy  is  but 
one  expression  of  the  tendency  to  take  over  all 
experiences  into  the  predeveloped  types  of  which 
we  have  made  so  much  throughout.  There  is 
no  real  acceptance  of  any  fact  until  it  has  found 
a  resting  place  in  some  concept  or  law,  in  the 
framework  of  our  knowledge.  The  result  of 
accepting  an  analogy  is  to  dispose  of  a  new  fact 
under  a  familiar  head.  It  is  put  into  an  old 
class  where  it  may  be  easily  handled.  Until 
disposed  of  in  some  such  way,  the  fact  always 
causes  unrest;  there  is  relief  when  it  is  given 
a  place,  even  temporarily.  Analogies  then  find 
the  readier  acceptance  from  the  fact  that  they 
furnish  an  anodyne  to  thought.  They  give  re- 
pose where  otherwise  would  be  conflict  and 
irritation. 

It  must  not  be  supposed,  however,  that  rea- 
soning from  analogy  always  or  even  usually  con- 
duces to  fallacious  conclusions.  In  fact  the 
warrant  that  is  provided  by  analogy  is  but  a 
stage  removed  from  the  warrant  that  is  given 
by  the  syllogism.    As  has  been  seen,  the  only 

229 


THE  PSYCHOLOGY  OF  EEASOXIl^G 

warrant  for  the  truth  of  the  major  premise  of 
the  syllogism  is  the  fact  that  it  is  believed,  that 
it  has  been  wrought  into  the  framework  of  our 
knowledge  and  has  been  found  to  harmonize 
with  the  other  elements  of  that  knowledge. 
Eeferenee  of  the  conclusion  to  the  major  prem- 
ise has  value  only  as  it  serves  to  connect  it  with 
something  that  had  previously  been  explicitly 
accepted.  Proof  by  analogy  is  identical  with 
proof  through  the  syllogism  in  that  both  give 
truth  only  through  connection  with  something 
that  has  itself  been  accepted  as  true.  The  only 
difference  lies  in  the  nature  of  the  reference. 
In  the  syllogism  the  conclusion  is  made  a  par- 
ticular instance  under  a  general  proposition; 
in  analogy  the  conclusion  is  asserted  to  be 
merely  similar  to  the  general  proposition  or  to 
some  other  accepted  particular.  This  differ- 
ence is  slight  when  the  analogy  is  close.  For 
the  particulars  that  are  referred  to  the  general 
are  not  always  identical  with  it.  If  they  were 
identical  there  would  be  no  need  for  the  refer- 
ence. If  the  analogy  is  close,  there  may  be  as 
much  similarity  between  the  conclusion  to  be 
proved  and  the  accepted  law  to  which  it  is  re- 
ferred as  there  is  between  the  particular 
and    the    general    to    which    it    is    referred 

230 


PROOF— THE  SYLLOGISM 

by  the  syllogism,  all  the  more  if  the  syl- 
logism be  somewhat  loose.  In  close  analogy 
we  approximate  the  syllogism.  In  the  less  rigid 
forms  of  syllogism  we  approximate  the  argu- 
ment from  analogy.  The  dividing  line  is 
easier  to  draw  than  in  most  of  the  distinctions 
that  we  have  investigated,  but  just  at  the  divid- 
ing line  it  is  not  always  easy  to  say  whether 
an  argument  is  a  very  close  analogy  or  a  some- 
what loose  syllogism.  At  the  very  least,  it  may 
be  asserted  without  fear  of  contradiction  that 
what  gives  plausibility  to  the  analogy  is  the 
same  sort  of  general  statement  that  affords 
proof  in  the  syllogism.  The  two  forms  of  rea- 
soning belong  in  the  same  class,  and  ultimately 
draw  their  validity  from  the  same  source. 

In  view  of  the  somewhat  scattered  treatment, 
it  may  be  well  to  cast  a  glance  back  over  the 
discussion  of  inference  and  ^deductive  proof. 
First  we  define  inference  as  the  process  of  im- 
proving or  changing  the  given  situation,  either 
actually  or  in  imagination.  Judgment  furnishes 
the  appreciation  of  the  situation,  inference  the 
improvement.  If,  as  is  usually  the  case,  the 
inference  arises  from  the  blocking  of  some 
habitual  action  by  a  difficulty,  judgment  is  the 
appreciation  of  the  difficulty,  inference  the  dis- 
16  231 


THE  PSYCHOLOGY  OF  REASONING 

CO  very  of  a  method  to  obviate  the  diflSculty  when 
appreciated.  The  psychological  operations  that 
give  rise  to  the  imagined  improvement  are  the 
laws  of  association  controlled  and  guided  by 
the  attitude  of  the  moment,  by  the  mental  con- 
text. But  the  more  essential  part  of  the  opera- 
tion, if  degrees  of  essentiality  are  to  be  recog- 
nized, is  to  be  found  in  the  operation  of  selecting 
from  the  solutions  offered  those  that  fit  the  par- 
ticular set  of  circumstances.  Often  one  tries 
various  suggestions  until  one  is  finally  found 
that  promises  to  be  suitable  to  the  situation. 
When  the  problem  is  merely  imagined,  the  ope- 
ration of  discovering  a  solution  is  not  unlike 
that  of  Professor  Thorndike's  cats  in  escaping 
from  a  box.  One  imagined  solution  after  an- 
other is  tried  until  one  comes  that  promises  to 
work  and  this  is  then  accepted.  The  origin 
of  the  suggestion  is  probably  not  always  due  to 
chance,  since  the  correct  solution  of  the  problem 
arises  only  in  the  mind  that  has  the  right  sort 
of  knowledge  and  is  at  the  moment  in  the  right 
attitude  toward  the  knowledge.  Suggestions 
may  present  themselves  in  any  mind  through 
bare  mechanical  association,  but  in  most  cases 
the  association  is  guided  by  large  elements  of 
experience  that  insure  or  at  least  make  prob- 

232 


PEOOF— THE  SYLLOGISM 

able  that  the  correct  solution  will  present  itself. 
Distinct  from  the  origin  of  the  suggested  im- 
provement is  the  process  of  testing.  An  infer- 
ence, no  matter  how  it  may  have  originated, 
must  be  tested  before  it  is  accepted.  The  test- 
ing is  one  phase  of  the  belief  problem.  "What 
harmonizes  with  experience  will  be  accepted. 
The  experience  that  tests  is  in  large  measure 
the  same  experience  that  generates  the  improve- 
ment. In  most  solutions  of  the  problem  there 
is  no  thought  of  the  truth  because  nothing  pre- 
vents the  immediate  acceptance ;  the  conclusion 
is  in  complete  harmony  with  the  knowledge  of 
the  individual.  In  fact,  in  many  cases  there  is 
no  consciousness  at  all.  It  is  only  when  there 
is  some  check,  some  doubt,  that  the  testing  is 
conscious.  When  the  check  comes,  we  make 
explicit  reference  to  earlier  experience  as  it  has 
been  formulated  in  a  general  law.  This  refer- 
ence may  be  formal  as  we  find  it  in  the  syllogism, 
it  may  be  informal  as  is  more  usual  in  every-day 
life.  In  either  case  the  effect  is  the  same. 
Some  crystallization  of  early  experience  is 
called  to  witness.  If  someone  questions  your 
use  of  tungsten  to  close  an  electric  circuit  when 
some  emergency  arises,  you  may  either  con- 
struct a  syllogism  with  ''all  metals  conduct,''  as 

233 


THE  PSYCHOLOGY  OF  liEASOXING 

the  major,  '^tungsten  is  a  metal,"  as  the  minor, 
or  what  is  more  likely  you  would  simply  say, 
** tungsten  is  a  metal''  and  let  him  supply  his 
own  major  premise.  The  effect  in  either  case  is 
the  same.  Belief  is  made  to  attach  to  the  con- 
clusion by  connecting  it  with  some  earlier  for- 
mulated general  principle.  That  in  its  turn  de- 
rives its  truth  only  from  the  experience  that 
it  formulates.  That  an  explicit  formulation  of 
the  knowledge  that  is  implicit  both  in  the  con- 
trol of  the  association  and  in  the  immediate 
acceptance  of  the  result  should  give  greater 
assurance  is  a  fact  on  the  same  level  as  the 
feeling  of  definiteness  that  attaches  to  the  type. 
It  is  to  be  noted  that  the  syllogism  and  anal- 
ogy apply  not  to  the  development  of  the  infer- 
ence but  to  its  proof,  and  even  then  do  not  have 
a  place  in  the  mental  operation  unless  the  con- 
clusion is  questioned  after  it  has  been  formu- 
lated. Deduction  is  a  method  of  proof,  not  of 
reasoning.  General  conclusions  have  much  the 
same  character  as  particular  conclusions.  The 
method  of  production  is  the  same,  very  often 
the  imagery  is  the  same.  The  only  difference 
is  that  the  restrictions  of  the  particular  process 
are  removed.  The  general  is  merely  the  par- 
ticular as  the  typical.     The  process  of  inferring 

234 


PEOOF— THE  SYLLOGISM 

in  general  is  the  same  as  tlie  process  of  inferring 
in  the  particular.  The  only  difference  is  that 
the  starting  point  and  the  conclusion,  the  inter- 
pretation and  the  improvement,  are  typical 
rather  than  particular. 


CHAPTER   Vin 

THE   NATURE   OF   INDUCTIVE   PROOF 

The  proof  most  favored  by  the  formal  logi- 
cian, the  logician  in  general  in  fact,  is  the  de- 
ductive, particularly  the  syllogism.  It  is  prob- 
able, however,  that  science  and  popular  thought 
place  the  emphasis  upon  induction  and  for  sci- 
ence particularly  upon  experiment.  It  is  true 
that  the  ordinary  argument  in  a  cross  roads 
store  is  pervaded  by  reference  to  high-sounding 
general  principles,  but  even  more  frequent  is 
reference  to  some  particular  instance  as  proof 
of  a  general  principle.  Inductive  proof  differs 
from  deductive  primarily  in  that  while  the  one 
ordinarily  seeks  the  warrant  for  a  general  state- 
ment in  a  series  of  particulars,  the  latter  finds 
justification  for  the  particular  conclusion  in  a 
general  law.  This  statement  is  to  be  modified 
in  part  since  the  conclusion  in  deduction  is  fre- 
quently general  and  the  suggestion  to  be  jus- 
tified by  induction  is  now  and  again  particular 
in  form.    The  justification  is,  however,  in  the 

236 


NATUEE  OF  INDUCTIVE  PEOOF 

one  by  reference  to  a  general  statement,  in  the 
other  by  reference  to  a  number  of  particular 
observations.  We  may  again  emphasize  the 
statement  that  the  difference  between  induction 
and  deduction  is  always  in  the  sort  of  proof 
that  is  offered,  very  seldom  in  the  way  in  which 
the  conclusion  is  reached.  The  conclusion  in 
induction  is  given  by  the  same  sort  of  associa- 
tive laws  that  suggest  the  law  that  is  proved 
deductively.  The  law  may  be  suggested  by 
something  actually  observed,  it  may  come  from 
some  other  bit  of  knowledge  as  was  true  of 
Darwin's  doctrine  of  natural  selection.  In 
either  case  the  solution  of  the  problem  that  sug- 
gests itself  is  proved  by  the  accumulation  of  a 
large  number  of  particular  instances  that  can 
be  explained  by  it  or  that  are  in  harmony  with 
it. 

The  way  in  which  the  general  statement  is 
referred  to  the  particulars  for  its  justification 
need  not  concern  us  here,  since  no  special  form 
or  technique  of  reference  has  been  developed  as 
was  true  of  the  syllogism.  But  one  must  ask 
how  it  is  possible  to  prove  general  statements 
by  particular  instances.  As  has  been  fre- 
quently pointed  out  enumeration  can  never  be 
exhaustive.    Even  if  it  includes  every  event  of 

237 


THE  PSYCHOLOGY  OF  EEASONING 

a  given  sort  up  to  the  present,  it  is  not  possible 
to  say  anything  whatever  about  the  future, 
unless  one  goes  beyond  the  actual  warrant  of 
the  enumeration.  Inductions  are  never  com- 
plete and  so  in  strictness  prove  nothing.  As  a 
matter  of  fact  all  this  discussion  is  beside  the 
point  for  most  of  the  proof  in  induction  comes 
not  from  the  particular  as  particular;  the  real 
value  of  the  instance  is  as  a  type,  as  the  expres- 
sion of  a  previously  established  law  or  prin- 
ciple. The  necessity  for  choosing  many  in- 
stances rather  than  one  is  that  the  different 
instances  contain  the  typical  principle  in  con- 
nection with  different  subsidiary  and  irrelevant 
details.  To  make  sure  that  the  details  in  other 
cases  are  irrelevant  the  typical  part  must  be 
seen  in  as  many  different  connections  as  possible. 
One  would  not  care  to  find  many  instances  of 
selection  in  the  same  species  in  Darwin's  case. 
Or  were  one  studying  the  structure  of  mam- 
mals in  reference  to  some  point  one  would  not 
care  to  examine  many  animals  of  the  same 
species.  Except  for  the  possible  individual 
variation  on  minor  points  one  would  be  content 
with  a  thorough  examination  of  one.  Still  truer 
would  this  be  of  the  magnetic  properties  of  iron. 
If  one  knew  the  chemical  composition  of  the 

238 


NATURE  OF  INDUCTIVE  PROOF 

iron  he  would  be  content  to  investigate  a  single 
specimen  thoroughly  and  use  his  results  as 
true  for  all  specimens.  Were  his  results  to 
show  deviations  he  would  assume  that  there  had 
been  some  change  in  the  conditions  of  the  ex- 
periment or  some  inaccuracy  in  the  observation. 
He  would  accept  the  result  as  true  for  all  speci- 
mens and  conditions  of  the  type.  Confidence 
comes,  then,  not  from  the  number  of  observa- 
tions, but  from  the  closeness  with  which  the 
things  observed  may  be  assumed  to  represent 
typical  conditions,  to  embody  types.  If  the 
objects  observed  are  not  typical,  the  observa- 
tion is  valueless. 

Inductions  from  another  point  of  view  de- 
pend not  at  all  upon  the  results  of  enumeration, 
but  upon  the  relations  of  a  general  statement  to 
other  subordinate  general  statements  that  have 
been  established  partly  by  observation,  partly 
by  the  agreement  of  observations  with  each 
other  over  long  stretches  of  time  and  under 
numerous  different  typical  conditions.  For  ex- 
ample, the  favorite  major  premise  of  the  formal 
logician  *^all  men  are  mortaP'  could  never  be 
established  by  mere  enumeration.  It  does  de- 
pend upon  observations  undoubtedly,  but  these 
are  of  the  conditions  of  life  and  subordinate 

239 


THE  PSYCHOLOGY  OF  REASONING 

laws  of  that  character  rather  than  of  vital  sta- 
tistics. We  know  that  man  must  die  from  our 
study  of  the  conditions  of  waste  and  repair  in 
the  organism  and  from  the  suitability  of  the 
animal  tissues  as  culture  media  for  pathogenic 
organisms.  Each  of  these  laws  is  the  outcome 
of  long  observation  and  experiment,  but  fully  as 
much  from  the  observation  of  animal  tissues  as 
of  human.  Each  of  the  statements  represents  a 
large  mass  of  experiences  that  are  harmonized 
with  each  other  in  the  statement  and  are  also 
known  to  harmonize  with  all  relevant  knowl- 
edge. Induction  here  approaches  very  close  to 
deduction. 

In  one  other  particular  are  the  separate  ob- 
servations that  together  constitute  induction 
like  deduction.  Each  perception  has  been 
seen  in  an  earlier  chapter  to  involve  the  results 
of  accumulated  experiences  that  unite  to  consti- 
tute meanings.  Pure  observation  under  the 
most  favorable  circumstances  does  not  repre- 
sent the  entrance  to  consciousness  of  purely  un- 
biased and  totally  new  facts;  rather  is  it  an 
occasion  for  the  rearousal  of  earlier  developed 
generalizations,  under  the  influence  of  the  prob- 
lem that  dominates  consciousness  at  the  moment 
and  on  the  occasion  of  the  stimulus  that  presents 

240 


NATURE  OF  INDUCTIVE  PEOOF 

itself  to  the  sense  organ.  When  one  turns  to 
observe  events  in  the  external  world  to  test 
some  new  suggestion,  one  sees  objects  that 
would  not  be  noticed  did  one  not  have  the  prob- 
lem, and  one  sees  in  them  elements  that  would 
not  otherwise  be  observed.  The  results  of  the 
perception  are  interpreted  by  earlier  acquired 
meanings  and  laws.  Neither  need  affect  the 
validity  of  the  observation  except  favorably, 
but  they  undoubtedly  make  one  see  what  would 
otherwise  pass  unseen.  It  must  not  be  assumed 
either  that  the  stimulus  is  merely  the  occasion 
for  the  rearousal  of  earlier  generalizations  and 
crystallizations  of  experience.  The  new  per- 
ception, while  largely  the  embodiment  of  early 
knowledge,  in  nearly  every  case  modifies  the 
older  mass,  or  at  the  very  least  the  old  is  con- 
firmed anew  by  the  fact  that  it  fits  into  the  new 
setting  satisfactorily. 

Not  only  does  the  earlier  accepted  general 
principle  contribute  in  part  to  the  content  of  the 
perception,  but  the  validity  of  the  observation 
will  depend  very  largely  upon  the  degree  of 
agreement  between  the  new  and  the  old.  When 
the  new  fact  does  not  find  a  resting  point  in 
the  body  of  knowledge  it  seems  to  baffle,  it  is 
not  understood  and  is  with  difficulty  accepted. 

241 


THE  PSYCHOLOGY  OF  KEASONING 

A  very  good  illustration  of  this  is  furnished 
by  the  results  of  the  experiments  of  Michelson 
and  Morley  that  demonstrate  that  there  is  no 
ether  drift,  no  displacement  of  the  light  waves 
by  the  motion  of  the  earth  through  space.  The 
fact  is  established  as  completely  as  any  fact 
may  be  established,  but  apparently  it  can  not 
be  related  to  the  accepted  general  principles 
in  the  same  field — it  stands  alone.  Two  alter- 
natives apparently  present  themselves.  An 
attempt  has  recently  been  made  to  develop  a 
new  mathematics  that  shall  include  this  fact 
with  others  in  its  explanations.  That  is,  one 
may  modify  the  old  principles  to  include  the 
new  fact.  Were  the  observations  less  trust- 
worthy the  other  alternative  would  be  to  reject 
the  results  and  keep  to  the  old  principles.  As 
it  stands  without  relation  to  old  principles  it  is 
not  understood  and  stands  as  a  perpetual  thorn 
in  the  side  of  the  physicist,  a  dire  foreboding 
that  somehow  his  developed  system  contains  a 
flaw  that  may  bring  disaster  to  the  whole.  In- 
duction is  like  deduction  in  its  dependence  upon 
earlier  developed  general  laws  and  meanings. 
Even  the  most  highly  developed  and  most 
carefully  guarded  form  of  induction,  experi- 
ment, shows  the  same  dependence  upon  earlier 

24t2 


NATUEE  OF  INDUCTIVE  PROOF 

developed  laws  and  principles.  Experiments 
perhaps  more  completely  than  observations 
grow  out  of  suggestions  developed  in  advance. 
Experiment  is  a  form  of  proof.  As  with  all 
sorts  of  proof  experiments  are  made  only  when 
the  suggested  conclusion  is  in  some  way  in 
doubt  or  when  alternative  possibilities  present 
themselves.  Experiments  are  not  made  at  hap- 
hazard, but  one  usually  has  a  definite  expecta- 
tion of  the  result  that  is  to  be  obtained  or  of 
the  range  within  which  the  result  will  lie.  One 
not  only  has  a  definite  problem  in  mind  when 
the  experiment  is  begun  but  ordinarily  has  an 
idea  of  what  the  answer  is  to  be.  The  only  case 
in  which  the  results  are  unforeseen  is  in  ex- 
periments to  obtain  exact  measurements.  Even 
here  the  problem  controls  the  course  of  the 
experiment  and  the  values  are  assumed  to  lie 
within  certain  ranges.  It  is  true  of  course  that 
occasionally  an  experiment  will  give  an  unex- 
pected result,  or  that  the  experiment  will  give 
rise  to  problems  that  will  themselves  open  new 
fields  of  investigation.  Often,  too,  some  phase 
of  an  experiment  will  suggest  an  answer  to  a 
problem  that  has  long  been  before  the  mind. 
These  results  are  all  incidental  to  the  main  pur- 
pose of  the  experiment.     The  experimenter  has 

243 


THE  PSYCHOLOGY  OF  REASONING 

them  in  mind  only  in  so  far  as  he  is  aware  that 
the  best  results  of  investigation  are  often  un- 
foreseen. 

Experiment  is  like  observation  in  the  usual 
inductive  proof,  too,  in  that  what  one  sees  in 
the  experiment  will  depend  very  largely  upon 
the  problem  to  be  solved.  Frequently  the  same 
operation  contains  the  proof  of  several  hypoth- 
eses but  only  those  phases  of  the  experiment 
are  noticed  that  are  related  to  the  particular 
problem  in  mind.  Experiment  exhibits  the 
effects  of  earlier  experience  in  two  other  ways. 
It  must  supply  the  meanings  that  interpret  what 
is  immediately  seen  and  also  provide  the  means 
of  understanding  the  results.  The  former  is 
merely  another  expression  of  the  general  law  of 
perception,  the  effect  of  the  action  of  the  old 
in  enabling  one  to  understand  the  things  seen 
in  the  experiment.  In  an  experiment  one  ordi- 
narily understands  the  general  outcome  at  once, 
but  it  is  often  the  case  that  the  true  meaning 
of  the  parts  is  appreciated  only  gradually,  ordi- 
narily one  part  at  a  time.  When  each  part  is 
appreciated  it  is  referred  to  some  general  prin- 
ciple. It  is  only  as  the  parts  of  the  operation 
are  seen  to  embody  general  laws  that  the  ex- 
periment is  understood  in  its  entirety,  and  the 

2U 


NATURE  OF  INDUCTIVE  PROOF 

degree  in  which  it  is  understood  depends  upon 
how  far  it  is  possible  to  see  it  as  typical  of 
earlier  established  formulations  of  experience. 
Induction  by  observation  and  by  experiment 
are  essentially  alike  in  that  each  is  primarily  a 
process  of  proof,  not  of  inference.  In  the 
proof,  too,  each  is  in  three  respects  dependent 
upon  the  same  sort  of  general  propositions  as 
are  contained  in  the  premises  of  the  syllogism. 
The  course  of  the  observation  or  experiment  is 
guided  by  the  general  principle  already  sug- 
gested as  the  solution  of  the  problem.  The  in- 
terpretation of  what  is  seen  consists  in  referring 
the  materials  of  sense  to  meanings  and  general 
laws,  and  the  results  in  each  case  are  under- 
stood only  as  they  may  be  referred  to  these 
earlier  explicit  formulations.  While  emphasis 
has  been  put  throughout  on  the  part  that  gen- 
eral principles  and  earlier  experience  has 
played  in  inductive  proof,  it  is  of  course  hardly 
necessary  to  say  that  as  a  result  of  these  new 
observations  the  old  formulae  are  constantly 
changed.  The  old  is  constantly  interpreting 
the  new,  but  the  new,  on  the  other  hand,  is  also 
constantly  even  if  gradually  transforming  the 
old.  Otherwise  there  would  never  be  progress 
in  knowledge. 

245 


THE  PSYCHOLOGY  OF  REASONING 

The  difference  between  proof  by  induction  and 
by  deduction  is  by  no  means  so  great  as  it 
is  often  assumed.  The  traditional  difference 
makes  one  depend  upon  general  principles,  the 
other  upon  particular  observations  either  before 
or  after  the  proof  is  undertaken.  As  has  been 
shown  repeatedly  the  general  principles  are 
themselves  not  independent  of  particular  ex- 
periences, and  particular  experiences  prob- 
ably do  not  exist.  They  are  always  particular 
instances  of  general  principles,  types  or  laws. 
The  difference  between  the  two  sorts  of  proof 
is  that  in  the  one  we  have  the  conclusion  jus- 
tified by  experience  crystallized,  in  the  other  we 
have  justification  by  new  experiences  inter- 
preted by  the  old  or  embodied  in  the  old  at 
the  moment  of  perception.  Probably  inductive 
proof  is  the  more  valuable  because  it  adds  some 
new  experience  to  that  already  accumulated 
which  is  active  in  the  control  of  inference  and 
in  giving  informal  belief.  Both  forms  of  proof 
are  alike  in  that  they  consist  in  showing  that 
the  conclusion  harmonizes  with  experience:  in 
the  one  case  with  earlier  experience  formu- 
lated into  general  laws,  in  the  other  with  general 
laws  that  are  supported  and  confirmed  by  defi- 
nitely enumerated  observations  or  experiments. 

246 


NATUEE  OF  INDUCTIVE  PROOF 

Inductive  proof  not  merely  states  the  general 
principle  but  gives  some  of  the  concrete  expe- 
riences upon  which  it  depends.  These  serve 
to  confirm  if  not  to  modify  in  some  degree  the 
old  formula?.  It  brings  new  experience  as  well 
as  the  old  to  test  the  suggestion.  In  this  alone 
does  inductive  proof  differ  from  deductive. 

Since  induction  and  deduction  are  in  the  his- 
tory of  logic  treated  not  merely  as  different 
forms  of  proof  but  as  different  forms  of  reason- 
ing as  a  total  process,  it  may  be  desirable  to  ask 
again  whether  it  is  possible  at  all  to  distinguish 
differences  in  the  way  conclusions  are  derived 
as  well  as  differences  in  the  way  they  are  estab- 
lished. Eegarded  in  this  traditional  way  it  is 
easy  to  define  the  two  processes.  Deduction  is 
the  process  of  obtaining  new  truths  or  appli- 
cations from  general  principles.  Induction  is 
the  process  of  obtaining  general  truths  fom  par- 
ticular observations.  While  the  definitions 
make  them  sufficiently  distinct,  slight  considera- 
tion shows  that  they  have  many  points  in  com- 
mon. As  has  just  been  said,  all  perception 
results  in  the  appearance  of  a  general,  not  a  par- 
ticular. The  simplest  perception,  then,  really 
gives  rise  to  a  universal,  not  to  a  particular. 
If  this  statement  be  generalized  and  applied  to 

17  247 


THE  PSYCHOLOGY  OF  REASONING 

induction,  we  see  that  the  particular  never  ap- 
/  pears  in  consciousness  as  particular.  Even 
,  the  most  concrete  object  or  percept  when  it 
I  enters  consciousness  has  already  become  a  type, 
j  has  taken  on  meaning.  This  same  conclusion 
may  be  applied,  if  it  has  not  been  applied,  to 
dynamic  relations  as  well  as  to  any  other  rela- 
tion. One  no  more  sees  a  single  succession 
of  events  as  a  bare  succession  than  one  receives 
a  group  of  sensations  as  a  bare  group  of  sen- 
sations. This,  too,  at  its  first  apprehension  is 
referred  to  some  predeveloped  law.  The  rec- 
ognition of  the  fall  of  a  single  body  constitutes 
reference  to  a  general  law  just  as  truly  as  the 
recognition  of  the  movement  of  the  heavenly 
bodies  as  one  phase  of  the  attraction  of  body 
for  body  is  a  reference  to  a  general  law  of  a 
more  inclusive  sort.  The  difference  between 
the  two  recognitions  is  largely  if  not  altogether 
in  terms  of  the  amount  of  material  that  is  com- 
bined in  the  recognition.  The  perception  of  a 
falling  body  would  probably  be  called  induc- 
tion ;  the  formulation  of  the  law  of  gravitation 
as  a  principle  applicable  to  all  masses  every- 
where would  certainly  be  called  deduction. 

Before  the  first  induction  of  this  simplest  sort 
there  was  certainly  some  crude  type  of  refer- 

218 


NATURE  OF  INDUCTIVE  PEOOF 

ence.  The  body  would  not  be  recognized  as 
falling  unless  there  were  other  forms  of  motion 
that  were  already  known  from  which  it  might  be 
distinguished,  as  well  as  other  instances  of  fall- 
ing to  which  it  might  be  referred.  Perception 
would  come  only  when  early  experiences  had 
been  in  some  way  united  to  form  the  type.  The 
question  of  the  order  of  development  is  not  es- 
sential, but  it  is  important  and  may  be  repeated 
that  there  is  no  perception  of  object,  movement, 
or  relation  unless  there  be  connection  with  pre- 
formed type.  In  other  words,  as  we  were  com- 
pelled to  assert  earlier  that  there  is  no  concept, 
meaning  or  universal  that  does  not  develop 
through  experience,  so  we  may  say  that  there 
is  no  particular  experience  that  becomes  a  real 
experience,  except  through  the  help  of  a  pre- 
formed meaning,  of  an  earlier  developed  uni- 
versal. If  the  particular  is  essential  to  the 
development  of  the  universal,  the  universal  is 
equally  essential  to  the  existence  of  the  partic- 
ular. If  the  type  is  always  present  in  percep- 
tion, it  follows  that  induction  is  like  de- 
duction in  so  far  as  it  can  not  go  on  except  on 
the  basis  of  and  by  the  help  of  earlier  acquired 
experience.  The  two  are  alike  also  in  that  the 
earlier  acquired  experience  is  effective  not  in 

249 


THE  PSYCHOLOGY  OF  REASONING 

the  form  of  raw  material,  but  as  it  has  crystal- 
lized into  types  or  universals.  As  has  been 
shown  in  some  detail,  the  forces  that  direct  and 
control  the  construction  of  the  percept  are  prac- 
tically identical  with  the  forces  that  guide  the 
operation  of  constructive  reasoning.  The  ma- 
terials of  which  the  percept  is  formed  are 
identical  in  large  measure  with  the  materials  of 
abstract  thought,  and  the  resulting  meaning  is 
of  the  same  character  and  often  on  the  same 
level  of  generality.  Each  again  has  the 
same  measure  of  truth,  and  it  is  applied  in 
the  same  way. 

The  only  apparent  difference  between  them 
is  that  in  induction  one  starts  on  the  stimulus 
of  some  external  impression  and  proceeds  to 
the  universal,  while  in  deduction  one  proceeds 
from  the  interpretation  in  which  the  induction 
ends  and  proceeds  to  some  improvement  in  the 
thing  interpreted  on  the  basis  of  accumulated 
experience.  One  passes  from  particular  occa- 
sion to  a  general  truth,  the  other  makes  a  par- 
ticular application  of  the  earlier  developed 
universal.  One  begins  in  the  particular  and 
ends  in  the  general,  the  other  begins  with 
the  general  and  ends  in  a  particular  appli- 
cation.   In  fact,  the  similarity  is  even  closer 

250 


I^ATUEE  OF  INDUCTIVE  PROOF 

if  we  extend  the  time  over  which  the  operation 
is  considered,  since  there  is  no  case  of  deduc- 
tion that  does  not  arise  on  the  spur  of  practical 
need  and  have  reference  to  some  particular 
occasion  while,  on  the  other  hand,  there  is  no 
induction  that  does  not  have  as  its  end  ultimate 
application  in  some  practical  way  of  the  results 
attained.  With  this  extension  every  bit  of  rea- 
soning, inductive  or  deductive,  makes  the  com- 
plete circuit  from  particular  occasion  in  the 
stimulus  through  the  accumulated  experience 
that  is  embodied  in  the  universal  to  the  partic- 
ular application  in  the  improvement  of  actual 
conditions.  What  we  call  induction  and  deduc- 
tion are  but  arcs  of  the  one  circle,  and  it  is  by 
no  means  easy  to  distinguish  the  beginning  of 
one  from  the  end  of  the  other.  In  actual  prac- 
tice they  overlap  in  a  considerable  portion  of 
the  total  operation. 

One  can  not  have  knowledge  without  the 
accumulation  of  experience,  but  also  one  can 
not  have  experience  without  preliminary  knowl- 
edge developed  and  arranged  in  tyiDes.  The 
two  processes  are  reciprocal.  One  could  not 
exist  without  the  other.  It  is  even  difficult  to 
determine  in  our  adult  consciousness  which 
came  first  in  the  development  of  knowledge. 

251 


THE  PSYCHOLOGY  OF  REASONING 

It  would  seem  that  there  could  not  be  observa- 
tion before  there  were  types  into  which  the 
results  of  the  observation  might  be  taken  up 
and  by  which  they  might  be  given  form,  but  we 
also  can  not  conceive  of  the  development  of 
types  except  through  the  accumulation  of  ex- 
perience. It  is  probable  that  in  the  earlier 
stages  the  two  processes  went  on  together.  Be- 
fore there  were  types  or  universals  in  our  em- 
pirical sense,  there  was  no  articulate  knowledge 
even  on  the  level  of  perception..  Distinct  con- 
sciousness developed  out  of  the  original  chaos 
pari  passu  with  the  development  of  meanings 
and  concepts.  What  there  was  before  this  de- 
velopment of  articulate  consciousness,  one  can 
not  imagine.  It  was  probably  not  unlike  the 
moments  of  disorientation  of  the  earliest  awak- 
ening from  sleep  or  an  anaesthetic,  or  even  like 
the  consciousness  during  sleep.  But  on  the 
other  hand,  the  types  or  meanings  seem  depend- 
ent upon  consciousness,  and  develop  out  of  it. 
The  development  of  the  one  is  dependent  upon 
the  other  and  must  go  on  together  with  it.  The 
change  of  types  in  our  developed  consciousness 
is  probably  similar  to  the  changes  that  went  on 
in  the  early  stages.  Probably  the  first  types 
were  vague  and  general,  and  imparted  their 

252 


NATUKE  OF  INDUCTIVE  PKOOF 

uncertainty  to  consciousness.  As  more  and 
more  experience  was  acquired  they  became  more 
sharply  defined,  always  reflecting  the  kind  and 
amount  of  knowledge.  Fortunately  the  prob- 
lem of  the  development  of  types  does  not  con- 
cern us  directly.  It  was  only  raised  to  suggest 
that  while  there  is  no  consciousness  that  is  not 
consciousness  of  meaning  or  type,  the  meanings 
or  types  have  themselves  been  derived  and  are 
being  derived  through  experience. 

Induction  is  not,  as  it  has  been  sometimes 
pictured,  a  conscious  and  labored  attempt  to 
derive  general  principles  from  discrete  partic- 
ulars. If  it  were,  it  would  never  be  possible 
to  obtain  universals  or  even  general  statements. 
Deduction,  on  the  other  hand,  is  not  a  process 
by  which  one  truth  is  derived  from  universals 
already  established  without  reference  to  the  use 
to  which  it  may  be  put.  Any  reasoning  that 
is  of  the  least  practical  value  is  devoted  to  the 
solution  of  a  particular  problem  under  the  spur 
of  necessity,  and  in  the  solution  of  the  problem 
it  must  always  draw  upon  accumulated  experi- 
ences that  have  taken  on  the  typical  or  universal 
form.  Each  operation  is  part  of  a  larger  whole 
of  thought.  It  has  no  meaning  apart  from  that 
whole.     The  round  from  induction  to  deduction 

253 


THE  PSYCHOLOGY  OF  EEASONING 

is  never  ceasing.  One  can  in  practice  scarcely 
distinguish  them.  If  one  keeps  close  to  the 
actual  practice  it  is  almost  impossible  to  define 
induction  in  a  way  that  shall  not  describe  deduc- 
tion almost  as  well.  They  are  complementary 
parts  of  a  single  whole.  The  process  of  reason- 
ing as  we  have  sketched  it  is  not  what  the  older 
authorities  would  call  induction  nor  is  it  what 
they  would  have  called  deduction.  It  partakes 
in  part  of  the  nature  of  induction,  still  more 
perhaps  of  the  nature  of  deduction.  So  com- 
pletely do  the  two  processes  fuse  in  the  actual 
operations  of  reasoning,  that  it  is  difficult  to 
select  from  the  resultant  the  part  that  belonged 
originally  to  one  and  the  part  that  originally 
belonged  to  the  other. 


CHAPTER   IX 

IDEGKEES    OF    TRUTH.      MODALITY    AND    PROBABILITY 

It  must  be  remembered  that  conclusions  when 
i  established  are  not  regarded  as  equally  certain. 
\  It  matters  not  how  the  conclusion  may  be 
reached  or  how  it  has  been  proved,  one  finds  that 
all  are  not  equally  assured.  It  is  obviously  im- 
portant that  the  degrees  of  certainty  of  conclu- 
sions should  be  established,  that  they  should  be 
graded  with  reference  to  their  probability,  and 
if  possible  that  the  conditions  that  make  some 
seem  certain,  others  less  certain  should  be 
stated.  Two  general  groups  of  discussions  of 
the  degrees  of  truth  have  been  developed  in  the 
history  of  logic  and  of  science.  One  attempts 
to  grade  the  truth  of  conclusions  that  have  been 
warranted  deductively,  the  other  to  measure  the 
likelihood  of  conclusions  that  have  been  proved 
by  reference  to  specific  instances  in  observa- 
tion or  experiment.  The  one  can  grade  the  de- 
gree of  probability  only  roughly  and  in  conse- 
quence devotes  most  attention  to  making  clear 

255 


THE  PSYCHOLOGY  OF  REASONING 

the  limits  within  which  the  statement  will  hold 
or  the  circumstances  that  make  it  seem  prob- 
able. The  other  measures  the  probability  more 
closely  but  is  perhaps  less  successful  in  assign- 
ing the  grounds  that  give  truth.  The  one  is 
covered  by  the  term  modality  as  it  is  used  by 
the  formal  logician,  the  other  leads  to  the  math- 
ematical theory  of  probabilities.  Each  recog- 
nizes that  a  statement  is  likely  to  be  true  within 
limits  only,  and  that  if  true,  it  will  hold  not  of 
every  specific  instance  that  would  seem  to  fall 
under  it,  but  of  a  certain  proportion  only. 

The  logician  discusses  the  probability  of  his 
conclusion  under  the  head  of  modality.  The 
logician  usually  regards  it  as  the  modality  of 
the  judgment,  but,  as  we  have  seen,  what 
he  calls  the  judgment  is  practically  identical 
with  what  we  have  found  to  be  better  described 
as  the  inference  or  conclusion.  The  logical 
problem  of  the  modality  of  judgment  is  really 
the  problem  of  the  modality  of  the  conclusion, 
or  at  the  very  least  the  modality  of  the  con- 
clusion and  the  judgment.  By  modality  the 
logician  means  the  measure  of  truth,  or  the 
degree  of  certainty  that  is  ascribed  by  the 
thinker  to  the  conclusion  when  it  is  reached. 
Some  conclusions  are  apparently  regarded  as 

256 


f 


DEGREES  OF  TRUTH 

true  without  condition,  others  are  regarded  as 
true  under  assignable  conditions.  Of  this  last 
group,  the  conditions  are  sometimes  stated, 
sometimes  assumed  to  be  known  and  not  stated, 
sometimes  are  regarded  as  entirely  unknown. 
The  best  known  types  of  the  modal  judgment  are 
the  hypothetical,  in  which  it  is  asserted  that 
something  is  true  if  some  preliminary  condition 
is  complied  with;  the  disjunctive  in  which  two 
alternative  sets  of  conditions  are  stated  with 
the  results  that  would  follow  from  each  if  true ; 
and  finally  the  general  assertions  of  probability 
and  possibility,  where  no  conditions  are  explic- 
itly stated  and  no  measure  of  the  degree  of 
probability  can  be  given  except  in  terms  of  a 
mathematical  treatment  of  empirical  facts.  To 
these  might  be  added  necessity  which,  however, 
may  be  regarded  as  a  high  degree  of  probability 
and  in  any  event  offers  less  of  interest  psycho- 
logically than  the  others. 

Each  of  these  types  of  modal  judgment  may, 
I  think,  be  very  easily  brought  under  the  laws 
of  the  syllogism  and  its  psychological  condi- 
tions as  sketched  above.  It  has  been  insisted 
throughout  that  the  conclusion  reached  is  con- 
ditioned and  controlled  by  the  setting  in  which 
it  occurs  and  that  thi3  in  turn  is  dependent 

257 


THE  PSYCHOLOGY  OF  REASONING 

upon  and  is  an  outgrowth  of  the  more  remote 
experience  of  the  individual.  When  these  con- 
ditions become  self-conscious  and  are  expressly- 
formulated,  we  have  the  hypothetical  and  other 
modal  judgments.  When  one  appreciates  the 
fact  that  a  conclusion  depends  for  its  truth  upon 
the  truth  or  adequacy  of  the  mental  grouping 
or  setting  out  of  which  it  grows,  and  is  able  to 
state  at  least  a  few  of  the  elements  that  have 
led  to  the  conclusion,  one  has  the  hypothetical 
statement.  Of  course,  again,  every  conclusion 
depends  upon  other  related  experiences  for  its 
truth,  but  the  dependence  is  not  always  recog- 
nized. In  this  sense  one  may  agree  with  Brad- 
ley that  all  categorical  statements  are  really 
hypothetical.  We  are  not  at  the  moment  con- 
scious that  they  have  grown  out  of  a  particular 
mental  attitude,  of  a  single  group  of  experi- 
ences, but  a  little  examination  of  the  changes 
that  would  be  made  in  the  statement,  were  the 
attitude  or  the  wider  experience  to  change,  is 
sufficient  to  indicate  that  the  statement  depends 
for  its  truth  upon  the  truth  of  the  context.  It 
is  but  another  way  of  saying  that  a  proposition 
can  never  be  true  except  in  its  context,  be  the 
context  verbal  or  mental.  Ordinarily  the  truth 
of  the  context  is  taken  as  a  matter  of  course. 

258 


DEGREES  OF  TRUTH 

It  is  probably  only  when  there  is  reason  to 
doubt  the  truth  of  the  statement,  when  there 
is  conflict  between  two  sets  of  experiences  that 
are  recognized  as  related  to  the  conclusion, 
that  the  conditions  become  conscious.  In  this 
sense,  the  statement  of  the  hypothesis  is  closely 
related  to  the  statement  of  the  premises.  Both 
come  after  the  inference  has  been  completed 
and  both  come  only  when  there  is  some  doubt, 
when  there  is  something  to  disturb  the  assur- 
ance of  certainty  that  normally  attaches  to  the 
inference.  The  difference  appears  to  lie  in  the 
fact  that  in  the  ordinary  syllogism  doubt  is  dis- 
pelled on  examination;  it  is  possible  to  refer 
the  conclusion  to  general  principles  that  are 
self -consistent  and  consistent  with  the  entirety 
of  experience,  while  in  the  hypothetical  propo- 
sition, the  doubt  is  not  resolved  on  examination 
but  confirmed  and  the  most  that  can  be  done  is 
to  push  it  one  step  farther  back  to  a  doubt  con- 
cerning some  one  general  proposition.  Take  an 
engineering  problem  for  example.  One  asserts 
that  the  dams  on  the  Panama  Canal  will  be  suf- 
ficiently stable  provided  they  can  be  placed  upon 
a  firm  subsoil  or  bedrock.  The  subsoil,  the 
commission  tells  us,  will  be  stable  enough  pro- 
vided the  ground  water  can  be  kept  out  from 

259 


THE  PSYCHOLOGY  OF  REASOXIXG 

it,  and  the  ground  water  in  turn  can  be  kept 
away  provided  it  is  not  under  too  great  pres- 
sure and  there  is  a  waterproof  stratum  suffi- 
ciently near  the  surface.  On  the  final  suppo- 
sition one  might  or  might  not  be  in  a  position 
to  commit  one's  self.  Did  one  know  the  facts 
in  advance  as  would  ordinarily  be  the  case  be- 
fore the  hypothetical  judgment  is  formulated, 
the  bits  of  knowledge  that  constitute  the  hypoth- 
eses would  be  concerned  in  the  original  state- 
ment in  giving  to  it  its  degree  of  probability 
or  improbability.  There  would  under  these  cir- 
cumstances be  bits  of  knowledge  that  would 
make  for  each  of  the  two  possible  conclusions 
that  the  dams  would  stand,  and  that  they  would 
not.  In  the  resulting  proposition  there  would 
be  either  a  qualified  affirmative  or  a  qualified 
negative.  When  the  problem  is  analyzed  still 
farther,  the  opposing  sets  of  considerations 
come  to  explicit  consciousness  in  the  hypotheses 
and  the  doubt  is  pushed  back  and  centered  upon 
one  single  proposition,  and  that  is  neither 
affirmed  nor  denied.  What  is  meant  by  assert- 
ing that  all  general  categorical  statements  are 
hjq^othetical  is  only  that  all  assertions  depend 
upon  the  cooperation  of  similar  bits  of  knowl- 
edge and  that  one  must,  in  asserting  the  truth 

260 


DEGREES  OF  TRUTH 

of  any  proposition,  go  backward  in  a  never- 
ending  regressus  of  experiences  before  one  can 
assign  the  real  basis  for  acceptance  or  rejec- 
tion. Tacitly  at  least  each  statement  that  can 
be  made  depends  for  its  truth  upon  something 
else,  no  matter  how  far  one  cares  to  push  the 
investigation.  Since  one  must  stop  somewhere 
in  the  assignment  of  reasons,  the  last  step  may 
always  be  regarded  as  the  hypothesis  upon 
which  the  more  immediate  statements  rest.  We 
ordinarily  have  the  feeling  of  belief  that  comes 
with  absence  of  contradiction  among  our  experi- 
ences with  reference  to  any  point,  and  are  not 
inclined  to  raise  the  question  of  the  probability 
of  our  conclusion.  The  interdependence  of  our 
inferences  passes  unnoticed,  but  it  none  the  less 
exists  as  can  be  seen  by  the  examination  of  any 
simple  statement. 

The  disjunctive  judgment  or  inference  is 
closely  related  both  in  the  conditions  of  its 
origin  and  in  its  fundamental  basis  to  the  hypo- 
thetical judgment,  inference,  or  proposition. 
The  hypothetical  judgment  always  arises,  as 
was  said,  from  conflict  or  opposition  between 
different  elements  of  experience.  The  disjunc- 
tive judgment  arises  when  one  becomes  con- 
scious of  the  conflict  and  of  its  conditions.     The 

261 


THE  PSYCHOLOGY  OP  REASONING 

only  difference  is  that  the  disjunctive  form  of 
expression  is  assumed  when  the  opposition  is 
between  two  sets  of  elements  alone,  and  it  is 
certain  that  no  other  possibilities  can  present 
themselves.  The  possibility  of  limiting  the  op- 
posing suppositions  to  two  is  an  important 
positive  addition.  It  requires  fully  as  much 
certainty  about  the  nature  of  one's  knowledge 
to  assert  that  in  any  given  case  there  are  but 
two  points  of  view  from  which  a  subject  can  be 
viewed,  and  two  corresponding  conclusions  that 
can  be  drawn  from  the  given  set  of  facts,  as  to 
assert  any  positive  fact.  The  disjunctive  form 
of  statement  arises  with  reference  to  a  prac- 
tical situation  when  a  conclusion  is  reached  that 
is  accompanied  by  doubt.  Then  it  is  found  that 
there  are  two  general  formulations  of  expe- 
rience to  which  the  conclusion  can  be  referred, 
and  that  when  referred  to  one,  one  inference  is 
necessarily  drawn,  when  looked  at  in  the 
light  of  the  other,  another  inference  is 
made.  The  practical  advantage  of  the  dis- 
junction comes  from  the  fact  that  it  is  not  at 
all  infrequently  the  case  that  which  of  the  two 
inferences  be  correct  is  indifferent  to  our  action. 
If  the  given  situation  is  of  one  kind,  our  course 
of  action  will  satisfy  the  conditions  equally  as 

262 


DEGEEES  OF  TEUTH 

well  as  if  the  situation  proves  to  be  of  the  oppo- 
site kind.  Or  if  they  be  not  altogether  indif- 
ferent to  our  proposed  line  of  action,  we  may 
at  least  be  prepared  for  eventual  decision  in 
either  way.  Suppose  for  instance  a  physician 
is  presented  with  a  case  of  mental  alienation 
marked  by  definitely  developed  and  firmly  fixed 
delusions.  He  has  had  no  opportunity  to  study 
the  case  history  or  fully  to  trace  out  the  other 
symptoms  of  the  disease.  He  is,  however,  in 
position  to  state  with  definiteness  that  the 
patient  is  suffering  either  from  dementia 
praecox  or  from  paranoia.  (We  may  assume 
for  the  sake  of  argument  that  the  diagnosis 
has  been  sufficient  to  exclude  some  of  the  other 
forms  of  delusional  insanity.)  This  alterna- 
tive diagnosis  will  suffice  for  many  purposes. 
It  will  suffice  to  warrant  the  commission  of  the 
patient  to  an  asylum,  and  will  warrant  the 
physician  in  holding  out  little  hope  to  friends 
and  relatives  for  the  ultimate  recovery.  Fur- 
thermore it  will  be  possible  to  advise  a  subordi- 
nate or  a  layman  that  if  certain  new  symptoms 
develop  the  case  will  fall  under  one  of  these 
two  heads,  while  if  other  symptoms  develop  it 
will  fall  under  another  head.  In  either  case 
provision  can  be  made  in  advance  for  the  treat- 
is  2G3 


THE  PSYCHOLOGY  OF  REASONING 

ment  of  the  case  to  the  practical  advantage  of 
all  concerned. 

It  will  be  noticed  that  in  our  nomenclature 
what  is  affected  by  the  uncertainty  in  the  dis- 
junction is  the  judgment  proper,  the  apprecia- 
tion of  the  given,  while  the  hypothesis  affects 
the  inference.  If  our  observation  is  guided  by 
one  set  of  factors,  by  one  context,  one  interpre- 
tation will  be  made,  if  guided  by  another,  an- 
other interpretation  comes  into  being.  This 
interpretation  is  the  basis  for  the  inference  but 
it  is  not  the  inference  itself.  All  disjunctive 
judgments  then  limit  the  interpretations  that 
may  be  put  upon  a  presented  somewhat  or  are 
memories  of  such  limitations  of  possible  inter- 
pretations. From  the  disjunctive  judgment  one 
may  look  either  backward  or  forward ;  backward 
to  the  conditions  out  of  which  the  interpretations 
might  arise ;  forward  to  the  resulting  methods  of 
dealing  with  the  possible  interpretations.  Each 
of  the  two  interpretations  would  necessarily 
lead  to  at  least  one  conclusion.  The  hypothet- 
ical form  may  be  taken  by  the  judgment 
as  well  as  the  inference  in  the  true  sense,  but 
this  is  not  so  frequent.  One  might  say  of  an 
object  at  a  distance,  that  it  is  a  man  if  it  moves 
in  the  upright  position,  just  as  we  may  say  oi 

2Gi 


DEGREES  OF  TRUTH 

our  case  of  mental  disease,  that  it  is  more  likely 
to  be  paranoia  if  it  lias  remained  without  in- 
creased deterioration  for  a  term  of  years,  or 
if  the  group  of  accompanying  mental  processes 
is  of  one  kind,  the  case  will  be  called  paranoia, 
if  of  another,  dementia  praecox.  The  hypoth- 
esis more  usually  attaches  to  the  inference; 
the  disjunction  aifects  the  interpretation  of  the 
situation,  as  the  coming  to  consciousness  of  the 
context  into  which  the  object  to  be  interpreted 
must  be  taken  up.  The  hypothesis  on  the 
other  hand  arises  when  the  conditions  that  are 
controlling  the  inference  become  self-conscious. 
There  is  the  further  difference  that  the  disjunc- 
tion definitely  limits  the  number  of  possible 
ways  of  considering  or  interpreting  the  given, 
while  the  hypothesis  recognizes  but  one  of  the 
conditions  and  does  not  attempt  to  deny  that 
there  may  be  others  that  are  equally  to  be 
taken  into  consideration.  The  disjunction 
gives  an  important  piece  of  information  of  a 
positive  character,  the  hypothetical  but  recog- 
nizes the  uncertainty  of  the  judgment  and  one 
at  least  of  the  bases  of  the  uncertainty. 

The  more  general  attitude  toward  an  infer- 
ence or  a  judgment  that  it  is  probable  or  pos- 
sible, goes  back   to  the  same  psychological  con- 

265 


THE  PSYCHOLOGY  OF  REASONING 

ditions.  When  we  are  willing  to  assert  that  a 
result  is  probable  but  not  certain,  the  conclu- 
sion when  tested  by  experience  is  found  to 
harmonize  with  everything  that  is  explicitly 
present,  but  there  is  still  a  lurking  feeling  that 
it  might  not  harmonize  with  some  facts  that  are 
not  so  explicitly  present.  We  have  in  this  case 
no  recognition  of  the  attitudes  that  would  lead 
to  other  conclusions,  but  there  is  still  some 
remnant  of  the  doubt  consciousness  that  is  a 
sign  that  there  is  not  complete  harmony  with 
all  experience.  There  is  not  quite  complete  be- 
lief. When  a  statement  is  asserted  to  be  pos- 
sible, the  doubt  feeling  is  stronger  and 
approaches  a  reservation  of  judgment.  Possi- 
bility and  probability  then  are  merely  expres- 
sions of  the  doubt  consciousness.  The  doubt 
feeling  is  present  but  there  is  no  definite  ap- 
preciation of  the  conditions  that  give  rise  to  it, 
there  is  no  recognition  of  the  particular  parts 
of  consciousness  with  which  it  will  and  will  not 
harmonize  as  in  the  hypothetical  and  disjunc- 
tive judgments. 

The  assertion  of  necessity  or  certainty 
would  be  on  its  face  the  expression  of  the  per- 
fect harmony  with  the  entirety  of  experience. 
It  is  probable,  however,  that  in  practice  the 

266 


results  that  are  asserted  to  be  absolutely  certain 
are  really  in  greater  doubt  than  those  that  are 
made  and  never  questioned.  As  we  have  seen 
so  frequently  it  is  only  when  there  is  a  pre- 
liminary doubt  that  a  conclusion  is  ever  ques- 
tioned, and  at  most  to  assert  that  a  conclusion 
is  necessary  means  that  the  preliminary  doubt 
has  been  dispelled  upon  examination.  Even 
then  man  is  prone  to  assert  belief  most  pos- 
itively when  least  certain,  that  there  may  be 
no  sign  in  speech  of  the  wavering  in  the 
speaker's  own  mind.  Barring  this  evidence  of 
human  frailty  which  is  rather  a  matter  for 
psychology  or  for  ethics  than  for  logic,  we 
might  arrange  the  inferences  and  judgments  in 
the  order  of  their  harmony  with  the  experience 
of  the  individual,  and  in  order  of  their  truth 
for  him  in  the  series,  (1)  those  that  are  unques- 
tioned, (2)  the  necessary,  (3)  the  probable,  (4) 
the  possible,  and  (5)  the  rejected.  The  hypo- 
thetical would  fall  under  the  head  of  the  proba- 
ble or  possible  in  which  the  particular  conditions 
of  doubt  or  belief  had  become  self-conscious,  in 
which  one  had  become  aware  of  the  particular 
phases  of  experience  with  which  they  were  or 
were  not  in  harmony.  All  phases  of  modality 
are  an  expression  of  the  fact  that  every  inter- 

267 


THE  PSYCHOLOGY  OF  REASONING 

pretation  and  every  inference  is  tested  by  the 
background  of  knowledge,  and  that  acceptance 
or  rejection,  partial  acceptance  or  partial  re- 
jection depends  upon  the  completeness  of  har- 
mony with  the  accumulated  experiences. 

When  after  the  knowledge  of  the  individual 
has  passed  upon  the  conclusion  and  it  is  still 
found  that  there  is  a  disjunction,  when  it  is  ap- 
preciated that  in  the  present  state  of  knowledge 
there  are  certain  factors  that  make  for  one 
conclusion  and  certain  factors  that  make  for 
another,  the  problem  is  put  to  the  test  of  experi- 
ment. Even  then  it  is  not  at  all  unlikely  that 
the  results  will  fall  out  now  in  one  way  and 
again  in  another.  This  is  the  usual  result  in 
matters  that  are  at  all  complicated.  But  the 
discussion  takes  us  over  to  the  probability  of  an 
inductive  proof. 

It  remains  but  to  insist  that  the  probability 
of  the  judgment  or  of  the  conclusion  is  one  of 
the  results  that  may  come  from  the  process  of 
bringing  the  conclusion  to  the  bar  of  experience 
after  the  operation  of  interpreting  or  of  infer- 
ring has  been  completed.  When  one  turns  to 
examine  the  product  of  the  mental  operation, 
it  may  be  found  to  fit  in  under  some  law  already 
accepted,  it  may  be  found  that  it  not  only  has  nc 

268 


DEGREES  OF  TRUTH 

resting  place  in  the  completed  system,  but  that 
there  are  certain  parts  of  knowledge  with  which 
it  will  not  harmonize,  while  there  are  others 
that  seem  to  demand  it.  In  the  one  case,  the 
conclusion  is  proved  as  in  the  syllogism;  in  the 
other  we  can  do  no  more  than  assert  doubt  m 
varying  degrees  by  the  word  probably  or  pos- 
sibly or  can  perhaps  show  that  the  doubt  rests 
upon  a  particular  conflict,  a  conflict  between  two 
definitely  formulable  phases  or  aspects  of 
knowledge.  In  either  case  truth  or  uncertamty 
depends  not  upon  the  particular  process  before 
the  bar  but  upon  its  relation  to  the  organized 
whole  of  knowledge. 

When  a  conclusion  is  put  to  the  test  m  ex- 
periment or  by  observation  it  frequently,  in  fact 
usually,  happens  that  it  will  be  confirmed  by 
some  trials  and  not  by  others.    Then  the  ques- 
tion presents  itself:  is  it  possible  that  the  state- 
ment is  true  nevertheless  and,  if  it  is  possibly 
true,  what  is  the  degree  of  probability?     ihat 
the  conclusion  may  still  be  accepted  in  the  face 
of  certain  negative  instances  is  believed  because 
a  real  connection  between  two  events  may  be 
obscured  in  one  of  two  ways:  by  errors  of 
observation   and  by  the   action   of   irrelevant 
forces  which  can  not  be  excluded  or  detected 

269 


THE  PSYCHOLOGY  OF  REASONING 

when  present.  The  former  will  affect  any  ob- 
servation whatever,  but  will  be  important  only 
in  disturbing  measurements, —  usually  the  pres- 
ence or  absence  of  a  cause  is  not  easily  con- 
cealed. Irrelevant  circumstances  are  likely  to 
obscure  the  presence  of  the  real  cause.  The 
former  is  less  interesting  for  our  purposes. 
Suffice  it  to  say  that  the  greater  the  similarity 
between  different  measurements  the  more  ac- 
curate the  result.  The  mathematical  treatment 
and  measurement  of  probability  in  this  use 
would  take  us  too  far. 

Where  on  the  other  hand  one  is  seeking  to 
determine  whether  a  connection  that  is  observed 
or  that  has  been  suggested  is  really  causal  there 
is  more  evidence  of  the  nature  of  the  thinking 
process  and  of  the  factors  that  give  probability. 
The  assumption  upon  which  the  calculus  of 
probabilities  depends  is  that  in  a  mass  of  in- 
fluences that  are  governed  by  no  law  one  is 
as  likely  to  occur  as  another,  and  similarly  that 
when  the  causes  are  unknown  one  effect  is  as 
likely  to  make  its  appearance  as  any  other. 
When  a  cause  and  a  particular  effect  appear 
together  more  frequently  than  they  should  on 
this  assumption  it  is  believed  that  the  connec- 
tion is  one  of  cause  not  of  chance  coincidence. 

270 


DEGEEES  OF  TEUTH 

The  more  frequent  their  joint  appearance  the 
greater  is  the  probability  that  the  connection  is 
causal,  not  chance.  We  need  not  here  go  into 
the  more  detailed  mathematical  computations  or 
even  consider  MilPs  canons.  It  is  rather  our 
problem  to  show  the  similarities  between  prob- 
ability in  inductive  and  deductive  proofs  from 
more  general  considerations.  For,  while  fre- 
quency of  connection  is  the  explicit  ground  for 
assuming  that  a  connection  is  real,  one  may 
easily  trace  the  influence  of  older  experiences 
and  of  meanings.  Usually  one  suspects  a 
causal  relation  before  the  coincidences  have 
been  observed.  Even  when  a  causal  relation 
is  suggested  by  the  coincidences  a  large  part  of 
the  probability  is  derived  from  the  agreement 
of  the  connection  with  large  masses  of  expe- 
rience. Unless  the  relation  seems  important  or 
the  cause  appears  to  be  really  adequate  to  the 
effect  on  other  grounds,  even  frequent  coinci- 
dences will  not  suffice  to  make  the  relation 
seem  to  be  one  of  cause  and  effect.  For  in- 
stance, I  have  frequently  been  struck  with  an 
uneven  distribution  of  the  initials  of  my 
students  over  the  alphabet.  One  year  there 
will  be  an  undue  proportion  from  first  letters, 
the  next  the  latter  half  of  the  alphabet  will 

271 


THE  PSYCHOLOGY  OF  KEASONING 

predominate.  I  have  never  worked  out  the 
relation,  but  were  the  calculation  to  confirm  the 
conjecture,  one  would  certainly  not  regard  it  as 
evidence  of  the  working  of  obscure  causes. 
Rather  one  would  still  insist  that  it  was  a 
peculiar  chance,  working  even  through  a  large 
number  of  instances.  It  is  only  when  such  a 
relation  can  be  seen  to  have  connections  with 
other  laws  and  other  parts  of  the  system,  when 
it  seems  reasonable,  that  a  number  of  coinci- 
dences will  be  accepted  as  proving  a  causal 
relation. 

Cause  itself  is  on  the  same  level  as  the  mean- 
ings we  have  been  discussing.  It  is  a  crystal- 
lization of  numerous  experiences  into  a  general 
principle  that  now  serves  to  give  order  to  ex- 
perience. It  is  easier  to  trace  the  course  of 
precipitation  of  the  causal  principle  from  the 
original  chaos  than  it  was  to  understand  the 
development  of  many  other  meanings.  The 
center  is  apparently  the  feeling  of  human  effort, 
the  mass  of  feelings  that  appear  when  we  are  . , 
accomplishing  something  in  the  world  as  com-jj 
pared  with  the  passivity  that  marks  our  atti- 
tude toward  events  that  merely  happen.  This 
original  personification  has  been  much  modified 
by  the  numerous  instances  of  purely  mechanical 

272 


DEGREES  OF  TRUTH 

i  relation  that  have  been  classed  with  it.  Even 
now,  however,  we  sympathize  with  a  cause  that 
seems  not  quite  adequate  much  as  we  would  with 
a  person.  We  find  our  muscles  tense  as  we 
watch  an  automobile  that  is  barely  able  to  reach 
the  top  of  a  hill,  or  even  when  an  induction  cur- 
rent is  not  quite  strong  enough  to  induce  a 
muscle  to  contract  in  a  physiological  experi- 
ment. Whatever  may  have  been  the  origin  of 
the  relation,  it  has  developed  in  the  course  of 
time  to  become  a  systematized  relation  on  the 
same  level  as  a  meaning.  As  such  it  serves  to 
give  definiteness  to  the  experiences  that  are  re- 
ferred to  it.  On  the  other  hand  the  nature  of 
the  relation  that  is  assigned  to  successive  events 
is  dependent  upon  the  wider  ramifications  of 
the  experience,  not  alone  upon  the  frequency  of 
the  connection  or  the  nature  of  the  objects  con- 
nected. 

If  one  is  observing  particular  relations  the 
probability  that  a  connection  will  be  regarded 
as  causal  will  depend  then  upon  reference  to 
the  causal  relation  and  upon  the  degree  with 
which  the  assumption  that  it  is  causal  har- 
monizes with  related  experiences.  One  might 
add  that  even  the  mathematical  deter- 
minations   of    probability    from    coincidences 

273 


i. 


THE  PSYCHOLOGY  OF  EEASONIN 

is  itself  to  be  justified  by  certain  assumptions 
that  were  established  on  general  considerations, 
and  have  been  justified  only  by  the  completeness 
with  which  they  agree  with  observed  facts. 
Gauss's  formula  for  the  distribution  of  observa- 
tions was  certainly  not  established  by  mere 
observation,  and  no  more  was  the  assumption 
that  where  conditions  are  unknown  one  effect  is 
as  likely  to  predominate  as  another.  The  work- 
ing assumptions  of  all  computations  of  prob- 
ability is  in  terms  of  meanings,  the  relation  that 
we  call  causal  is  a  meaning,  and  each  is  depend- 
ent for  its  particular  application  not  alone  upon 
observations  of  the  moment  but  upon  the  degree 
to  which  the  observation  may  be  interpreted  by 
definitely  formulated  earlier  experience,  and  by 
the  degree  to  which  the  interpretation  when 
applied  will  harmonize  with  related  experiences. 
The  probability  that  a  causal  relation  will  be 
ascribed  to  successive  events  will  depend  first, 
upon  the  number  of  coincidences  and  second, 
upon  the  degree  to  which  the  suggestion  har- 
monizes with  related  experiences.  Ordinarily 
the  two  work  in  harmony.  If  the  number  of 
coincidences  is  large  one  turns  at  once  to  dis- 
cover some  earlier  accepted  principle  that  may 
be  connected  with  them.    If  that  is  not  found 

274 


DEGREES  OF  TRUTH 


one  would  suspect  fraud,  would  assume  some 
mysterious  force,  or  would  put  the  obseryatK.n 
aside  as  mere  chance  result  or  as  inexplicable 
On  the  other  hand,  could  one  find  no  empirical 
evidence  to  support  a  relation  that  seemed  prob- 
able on  general  grounds  one  would  either  dis- 
trust the  observation,  assume  that  the  cause  was 
Itoo  slight  to  be  observed  or  assume  that  some 
xnistake    had    been    made    in    the    conchision^ 
Neither  inductive  nor  deductive  proof  will  give 
any  high  degree  of  probability  unless  confirmed 
by  the  other.    The  probability  assigned  to  any 
conclusion  that  may  be  given  application  will 
depend  in  part  upon  observed  coincidences,  in 
part  upon  its  relation  to  other  experiences. 


CHAPTER  X 

CONCLUSION 

One  general  principle  that  has  been  empha- 
sized in  connection  with  each  separate  problem 
may  still  require  more  explicit  discussion.  This 
is  the  statement  of  the  nature  and  action  of 
meanings  or  types,  or  the  system  of  knowledge. 
It  has  been  stated  just  now  and,  on  occasion 
throughout,  that  the  beginning  as  well  as  the 
end  of  all  reasoning  has  been  the  establish- 
ment of  a  system  of  things  and  of  explanations 
that  corresponds  on  the  empirical  level  to  the 
world  of  universals  of  Bradley  and  Bosanquet. 
This  is  a  statement  that  is  manifestly  dangerous 
as  may  well  be  seen  from  the  abuse  of  the  idea 
in  many  systems  of  philosophy.  I  desire  by 
way  of  final  statement  to  limit  the  principle  of 
explanation  that  it  shall  not  seem  to  mean  either 
too  little  or  too  much.  In  the  first  place  I  de- 
sire to  insist  that  it  is  intended  that  no  mystery 
or  miracle  shall  be  concealed  in  the  term,  al- 
though  there   is   very  much   ignorance   about 

276 


CONCLUSION 

many  of  the  applications.  If  possible  my  aim 
in  this  final  summary  is  to  draw  a  line  care- 
fully that  shall  delimit  both  our  ignorance  and 
our  knowledge  of  the  principle  that  has  been 
made  so  much  of. 

In  the  first  place  my  intention  has  been  to 
introduce  into  the  system  nothing  that  can  not 
be  discovered  in  the  concrete  consciousness,  and 
to  insist  that  the  system  has  been  developed  in 
consciousness,  or  at  least  through  experience. 
On  the  other  hand  it  must  be  insisted  that  the 
system  is  not  a  mere  accumulation  of  experi- 
ences and  its  elements  are  not  particular  expe- 
riences. If  one  asks  on  the  common  level  of 
observation  what  is  meant  by  this  system,  we 
must  answer  that  it  is  the  world  of  things  as  it 
is  thought  of  in  our  every  day  life.  On  a  some- 
what higher  level  it  is  the  world  of  the  scientist, 
so  far  as  it  is  represented  in  the  mind  of  the 
individual.  "We  may  affirm  in  the  light  of  our 
earlier  discussion  that  our  mental  states  are 
primarily  the  world  as  we  think  it  and  as  we 
see  it.  There  is  no  evidence  of  a  world  of  dis- 
crete sensation  apart  from  this  unitary  and  in- 
terpreted world  of  things.  We  do  not  have  as 
we  think  or  perceive  a  mass  of  discrete  sensa- 
tions, or  of  other  distinct  elements.    What  we 

277 


THE  PSYCHOLOGY  OP  REASONING 

do  have  in  mind  on  the  contrary  is  an  articu- 
late system  that  comes  at  once  and  monopo- 
lizes consciousness  from  the  moment  that  there 
is  consciousness. 

If  we  turn  from  vague  general  statement  to 
the  question  of  origin  and  development,  it  may 
be  possible  to  make  a  little  clearer  the  nature  of 
the  process,  as  well  as  its  origin.  That  an 
atom  or  an  idea  of  cause  could  anywhere  be 
seen  or  otherwise  make  its  appearance  as  a 
single  event  in  perception  is  incredible.  All 
attempts  to  explain  the  development  of  any  of 
the  real  units  or  relations  in  that  way  have 
proved  to  be  failures.  One  never  sees  an  atom, 
one  never  sees  an  ether  vibration,  one  has  direct 
and  immediate  consciousness  of  none  of  the 
fundamentals  of  reality  or  of  science.  In  an 
earlier  discussion  we  saw  that  the  simplest 
object  did  not  make  its  entrance  into  conscious- 
ness as  it  is  found  to  exist  in  consciousness. 
Even  the  desk  in  front  of  you  has  never  given 
rise  to  a  retinal  image  that  is  like  your  memory 
or  your  percept.  We  saw  that  the  simple  object 
had  developed  from  experience  by  a  process  of 
trial  and  error  that  resulted  in  making  a  mental 
picture  that  was  like  no  single  impression  that 
had  ever  fallen  upon  the  retina.     One  chooses 

278 


CONCLUSION 

from  the  images  and  from  thought  modifica- 
tions of  the  images  that  which  best  fits  into 
'experience,  which  satisfies  the  largest  number 
of  practical  tests.  It  is  the  one  that  will  work 
under  the  more  important  conditions.  It  is, 
therefore,  accepted  as  real. 

Consideration  of  the  development  of  any  idea 
seems  to  afford  evidence  that  it  too  has  devel- 
oped in  very  much  the  same  way,  at  least  by  the 
same  general  laws.  The  development  of  the 
more  general  ideas  of  the  science  gives  evidence 
of  a  similar  principle  on  a  large  scale.  Sugges- 
tion after  suggestion  is  made  and  that  one  is  ac- 
cepted that  best  explains  the  knowledge  of  the 
period  in  the  field  in  which  it  is  offered. 
These  suggestions  are  by  no  means  independent 
of  actual  experience  as  to  their  nature,  but  it  is 
equally  certain  that  they  are  very  often  not 
directly  given  in  experience.  How  they  stand 
to  the  concrete  experience  is  difficult  to  assert. 
It  can  be  said  only  that  the  explanations  are 
not  indifferent  to  experience.  The  degree  of 
similarity  to  particular  experiences  varies  in 
different  cases  from  near  zero  to  approximate 
identity.  The  process  of  developing  the  ex- 
planations has  been  enormously  slow.  The 
process  by  which  the  system  has  crystallized  out 
19  279 


THE  PSYCHOLOGY  OF  EEASONING 

of  discrete  experiences  has  been  long  drawn  out, 
but  it  has  been  gradually  approximating  its  end. 
More  important  than  the  origin  of  the  sugges- 
tion is  the  question  of  what  makes  the  selection, 
of  what  it  is  that  decides  which  one  is  fit  and 
shall  survive,  which  unfit  and  is  to  be  rejected. 
This  decision  is,  as  was  seen  in  the  case  of  the 
syllogism,  entirely  in  terms  of  the  accumulated 
experience.  Any  suggestion  that  will  har- 
monize with  that  experience  and  unify  it  will  be 
accepted  and  each  explanation  will  be  rejected 
whenever  new  facts  develop  that  can  not  be 
taken  up  into  it.  More  truly  perhaps  it  might 
be  said  that  an  old  theory  will  be  rejected  when 
a  new  theory  is  suggested  that  is  better  suited 
to  the  facts,  for  occasionally  a  theory  that  is  no 
longer  adequate  will  persist  by  inertia  until 
some  better  one  appears.  This,  for  example,  is 
the  present  status  of  the  physiological  color 
theories,  and  I  have  no  doubt  other  theories  in 
many  different  sciences  could  be  found  to  illus- 
trate the  fact.  However  theories  may  be  sug- 
gested, then,  they  are  tested  by  the  degree  to 
which  they  serve  to  harmonize  the  accumulated 
experiences. 

What  I  have  been  arguing  for  is  that  the  in- 
dividual consciousness  contains  a  system  or 

280 


CONCLUSION 

systems  that  are  on  exactly  the  same  general 
plane  as  this  system  of  knowledge  as  it  is 
formulated  in  the  sciences.  This  system 
springs  up  in  the  individual  mind  in  a  way  that 
is  fully  as  difficult  to  trace  as  the  development 
of  the  scientific  conception  of  the  world.  For 
the  most  part,  the  origin  is  apparently  by  the 
method  of  trial  and  error.  The  Suggestions 
have  their  material  furnished  by  the  senses  and 
experience  in  general,  but  are  always  modified 
from  the  contributions  of  sense.  The  test  of  the 
system  again  is  that  it  harmonizes  the  expe- 
rience of  the  individual,  and  that  it  will  work 
when  put  to  the  test.  That  it  is  closely  re- 
lated to  experience  in  origin  and  in  the  way  it  is 
tested  is  shown  by  the  closeness  of  its  relation 
to  the  amount  and  character  of  the  experience 
of  the  individual.  In  the  child,  in  the  man  of 
early  historic  times,  in  the  savage  and  the 
ignorant  of  to-day,  it  will  be  poorly  developed; 
in  the  man  of  science  of  the  present  it  will  be 
well  developed  along  certain  lines,  no  matter 
how  poor  its  development  in  other  relations. 
Wherever  it  is  found,  it  will  be  adequate  to  the 
experience  of  the  individual.  When  developed, 
it  is  what  the  individual  calls  his  real  world. 
This  world  or  individual  system  of  knowledge 

281 


THE  PSYCHOLOGY  OF  REASONING 

includes  not  merely  concrete  things  and  single 
relations  but  also  typical  forms  of  relation  that 
are  recognized  as  the  more  permanent  causes 
and  the  innumerable  general  principles  and 
laws.  The  substantive  resting  places  in  the 
entire  connected  system  constitute  our  types, 
meanings  or  concepts  and  are  the  things  of  the 
popular  mind;  the  ordered  relations  are  space 
and  time  on  the  more  passive  side,  cause  and 
effect,  reciprocity  etc.,  as  more  active  rela- 
tions. 

When  we  ask  how  this  system  is  thought,  one 
must  be  careful  not  to  be  misled  by  the  details  of 
structure.  The  system  is  the  essence  of  the 
consciousness  of  every  individual,  but  it  can  not 
be  easily  described  in  terms  of  discrete  ele- 
ments. To  understand  how  it  is  conscious,  one 
must  pay  more  attention  to  the  relations  and 
connections  than  to  the  elements.  While  the 
system  in  its  entirety  can  not  be  conscious  at 
once,  it  is  always  present  as  a  background  of 
consciousness,  and  all  experience  is  in  terms  of 
some  part  of  it.  The  system  is  effective  more 
as  a  possibility  of  reinstatement  than  in  what  is 
actually  presented.  When  one  part  is  pre- 
sented there  is  felt  the  possibility  of  the  rein- 
statement   of    all    that    remains.     This    felt 

282 


CONCLUSION 

potentiality  of  reinstatement  constitutes  the 
awareness  of  the  system  or  of  the  part  that  is 
open  to  return  at  the  time.  It  is  as  when  one 
cites  a  familiar  proposition  in  geometry,  or  in 
the  construction  of  a  piece  of  apparatus  comes 
to  a  part  that  has  been  used  frequently  before. 
As  soon  as  the  proposition  is  cited,  it  is  ac- 
cepted as  established,  and  thought  goes  on  to 
something  else  with  perfect  confidence.  The  ac- 
cepted potentiality  of  recall  has  all  the  efficacy 
for  proof  and  for  use  that  detailed  recall  would 
have.  Any  consciousness  of  the  system  seems 
to  be  nothing  more  than  this  accepted  capacity 
for  reinstatement.  In  fact,  any  bit  of  expe- 
rience is  nothing  more  than  the  consciousness 
that  accompanies  the  point  of  intersection  of 
open  paths  of  association.  Consciousness  is  not 
of  the  element  itself  but  always  of  the  element 
plus  many  of  its  connections, —  how  many  de- 
pends upon  circumstances.  Consciousness  is  of 
the  whole  with  emphasis  upon  the  part,  never 
of  the  part  alone.  Granted  the  awareness  of 
the  open  paths  of  connection,  it  seems  to  make 
very  little  difference  what  the  actual  imagery 
may  be.  Some  think  in  terms  of  vision  and  see 
things  with  perceptual-like  fidelity,  others  have 
but  vague  imagery  or  use  some  other  sense  for 

283 


THE  PSYCHOLOGY  OF  EExVSONING 

the  recall  of  objects,  while  still  others  seem  to 
have  practically  no  imagery  of  any  kind.  Yet 
all  think  the  same  thing  and  with  indistinguish- 
able degrees  of  effectiveness.  This  indiffer- 
ence of  the  image  seems  to  find  its  explanation 
in  the  fact  that  what  each  man  thinks  has  the 
same  group  connections.  With  the  same  con- 
nections the  same  end  is  attained,  no  matter 
what  the  kernel  may  be  about  which  they  center 
and  from  which  they  irradiate.  The  conscious- 
ness of  the  system  seems  to  depend  very  largely 
upon  the  connections  that  are  established  be- 
tween part  and  part,  connections  that  are  re- 
flected in  consciousness  over  wide  areas  even  if 
the  particular  mental  state  seems  to  be  of  lim- 
ited extent. 

Granted  the  existence  of  this  system  of  knowl- 
edge, all  thinking  is  in  terms  of  it.  Thinking 
grows  out  of  it  on  the  one  hand  and  on 
the  other  serves  still  farther  to  develop 
it.  At  any  given  moment  it  is  the  start- 
ing point  of  thinking  and  controls  thought, 
and  at  the  same  time  each  end  attained 
by  thought  serves  to  develop  and  enlarge  the 
system.  Each  of  the  reasoning  processes  illus- 
trates one  phase  or  the  other  of  this  operation 
of  elaborating  experience  in  terms  of  the  sys- 

284 


COXCLUSIOX 

tern,  or  of  elaborating  the  system  in  terms  of 
experience.  Judgment  we  have  seen  to  be  de- 
finable as  the  process  of  taking  the  presented 
something  up  into  the  system.  Thereby  the 
presented  is  interpreted  and  prepared  for 
understanding.  In  the  process  of  inference, 
the  situation  that  has  been  interpreted  is  modi- 
fied in  thought  or  in  practice  better  to  satisfy 
the  needs  of  the  moment.  To  put  the  matter 
more  concretely,  judgment  may  be  said  to  con- 
sist in  the  appreciation  of  a  difficulty ;  inference, 
in  the  process  of  removing  the  difficulty.  Be- 
fore judgment  there  is  only  vague  bafflement; 
with  judgment  the  source  of  the  difficulty  is  ap- 
preciated, and  this  recognition  prepares  for  the 
remedy  that  is  sought  and  found  in  the  infer- 
ence. When  it  has  been  found,  it  will  ordinarily 
in  some  degree  modify  the  system. 

The  system  also  serves  in  various  ways  to 
control  the  operation  of  interpreting  and  im- 
proving. Even  for  the  needs  that  impel  to 
interpret  and  to  improve  we  must  look  beyond 
the  momentary  consciousness.  The  need  is 
ordinarily  not  to  remove  an  instinctively  dis- 
agreeable effect.  The  need  arises  from  the 
wider  purpose  of  the  individual,  and  this  pur- 
pose is  itself  something  that  arises  because  of  a 

285 


THE  PSYCHOLOGY  OF  REASONING 

felt  gap  in  an  ideal  system.  One  has  ideals, 
and  ideals  are  not  realized  in  the  immediately 
presented.  The  disparities  between  the  ideals 
and  the  appreciated  situation  creates  a  need, 
just  as  the  realization  of  an  ideal  creates  a  pur- 
pose that  will  extend  over  a  longer  or  shorter 
time.  During  the  dominance  of  the  purpose, 
interpretations  and  inferences  are  devoted  to 
the  attainment  of  the  end,  be  the  end  actual  or 
only  the  solution  of  a  problem  in  thought.  On 
the  one  side  the  mental  life  might  be  re- 
garded as  the  appearance,  one  after  the 
other,  of  different  members  of  the  hierarchy  of 
purposes.  On  the  other  hand  the  appreciated 
situation  is  constantly  calling  into  being  new 
factors  that  serve  to  develop  and  to  check  pur- 
poses. From  this  point  of  view,  the  movement 
of  thought  might  be  regarded  as  an  interaction 
of  purposes  and  environment,  each  of  which  in 
some  measure  modifies  the  other.  At  least  no 
interpretation  and  no  improvement  can  be  con- 
sidered as  a  discrete  event.  It  has  its  meaning 
in,  and  its  appearance  and  development  is  con- 
trolled by,  wider  mental  and  physical  contexts. 
These  serve  to  determine  the  nature  of  the  ap- 
preciation and  to  give  the  desire  that  leads  to 
the  particular  improvements.    In  this  way  the 

286 


CONCLUSION 

progress  of  thought  is  one  continuous  operation. 
No  part  can  be  understood  unless  it  is  con- 
sidered with  the  whole.  The  occasion  for  the 
interpretation  is  found  in  the  purpose  that  is 
controlling  consciousness  at  the  time;  the  way 
the  interpreted  or  appreciated  presentation  is 
improved  depends  upon  the  universe  of  thought 
in  which  the  separate  process  arises.  The 
system  of  purposes  is  as  definitely  organized 
as  the  system  of  knowledge.  It  is  the  outcome 
of  the  same  experience  that  gave  rise  to  the 
system  of  knowledge.  Other  factors  are  em- 
phasized in  it  that  are  not  so  definitely  empha- 
sized in  the  development  of  the  system  of  knowl- 
edge, such  for  example  as  the  instincts,  and  the 
impulses  to  avoid  instinctively  disagreeable 
situations.  The  large  mass  of  experience,  how- 
ever, would  be  identical  in  each;  the  organiza- 
tion alone  is  different.  Of  both  the  system  of 
knowledge  and  the  system  of  purposes  we  may 
say  that  they  can  be  understood  only  as  wholes 
and  that  any  attempt  to  consider  a  fragment  of 
either  must  inevitably  lead  to  failure,  to  an  in- 
adequate explanation  even  of  that  part. 

Very  much  the  same  remarks  may  be  passed 
upon  the  tests  of  truth  as  upon  the  materials 
of  which  reasoning  makes  use,  and  the  incen- 

287 


THE  PSYCHOLOGY  OF  EEASONING 

tives  to  progress.  As  has  been  said  repeatedly, 
what  may  be  accepted  as  true  depends  upon  the 
same  organized  mass  of  experiences,  but  it  is 
active  here  as  a  magistrate  in  passing  upon  the 
interpretations  and  the  conclusions  that  suggest 
themselves.  Harmony  with  the  mass  gives  be- 
lief, conflict  gives  doubt  or  immediate  rejection. 
As  in  science  and  in  the  development  of  mean- 
ings in  the  individual,  the  suggestion  is  con- 
sciously tested  only  after  it  has  been  formed. 
Ordinarily  the  suggestion  is  adequate,  and  no 
consciousness  need  attach,  at  least  no  question 
of  truth  arises.  Action  goes  on  with  no  further 
consideration,  or  thought  progresses  to  the  next 
undertaking.  Where  there  is  conflict  the  test- 
ing may  become  self-conscious.  Then  we  have 
explicit  justification  by  reference  to  an  earlier 
accepted  general  principle.  If  it  fits  under  the 
head,  we  have  the  belief  spreading  from  the  al- 
ready accepted  to  the  new  suggestion.  This 
process  of  explicit  justification  is  the  work  of 
the  syllogism  in  formal  logic.  If  the  reference 
to  the  general  is  not  satisfactory,  we  may  have 
doubt  in  varying  degrees  that  finds  its  expres- 
sion in  the  modal  judgments.  In  any  case 
whether  the  justification  is  explicit  and  formal 
or  whether  it  be  implicit  and  informal,  the  ulti- 

288 


CONCLUSION" 

mate  test  of  truth  is  the  harmony  of  the  sugges- 
tion with  the  organized  and  unorganized  knowl- 
edge so  far  accumulated. 

Our  system  then  we  have  made  to  perform 
three  distinct  functions  in  the  reasoning  opera- 
tions. First  we  say  that  the  systematized  pur- 
poses provide  the  incentives  to  all  reasoning,  to 
all  advance  in  knowledge;  they  also  determine 
what  the  general  course  of  the  advancing  knowl- 
edge shall  be.  In  the  second  place  the  de- 
veloped system  of  knowledge  with  its  elements, 
the  meanings  and  concepts,  provides  the  ma- 
terials out  of  which  the  interpretations  origin- 
ate, and  from  which  improvements  of  the 
interpreted  situation  may  be  drawn.  In  the 
third  place  the  same  mass  of  knowledge  passes 
upon  and  selects  or  rejects  the  interpretations 
and  conclusions  that  are  derived  from  the  sys- 
tem of  knowledge  to  satisfy  the  system  of  needs. 
The  three  functions  are  more  distinct  than  the 
systems  that  perform  the  functions,  but  the 
functions  themselves  all  work  together  to  the 
single  end  of  the  advancement  of  knowledge. 

An  important  side  of  the  reasoning  process 
is  the  expression  of  the  results  in  language,  and 
their  acceptance  and  comprehension  by  another. 
This  is  at  once  the  basis  of  further  advance 

289 


THE  PSYCHOLOGY  OF  EEASONING 

in  the  knowledge  of  the  race  and  is  important 
to  the  individual  in  giving  him  a  wider  test 
of  his  results.  Upon  the  two  depend  the  more 
important  advances  in  the  knowledge  of  the  in- 
dividual and  of  the  race.  It  is  this  phase  of 
the  reasoning  process  that  most  concerns  the 
formal  logician.  Formal  logic  would  probably 
be  most  accurately  defined  as  the  science  of  the 
interpretation  and  proof  of  the  detached  propo- 
sitions. In  comparing  the  expression  of  a 
thought  with  the  thinking  itself  it  is  necessary 
to  consider  a  set  of  controls  that  is  not  present 
or  active  in  the  thought  process  of  the  isolated 
individual.  This  is  that  his  expression  always 
takes  into  account  the  knowledge  and  present 
purpose  of  the  listener.  To  adapt  one's  ex- 
pression to  that  becomes  one  of  the  guiding 
purposes  of  the  speaker  and  thinker.  As  the 
position  and  the  knowledge  that  is  assumed  to 
be  possessed  by  the  listener  changes  from  mo- 
ment to  moment,  a  change  in  linguistic  expres- 
sion may  mean  a  change  in  the  speaker's 
thought  or  it  may  mean  that  the  hearer  has 
changed  his  position,  or  that  the  hearer  has  .*| 
changed  and  that  the  new  listener  is  assumed  ;;( 
to  have  different  knowledge  and  different  pur-  i  J 
poses  or  interests  from  the  last.     To  under 

290 


CONCLUSION 

stand  any  spoken  statement,  it  is  necessary  not 
merely  to  consider  the  words  as  they  stand,  but 
the  mental  setting  of  both  speaker  and  hearer, 
the  mental  setting  of  the  hearer  at  least  as  it 
is  presupposed  by  the  speaker.    We  have  seen 
that  many  of  the  distinctions  of  the  formal 
logician  are  misleading,  both  because  he  con- 
siders the  proposition  without  reference  to  its 
context  in  either  mind,  and  because  he  neg- 
lects to  consider  the  social  factors  that  control 
speech  but  do  not  control  thought.    As  a  con- 
sequence his  discussion  of  the  proposition  is 
ordinarily  based  upon  what  it  might  mean  un- 
der any  conceivable  conditions,  while  in  actual 
use  it  means  at  once  less  and  more,  because  it 
can  be  understood  only  in  its  context,  only  as 
a  part  of  the  universe  of  discourse.    Logic,  then, 
may  be  said  to  be  different  from  the  psychology 
of  reasoning  because  it  is  primarily  concerned 
with  thought  as  expressed  in  language  rather 
than  with  thought  itself.     In  inference  it  is  con- 
cerned with  providing  proof  for  a  conclusion 
after  it  has  been  given  in  language ;  it  has  not 
been  concerned  with  the  origin  of  the  conclu- 
sion.    The    psychology    of    reasoning    is    or 
should    be    concerned    with    the    progress    of 
thought  as  a  whole  and  of  the  particular  bit 

291 


THE  PSYCHOLOGY  OF  EEASONING 

of  reasoning  in  its  setting.  It  is  also  con- 
cerned at  once  with  the  genesis  of  the  interpre- 
tation or  the  derivation  of  the  conclusion  and 
interpretation,  and  with  its  truth,  so  far  at  least 
as  the  test  of  truth  is  a  concrete  psychological 
state  with  assignable  conditions. 

Our  final  picture  of  the  reasoning  operation 
in  the  individual  is  of  the  development  of  a 
system  of  knowledge,  that  is  constantly  pro- 
gressing from  original  chaos  toward  perfect 
order.  Only  in  so  far  as  there  is  system  is 
there  consciousness,  but  the  system  with  its 
consciousness  is  developed  from  an  original  un- 
systematized experience.  Every  new  impres- 
sion is  interpreted  by  being  assigned  a  place 
in  the  system,  but  each  new  impression  also 
tends  as  well  to  modify  the  system.  The  re- 
sult is  that  out  of  the  system  everything  comes, 
into  the  system  everything  goes,  and  still  as 
the  net  result  of  the  operation  there  is  prog- 
ress. In  every  man  there  are,  of  course,  con- 
flicting partial  systems  as  James  has  shown  so 
brilliantly  in  his  Psychology.  But  the  prog- 
ress of  thought  tends  to  an  amalgamation  of 
systems  as  it  tends  to  a  development  of  the 
systems.  First  there  is  partial  crystallization 
of  knowledge  about  different  centers;  as  more 

292 


CONCLUSION 

experiences  accumulate  several  systems  may  be 
thrown  into  one,  they  may  be  organized  about 
a  single  center.  The  last  generation  has  seen 
such  an  amalgamation  between  the  systems  of 
physics  and  of  chemistry.  The  growth  of  the 
system  of  any  individual  shows  many  such 
amalgamations  on  a  smaller  scale.  Perfect 
knowledge,  if  one  were  to  indulge  in  Utopian 
speculation,  would  probably  involve  a  perfect 
unity  of  all  parts  of  knowledge,  but  that  we 
may  imagine  to  be  far  away.  At  that  time 
there  would  be  no  conflict,  no  doubt,  no  incen- 
tive to  progress ;  Nirvana  would  be  attained. 

Two  factors  in  the  process  of  development 
have  been  but  lightly  touched  upon.  These  are 
the  interaction  of  individual  upon  individual, 
and  the  test  of  the  accumulated  experience  in 
action  when  once  it  has  been  obtained.  Both 
have  been  taken  for  granted  as  one  of  the 
sources  of  knowledge  that  were  constantly 
providing  material  to  the  various  systems. 
The  social  life  is  perhaps  more  largely  effective 
in  providing  incentives,  in  offering  material  for 
the  system  of  purposes;  the  active  life  adds 
more  in  the  way  of  tests  of  adequacy,  but  each 
necessarily  modifies  the  system  of  knowledge 
as  a  mass  of  materials. 

293 


THE  PSYCHOLOGY  OF  EEASONING 

Granted  that  knowledge  is  this  consistent  sys- 
tem that  is  constantly  developing  by  taking  new 
materials  up  into  itself,  there  are  a  number  of 
more  general  problems  that  suggest  them- 
selves. For  example,  what  is  the  relation 
of  the  system  to  what  is  ordinarily  called 
the  human  mind  and  to  the  real  material 
world  without?  If  it  is  progressing,  where 
is  it  going!  Whither  is  it  tending?  Each 
of  these  questions  takes  us  well  beyond  the 
confines  of  either  logic  or  psychology,  but  it  may 
be  well  to  make  a  few  dogmatic  statements  con- 
cerning them  to  show  that  the  problems  are  rec- 
ognized and  to  state  some  of  the  connections  of 
our  results  with  the  more  generally  recognized 
problems  of  epistemology.  To  the  question  of 
the  connection  with  the  external  world  we  may 
say  that  our  system  is  the  external  world  as  it 
is  appreciated.  Whether  there  is  an  external 
world  that  is  not  appreciated  seems  to  me  to  be 
a  question  that  by  the  very  manner  of  its  asking 
can  not  be  answered.  At  the  most  it  is  but  the 
limit  toward  which  the  system  must  be  pictured 
as  progressing.  When  more  is  systematized  it 
will  be  part  of  the  system  of  knowledge,  before 
that  we  can  never  know  whether  it  exists  or 
does  not  exist.     The  outside  world  will  always 

29i 


CONCLUSION 

be  thought  of  as  the  source  from  which  knowl- 
edge comes  just  because  there  is  growth  in 
knowledge.  But  all  that  we  know  is  the  fact 
that  there  has  been  progress  in  the  individual 
and  in  the  race,  in  the  knowledge  of  the  indi- 
vidual and  in  science  as  a  whole.  AVhile  we  are 
bound  to  think  of  the  material  world  as  the  goal 
toward  which  all  knowledge  is  tending,  we  know 
it  only  in  so  far  as  the  goal  is  attained,  and 
the  material  is  appreciated  as  part  of  our  sys- 
tem. 

Very  much  the  same  remarks  must  be  made 
of  an  absolute  idealism  that  would  find  the  goal 
of  knowledge  in  some  world  of  universals,  or  of 
ideas  in  the  sense  of  the  neo-Hegelians  or  of 
Plato.  This,  too,  can  be  only  a  terminus  ad 
quern,  it  is  a  concept  that  explains  the  fact  of 
progress.  Its  justification  is  the  same  as  the 
justification  of  the  external  world.  It  has  no 
better  standing  and  no  worse.  It  saves  the  sys- 
tem as  we  know  it  from  being  suspended  in  air 
and  from  being  independent,  but  it  is  at  best 
only  one  way  of  organizing  the  fact  of  progress 
in  a  larger  system.  It,  too,  either  is  unknown 
or  when  known  ceases  by  that  very  fact  to  be  a 
permanent  ideal  outside  the  system.  Both  the 
external  world  thought  of  as  independent  of 
20  295 


THE  PSYCHOLOGY  OF  REASONING 

being  experienced  and  the  world  of  ideals  or 
universals  regarded  as  the  permanent  verities 
that  are  gradually  being  revealed  in  the  course 
of  experience,  individual  and  racial,  can  be  jus- 
tified only  in  so  far  as  they  serve  to  unify  expe- 
rience. As  they  unify  experience,  they  become 
part  of  the  system,  and  in  so  far  no  longer  per- 
manent entities  outside. 

If  we  ask  the  more  definite  question  of  the 
relation  of  the  system  to  the  concrete  human 
mind  as  it  is  usually  treated  psychologically,  we 
can  find  our  answer  in  the  statement  that  the 
mind  is  just  another  system  of  ideas  that  has 
been  gradually  developed  about  a  center  slightly 
different  from  that  about  which  the  system 
of  the  external  world  has  crystallized.  When 
an  attempt  was  made  to  understand  how  the 
individual  might  know,  the  answer  was  given  in 
terms  of  the  system  of  psychology.  This  sys- 
tem has  not  been  altogether  unified  with  the 
system  of  the  external  sciences  as  is  evidenced 
for  example  by  the  difficulty  in  explaining  the 
relation  of  mind  to  body.  Psychology  is  an 
attempt  to  explain  the  facts  of  experience  by 
bringing  them  into  an  independent  system.  In 
the  one  system  an  event  is  a  thing,  in  the  other  |1  a 
system  the  same  event  is  a  sensation,  a  percep- 

29G 


COXCLUSIOX 

tion  or  memory.  The  difference  is  in  the  way 
the  single  event  is  classified.  A  perfectly  uni- 
tary system  would  and  we  hope  will  unite  and 
harmonize  the  two  explanations,  but  for  the 
present  they  can  only  be  thus  referred  to  two 
systems  and  the  two  must  be  permitted  to  re- 
main side  by  side. 

Our  system  then  is  at  once  the  actual  experi- 
ence of  the  individual,  and  it  is  the  actual  reality 
of  the  external  world  so  far  as  it  has  been  re- 
vealed. It  partakes  of  the  nature  of  the  world 
of  the  realist  in  so  far  as  it  is  a  stubborn  fact 
that  can  not  be  changed  by  mere  willing,  or  by 
any  other  arbitrary  act  of  the  individual.  It 
partakes  of  the  nature  of  the  mind  of  the  idealist 
since  it  is  always  dependent  for  its  existence  on 
the  interpretation  and  appreciation  of  the  indi- 
vidual. Some  of  the  more  naive  minds  seem  to 
think  that  if  a  thing  is  made  a  mental  state,  that 
it  ceases  to  follow  law.  One  healing  cult  for 
example  disposes  of  disease  as  an  error  of  mor- 
tal mind  and  assumes  that  it  is  cured.  While 
granted  the  original  premise,  it  might  quite  well 
follow  that  other  mental  operation  like  the  tak- 
ing of  thought  pellets  and  the  removing  of  im- 
agined gangrene  from  an  imaginary  member 
may  result  in  an  imaginary  cure,  while  the 

297 


THE  PSYCHOLOGY  OF  EEASOXIXG 

error,  if  permitted  to  persist,  may  necessarily 
extend  in  thought  until  the  imaginary  member 
together  with  the  imagined  body  is  dissipated 
into  imaginary  space.  To  call  a  thing  an  idea 
does  not  make  it  open  to  change  at  will. 
Thought  laws  may  be  as  certain  and  inflexible 
as  the  laws  of  crass  matter.  On  the  other  hand 
it  is  occasionally  assumed  by  the  popular  mind 
that  when  a  thing  is  called  external  it  is  external 
just  as  it  is  thought.  Needless  to  say  the  re- 
sults of  the  sciences  make  this  view  quite  as 
untenable.  Colors,  for  example,  have  given 
place  to  vibrations,  and  these  to  electro-mag- 
netic phenomena  in  a  way  that  shows  that  the 
nature  of  the  external  object  in  the  nearest  ap- 
proach that  we  can  make  to  it  is  colored  by  the 
mind  that  thinks  it.  A  thing  is  an  external 
object  when  it  is  taken  up  into  the  system  of 
the  sciences ;  it  is  a  mass  of  sensations,  an  idea, 
when  taken  up  into  the  psychological  system. 
Wliat  it  is  out  of  a  system  we  can  not  say. 
Whether  we  call  the  thing  appreciated  real  or 
ideal  seems  to  me  a  matter  of  indifference.  The 
experience  is  the  same  whatever  we  call  it.  As 
long  as  the  ground  I  walk  upon  sustains  me  and 
the  food  I  eat  nourishes  me  it  makes  no  differ- 
ence whether  I  call  it  material  or  call  it  mental. 

298 


COXCLUSIOX 

The  name  does  the  experience  neither  good  nor 
ill. 

The  elements  of  the  system  of  knowledge  are 
real  as  the  things  of  the  sciences  and  the  things 
of  common  sense  are  real.  They  can  always  be 
relied  upon,  are  in  no  sense  arbitrary.  They 
are  ideal  as  the  ideas  of  Kant  and  Berkeley  are 
ideal,  because  dependent  for  their  nature  upon 
being  perceived,  upon  being  taken  up  into  the 
whole  of  knowledge.  It  is  neither  external  nor 
supra-mental  in  the  literal  sense  of  the  terms. 
Whether  either  the  supra-mental  or  material 
realm  exists  as  it  is  jDictured  seems  to  me  a 
matter  of  indifference,  for  if  they  did  exist  they 
could  not  be  known.  At  the  same  time  there 
must  ever  be  a  partially  organized  mass  of  ex- 
periences that  will  furnish  material  for  system- 
atization.  This  mass  of  unorganized  material 
will  always  be  partly  organized  before  it  is 
organized  completely.  To  explain  this  partly 
organized  mass  we  are  bound  to  have  ^ver 
with  us  the  hypothesis  of  an  external  world  or  of 
a  fixed  and  eternal  world  of  ideas.  Even  this 
partial  formulation  exists,  so  far  as  it  exists  at 
all,  only  as  part  of  the  one  unitary  system  of 
knowledge. 


INDEX 


B 


Absolute  time  as  type,  75. 
Abstract  reasoning,  5. 
Abstract  qualities,  60. 
Action,  Inference  as,  193f. 
relation  of,  to  reasoning, 

2,  5f. 
test  of  belief,  25ff,  55. 
Analogy,  226-231. 

and  syllogism,  227. 
Animal  reasoning,  1. 
Apperception,  12. 
Appreciation    of    situation 
the  beginning  of  rea- 
soning, 9. 
Appreciation  of  space  rela- 
tions,   judgment   not 
inference,  116-120. 
Aristotle,  216. 
Art,  belief  in,  48ff. 
Art  and  play,  50 f. 
Association,  basis  of  infer- 
ence, 191f. 
Attention    as    appreciation, 

12. 
Attitude,  12. 


Bain,  25,  28,  31,  55. 
Baldwin,  135. 
Belief,  23-59. 

a  social  product,  56. 
a  test  of  truth,  23. 
as  harmony  with  experi- 
ence as  a  whole,  40f, 
52f,  287f. 
as  mark  of  reasoning,  4. 
Conscious  quality  of,  57ff. 
dependent  upon  clear  and 

distmct  ideas,  24. 
established  by   proof,  13. 
Growth  of,  43ff. 
History  of,  23-30. 
in  dreams,  45ff. 
not  arbitral^,  53f. 
prmiai-y ;    doubt    second- 
ary, 25ff. 
unanalysable,  27. 
Bentley,  I.  M.,  78. 
Berkeley,  299. 
Binet,  184. 

Bosanquet,  18,  62f,  64,  71, 
77,    108,     110,     170, 
184,    276. 
301 


INDEX 


Bradley,  18f,  36,  62ff,  64, 
71,  77,  105,  108, 
117f,  112,  147,  158, 
170,  184,  276. 

Brentano,  27f,  31f,  57,  102, 
lllf,  135,  146,  152, 
184. 

Brown,  Thomas,  185. 


Conclusion,  product  of  as- 
sociation, 188f,  191ff. 

Consciousness,  exclusively 
of  types,  85-89, 108ff. 

Consistency,  basis  of  belief, 
29. 

Copula,  Theories  of,  139- 
149. 

"  Cortical  set,"  12. 


Cause,     as    recognition     of 
type    of    connection, 
273ff. 
dependent  on  coincidences, 
271f. 
Comparison,  a  single  opera- 
tion, 113-116. 
ascription  of,  typical  dif- 
ference, 113. 
character    of,    dependent 
on  purpose,  114. 
Concept,  60-98. 
as  type,  71  ff. 
and     general     law     com- 
pared, 218. 
Genesis  of,  65. 
Physiology  of,  69ff. 
Structure  of,  92ff. 
the     sum     of    attributes, 
94ff. 
Concept- feeding    dependent 
upon  association,  67. 
Conception,  15. 


D 

Darwin,  195f,  237f. 
Deduction      and      induction 

compared,  246f. 
Dewey,  158,  184. 
Disjunctive       propositions, 

261-265. 
Disbelief,    always   belief   in 

something,  35f. 
Doubt,  25. 

a  positive  process,  31  ff. 
due  to  fluctuation  of  in- 
terpretation, 34f,  42. 
in  matters  of  theory,  37. 
preliminai-y  to  all  proof, 
267f. 


E 


Einstellung,  75. 
Euler,  142f. 

Evaluation,  outcome  of  cog- 
nition, 123ff. 


303 


INDEX 


dependent    upon    experi- 
ence, 125-129. 

Mechanism  of,  133f. 
Experiment,     originates     in 
doubt   of   suggestion, 
197. 

presupposes  general  prin- 
ciples, 242-245. 


G 


General  conclusions  as  ty- 
pical, 200-205. 

General  idea,  71f. 

Genius  and  insanity,  198. 

Given,  The,  not  conscious 
until  appreciated,  IQ?. 


H 


Habit,  Relation  of,  to  rea- 
soning, 2,  5,  6. 

Hayden,  74. 

Hegelians,  214. 

Helmholtz,  184. 

Hume,  24,  220. 

Husserl,  18f. 

Hypothetical  propositions, 
257-261. 


Idealism,  295f. 
Image  and  idea,  62f. 


Imagery  of  types,  S3flr. 
Imagination       distinguislied 
from    reasoning,    2ff. 
Inconceivability  of  opposite, 

220. 
Induction,    always    presup- 
poses general  princi- 
ples, 240ff. 
and   deduction   compared, 

246f. 
as  a  process  of  inference, 

247-254. 
never  complete,  238. 
Inductive  proof,  236-244. 
Inference,  15,  172-199. 
as  action,  193f. 
distinguished   from   judg- 
ment, 184. 
distinguished  from  proof, 

187-190. 
related  to  synthetic  judg- 
ment, 178-183. 
Instinct,  opposed  to  reason- 
ing, 2,  5,  6. 


James,  28f,  54,  207. 
Judgment,  99-136. 

Analytic     and     synthetic, 

compared,  173-178. 
and  language,  137-171. 
as  appreciation   of  situa- 
tion, 15f. 


303 


INDEX 


Judgment,   as  analysis   and 

synthesis,  147ff. 
as  ascription  of  meaning, 

102f,  104r-110. 
as     ascription      of     two 

meanings,  161-166. 
as  assertion  of  existence, 

146. 
as  belief,  102ff. 
as  classification,  144f. 
as  comparison,  lOlf,  113. 
as  equation,  140ff. 
as  evaluation,  121-134. 
as  recognition,  146f. 
as     reference     to     types, 

106-112. 
as  subsumption,  142-146. 
considered  by  formal  logic 

out  of  its  setting,  138. 
Definition  of,  99f. 
demonstrative,  154^157. 
Formal  logic  theories  of, 

irreconcilable,   149. 
Forms      of,       compared, 

134ff. 
Impersonal,  152f. 
Interjectional,  151. 
of  formal  logic,  137-150. 
of  perception,  151-171. 
Simple    categorical,    157- 

171. 
Terms       of,       reversible, 

163ff. 


Kant,  184. 

Knowledge,     a     consistent 
system,  276. 
Development     of    system 

of,  278-282. 
System     of,     coextensive 
with      oonsciousness, 
284f. 
Kulpe,  184. 


Language,     Thought     and, 

289-292. 
Lehmann,  73,  132. 
Leibniz,  23. 
Leuba,  78. 
Logic   and   psychology,    14, 

19ff. 


M 


Malthus,  195. 
Marbe,   184. 
Marty,  152. 
Meaning,  as  movement,  91f.     f| 
Meaning   and    concept,    60-    f| 
98. 
Definition  of,  94.  . 

Memory  in  relation  to  rea-    I 

soning,   2ff. 
Michelson,  242. 


304 


INDEX 


Mill,  18f,  62f,  77,  105,  108, 

271. 
IVIind    and    body,    Relation 

of,  296f. 
Modality,  255-269. 
Morley,   242. 
Miiller,  75. 


N 


Natural  selection,  Hypothe- 
sis of,  as  illustration 
of  inference,  194ff. 

Necessity,  266. 

Neo-Hegelian,  71,  77,  84, 
87,  102,  111,  295. 

Newton,  266. 


Particulars  in  induction  al- 
ways types,  238f. 

Pascal,  23,  220. 

Perception  and  apprecia- 
tion, 13. 

Plato,  23,  216,  295. 

Platonists,  214. 

Play  and  art,  50f. 

Predicate   as  meaning,  160. 

Premises,  185ff,  210ff. 

Premise,  Major,  effect  of, 
to  arouse  belief,  211- 
215. 

Premises  never  complete, 
222f. 


Principle   of  sufficient   rea- 
son, 23. 

Probability   and  possibility, 
265f. 
Measurements  of,  269f. 

Problems  of  reasoning,  17. 

Proof,  Deductive,  as  means 
of     arousing     belief, 
205f. 
the  last  stage  of  reason- 
ing, lOf. 

Psychology    and    logic,    14, 
19ff. 

Psycho-physical  parallelism, 
38. 

Purpose,  controls  the  course 
of  reasoning,  9. 
gives  order  to  the   terms 
in   proposition,   166f. 
limits  meaning  of  the  con- 
cept, 69. 

Purposes,  system  of,  285ff. 


Realism,  294f. 

Reasoning,  an  operation  of 
the  concrete  con- 
sciousness, ISff. 

Recognition,  lacking  in  rea- 
soning, 4. 

Relations  as  types,  81ff. 


3U5 


INDEX 


Schumann,  74f. 
Sensation  as  type,  88f. 
Sigwart,  97,  146f,  164. 
Social  control  of  expression, 

153. 
Stages  of  reasoning,  9. 
Standards    of    value,    129- 

133. 
Storring,  119. 
Subject  as  the  given,  158- 

161. 
Sufficient   reason,    principle 

of,  219. 
Suggestion    as    solution    of 

problem,  10. 
Syllogism,    185fif,    200-226, 

206. 
and  analogy,  227-231. 
statement  of  proof,  is  not 

inference,  206ff. 


Thomdike,  190,  232. 
Trial  and  error,  a  method  of 
inference,  188  ff. 
Types  developed  by,  80f. 


Types,  Development  of,  73- 
80. 

involved  in  induction  and 
deduction  both,  251- 
254. 

Particulars  in  induction 
usually,  238f. 

representative  of  particu- 
lars, 89ff. 

the  only  content  of  con- 
sciousness, 216f. 

U 

Universals,  Wor-d  of,  63. 

V 

Values  dependent  upon  in- 
stincts, 129f. 

W 

Wallace,  195. 
Woodworth,  93,  115. 
Wundt,  57,  64,  147. 


Xilliez,  78. 


0) 


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